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Good news and bad news are still news: experimental evidence on belief updating

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Alexander Coutts Open the ORCID record for Alexander Coutts [Opens in a new window]
Alexander Coutts*
Affiliation:
Nova School of Business and Economics, Universidade NOVA de Lisboa, Campus de Campolide, 1099-032 Lisbon, Portugal
*
alexander.coutts@novasbe.pt
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Abstract

Bayesian updating remains the benchmark for dynamic modeling under uncertainty within economics. Recent theory and evidence suggest individuals may process information asymmetrically when it relates to personal characteristics or future life outcomes, with good news receiving more weight than bad news. I examine information processing across a broad set of contexts: (1) ego relevant, (2) financially relevant, and (3) non value relevant. In the first two cases, information about outcomes is valenced, containing either good or bad news. In the third case, information is value neutral. In contrast to a number of previous studies I do not find differences in belief updating across valenced and value neutral settings. Updating across all contexts is asymmetric and conservative: the former is influenced by sequences of signals received, a new variation of confirmation bias, while the latter is driven by non-updates. Despite this, posteriors are well approximated by those calculated using Bayes’ rule. Most importantly these patterns are present across all contexts, cautioning against the interpretation of asymmetric updating or other deviations from Bayes’ rule as being motivated by psychological biases.

Keywords

BeliefsBayes’ ruleAsymmetric belief updatingConservatismOverconfidence

JEL classification

D84: Expectations • Speculations C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior D83: Search • Learning • Information and Knowledge • Communication • Belief • Unawareness

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 22 , Issue 2 , 15 June 2019 , pp. 369 - 395
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9572-5) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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