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When less information is good enough: experiments with global stag hunt games

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

John Van Huyck ,
Ajalavat Viriyavipart Open the ORCID record for Ajalavat Viriyavipart [Opens in a new window]  and
Alexander L. Brown
John Van Huyck
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA
Ajalavat Viriyavipart*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, American University of Sharjah, Sharjah, UAE
Alexander L. Brown
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA
*
aviriyavipart@aus.edu
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Abstract

There is mixed evidence on whether subjects coordinate on the efficient equilibrium in experimental stag hunt games under complete information. A design that generates an anomalously high level of coordination, Rankin et al. (Games Econo Behav 32(2):315–337, 2000), varies payoffs each period in repeated play rather than holding them constant. These payoff “perturbations” are eerily similar to those used to motivate the theory of global games, except the theory operates under incomplete information. Interestingly, that equilibrium selection concept is known to coincide with risk dominance, rather than payoff dominance. Thus, in theory, a small change in experimental design should produce a different equilibrium outcome. We examine this prediction in two treatments. In one, we use public signals to match Rankin et al. (2000)’s design; in the other, we use private signals to match the canonical example of global games theory. We find little difference between treatments, in both cases, subject play approaches payoff dominance. Our literature review reveals this result may have more to do with the idiosyncrasies of our complete information framework than the superiority of payoff dominance as an equilibrium selection principle.

Keywords

Stag huntGlobal gamesEfficiencyEquilibrium selectionThreshold strategiesRisk dominancePayoff dominanceExperiments

JEL classification

C92: Laboratory, Group Behavior C73: Stochastic and Dynamic Games • Evolutionary Games • Repeated Games C72: Noncooperative Games D82: Asymmetric and Private Information • Mechanism Design

Information

Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 21 , Issue 3: Special Issue in Honor of John Van Huyck , September 2018 , pp. 527 - 548
Copyright
Copyright © 2018 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9577-0) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

John Van Huyck is deceased.

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