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Breathing Life into the Union’s Common Values: On the Judicial Application of Article 2 TEU in the EU Value Crisis

  • Luke Dimitrios Spieker

Abstract

The EU faces one of the deepest crises since its formation. A dangerous rule of law backsliding in several Member States undermines the Union’s common values and puts Europe to the test. This raises the question of how to substantially address violations of EU values in judicial proceedings before the Court of Justice. Unfortunately, relying on fundamental freedoms, EU secondary legislation and even the Charter will not help much to resolve this value crisis. This Article takes a different path and calls for engaging with Article 2 TEU itself. Yet this proposal rests on a crucial premise: The judicial applicability of the values enshrined in Article 2 TEU. Based on recent jurisprudential developments, this Article will elaborate a framework for the operationalization of Article 2 TEU values and demonstrate how their judicial applicability can be construed. The judgments of Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, Minister for Justice and Equality (“L.M.”) and Commission v. Poland will be at the heart of this proposal.

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This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-commercial re-use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is unaltered and is properly cited. The written permission of Cambridge University Press must be obtained for commercial re-use or in order to create a derivative work.

Footnotes

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PhD candidate and Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg. I am grateful to the Dienstagsrunde, especially Armin von Bogdandy, Iris Canor, Pedro Crúz Villalon, Michael Ioannidis, Christoph Krenn, and Eva Neumann as well as Lukas Huthmann, Nicole Lazzerini, Andreas Orator, Anca Mihaela Rusu, Marie-Sophie Schäfer, and Pál Sonnevend for their comments, reactions, and inspirations on this Article and earlier drafts. Section D. draws in parts on Armin von Bogdandy & Luke D. Spieker, Countering the Judicial Silencing of Critics: Article 2 TEU Values, Reverse Solange, and the Responsibilities of National Judges, 15 Eur. Const. L. Rev. (2019).

Footnotes

References

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1 On this term, see Laurent Pech & Kim L. Scheppele, Illiberalism Within: Rule of Law Backsliding in the EU, 19 Cambridge Y.B. Eur. Leg. Stud. 3 (2017).

3 On Poland, see Venice Commission, Opinion on the Draft Act Amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary, on the Draft Act Amending the Act on the Supreme Court, and on the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts, CDL-AD(2017)031-e (Dec. 8, 2017); European Commission, Reasoned Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union Regarding the Rule of Law in Poland, COM (2017) 835 final (Dec. 20, 2017). On Hungary, see Resolution on the Situation in Hungary, Eur. Parl. Doc. PV 216 (2017); Resolution on a Proposal Calling on the Council to Determine, Pursuant to Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union, the Existence of a Clear Risk of a Serious Breach by Hungary of the Values on which the Union is Founded, Eur. Parl. Doc. PV 340 (2018). On Romania, see Resolution on the Rule of Law in Romania, Eur. Parl. Doc. PV 446 (2018). For attempts of systematization, see Kim L. Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. Chi. L. Rev. 545 (2018); Günter Frankenberg, Authoritarian Constitutionalism, in Authoritarian Constitutionalism 1 (Helena A. García & Günter Frankenberg eds., 2019).

4 See Resolution on Media Pluralism and Media Freedom in the European Union, Eur. Parl. Doc. PV 204 (2018).

5 See ECJ, Case C-1/58, Stork v. High Authority, ECLI:EU:C:1959:4, Judgment of 4 Feb. 1959.

6 See ECJ, Case C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, ECLI:EU:C:1970:114, Judgment of 17 Dec. 1970.

7 See Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) [Federal Constitutional Court], 2 BvL 52/71, Solange I, Judgment of 29 May 1974, para. 62; 2 BvR 197/83, Solange II, Judgment of 22 Oct. 1986, para. 132. See also the parallel reactions of the Corte Costituzionale [Italian Constitutional Court], No. 183/73, Frontini, Judgment of 27 Dec. 1973; No. 170/1984, Granital, Judgment of 8 June 1984; No. 232/1989, Fragd, Judgment of 21 Apr. 1989.

8 See BVerfG, 2 BvL 1/97, Bananenmarkt, Judgment of 7 June 2000, para. 57.

9 On this prevalent narrative, see Joseph H.H. Weiler, Deciphering the Political and Legal DNA of European Integration, in Philosophical Foundations of European Union Law 137 (Julie Dickson & Pavlos Eleftheriadis eds., 2012). Critically, Giacomo Delledonne & Federico Fabbrini, The Founding Myth of European Human Rights Law, 44 EUR. L. REV. 178 (2019).

10 On the tension between democratic mandate and rule of law dismantling, see Joseph H.H. Weiler, Epilogue: Living in a Glass House, in Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union 313 (Carlos Closa & Dimitry Kochenov eds., 2016); Martin Mendelski, Das europäische Evaluierungsdezifit der Rechtsstaatlichkeit, 44 Leviathan 366, 390 (2016).

11 On the questionable use of constitutional amendments to circumvent constitutional review in Hungary, see Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments 199 (2017); Pál Sonnevend et al., The Constitution as an Instrument of Everyday Party Politics, in Constitutional Crisis in the European Constitutional Area 33 (Armin von Bogdandy & Pál Sonnevend eds., 2015).

12 Freedom House, Nation in Transit (2018), freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-2018.

13 On the EU’s legitimacy and mandate to act, see Armin von Bogdandy, Tyrannei der Werte? Herausforderungen und Grundlagen einer europäischen Dogmatik systemischer Defizite, 79 Zaörv 503, 508-516 (2019); Anastasia Iliopoulou-Penot, La justification de l’intervention de l’Union pour la garantie de l’Etat de droit au sein des pays membres, 24 Revue des Affaires Européennes 7 (2019); Christophe Hillion, Overseeing the Rule of Law in the EU: Legal Mandate and Means, in Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight, supra note 10, 59, 60-64; Carlos Closa, Reinforcing EU Monitoring of the Rule of Law, in Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight, supra note 10, 15. Critically with regard to the Union’s own justice and democratic deficit, see, among many others, Weiler, supra note 10.

14 See e.g. Gregor Schusterschitz, The EU and Rule of Law—The Unavoidable Question of: Who Controls it?, in Strengthening the Rule of Law in Europe 243 (Werner Schroeder ed., 2016). For comprehensive accounts, see the individual contributions to The Enforcement of Eu Law and Values (András Jakab & Dimitry Kochenov eds., 2017) and Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight, supra note 10. See also Laurent Pech et al., An EU Mechanism on Democracy, the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights, European Parliament, Eprs (2016); Michel Waelbroeck & Peter Oliver, La Crise de l’État de Droit dans l’Union Européenne: Que Faire?, 26 Cahiers de Droit Européen 299 (2017); Vassilios Skouris, Demokratie und Rechtsstaat (2018); Christoph Möllers & Linda Schneider, Demokratiesicherung in der Europäischen Union (2018).

15 See e.g. the Copenhagen Commission proposed by Jan-Werner Müller, Should the EU Protect Democracy and the Rule of Law inside Member States?, 21 Eur. L.J. 141 (2015). For an amendment of Art. 7 TEU or 51(1) CFR, see Viviane Reding, The EU and the Rule of Law – What Next? (Sept. 4, 2013), europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-13-677_en.htm.

16 See e.g. Viktor Orbán, Prime Minister, Hungary, Speech at the 28th Bálványos Summer Open University (July 22, 2017) www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches/viktor-orban-s-speech-at-the-28th-balvanyos-summer-open-university-and-student-camp (“we must make it perfectly clear that a campaign of inquisition against Poland will never succeed, because Hungary will resort to all the legal mechanisms offered by the European Union in order to show its solidarity with the Polish people”).

17 Koen Lenaerts, Some Thoughts About the Interaction Between Judges and Politicians in the European Community, 12 Y.B. Eur. L. 1, 2, 10 (1992). See also Pierre Pescatore, The Law of Integration 89 (1974); Robert Lecourt, L’Europe des Juges 306–07 (1976); Renaud Dehousse, The European Court of Justice: The Politics of Judicial Integration 70 (1998); critically, Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice 61 (1986).

18 ECJ, Case C-26/62, van Gend & Loos, ECLI:EU:C:1963:1, Judgment of 5 Feb. 1963; Case C-6/64, Costa/ENEL, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66, Judgment of 15 July 1964; G. Federico Mancini, The Making of a Constitution for Europe, 26 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 595, 612 (1989); Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L.J. 2403, 2425 (1991).

19 See e.g. Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, Case C-11/70 at para. 4; G. Federico Mancini, Safeguarding Human Rights: The Role of the European Court of Justice, in Democracy and Constitutionalism in the European Union 81 (G. Federico Mancini ed., 2000).

20 ECJ, Case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral, ECLI:EU:C:1979:42, Judgment of 20 Feb. 1979; Pierre Pescatore, La carence du législateur communautaire et le devoir du juge (1983), in Études de Droit Communautaire Européen 1962-2007 613 (Fabrice Picod ed., 2008); Kalypso Nicolaïdis, The Cassis Legacy, in Eu Law Stories 278 (Fernanda Nicola & Bill Davies eds., 2017).

21 See e.g. Kim L. Scheppele, Enforcing the Basic Principles of EU Law through Systemic Infringement Actions, Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight, supra note 10, 105. See also Matthias Schmidt & Piotr Bogdanowicz, The Infringement Procedure in the Rule of Law Crisis, 55 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1061, 1073–80 (2018).

22 See e.g. Michael Blauberger & R. Daniel Kelemen, Can Courts Rescue National Democracy?, 24 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 321, 325–26 (2017). See already Armin von Bogdandy et al., Reverse Solange–Protecting the Essence of Fundamental Rights, 49 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 489 (2012).

23 See Christoph Krenn & Anuscheh Farahat, Der Europäische Gerichtshof in der Eurokrise: eine konflikttheoretische Perspektive, 57 Der Staat 357 (2018). For a more limited influence of the Court, see Ulrich Everling, Justizielle Krisenbewältigung, in Verfassungszustand und Verfassungsentwicklung der Europäischen Union 86 (Armin Hatje ed., 2015).

24 See Möllers & Schneider, supra note 14, at 107, 147; Blauberger & Kelemen, supra note 22, at 331.

25 Bernd Schlipphak & Oliver Treib, Playing the Blame Game on Brussels, 24 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 352 (2017).

26 In 2012, the CJEU was “the only European institution that is trusted by a majority”. See European Commission, Standard Eurobarometer 78, 73 (Autumn 2012) (after 2012, the Eurobarometer no longer includes data specifically on trust in the CJEU). See also R. Daniel Kelemen, The Political Foundations of Judicial Independence in the European Union, 19 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 43, 45, 47 (2012). On the trust of national judges in the CJEU, see Juan A. Mayoral, In the CJEU Judges Trust, 55 J. Common Mkt. Stud. 551 (2016).

27 On the Polish retirement ages for judges, see the references in Zakład Ubezpieczeń Społecznych (C-522/18); Unipart (C-668/18); on the new Polish disciplinary chamber and the influence of the President of Republic and the Minister of Justice on its composition, see A.K. (Indépendance de la chambre disciplinaire de la Cour suprême) (C-585/18, C-624/18 & C-625/18), and the references in cases C-537/18 and C-824/18; on the disciplinary measures against ordinary judges, see Miasto Łowicz (C-558/18 & C-563/18) and Prokuratura Rejonowa w Słubicach (C-623/18). See also the references submitted in Prokurator Generalny (C-508/19) and W.Ż. (C-487/19). See further the preliminary reference by the Pest Central District Court, pending as IS (C-564/19).

28 See ECJ, Case C-619/18 R, Commission v. Poland (Indépendance de la Cour suprême), ECLI:EU:C:2019:531, Judgment of 24 June 2019; Case C-192/18, Commission v. Poland (Indépendance des juridictions de droit commun), ECLI:EU:C:2019:924, Judgment of 5 Nov. 2019. Another procedure has been initiated against the disciplinary regime for judges, see European Commission, Rule of Law: European Commission launches infringement procedure to protect judges in Poland from political control (Apr. 3., 2019), europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1957_en.htm. Further, proceedings against Hungary for its Foreign NGO and Higher Education laws are pending before the CJEU under Commission v. Hungary (Enseignement supérieur) (C-66/18) and Commission v. Hungary (Transparence associative) (C-66/18).

29 See the orders of October 19 and December 2017, 2018 in Commission v. Poland, Case C-619/18.

30 On November 21, 2018 the Polish Sejm passed an act reinstating the previous retirement age for judges, see Press Release, President Signs Bill Amending Law on Supreme Court (Dec. 17, 2018), www.president.pl/en/news/art,926,president-signs-bill-amending-law-on-supreme-court.html.

31 ECJ, Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, ECLI:EU:C:2018:117, Judgment of 27 Feb. 2018.

32 ECJ, Case C-216/18 PPU, Minister for Justice and Equality, ECLI:EU:C:2018:586, Judgment of 25 July 2018.

33 Commission v. Poland, Case C-619/18.

34 Blauberger & Kelemen, supra note 22, at 325–26.

35 See e.g. Sara Iglesias Sánchez, Purely Internal Situations and the Limits of EU Law: A Consolidated Case Law or a Notion to be Abandoned?, 14 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 7 (2018).

36 For such attempts, see the grounds on which the Commission brought its infringement proceedings against Hungary (supra note 28). For a further discussion of this path, see Mark Dawson & Elise Muir, Hungary and the Indirect Protection of EU Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law, 14 German L.J. 1959 (2013).

37 See ECJ, Case C-286/12, Commission v. Hungary, ECLI:EU:C:2012:687, Judgment of 6 Nov. 2012.

38 For a comprehensive account, see Gábor Halmai, The Case of the Retirement Age of Hungarian Judges, in Eu Law Stories, supra note 20, at 471 (2017).

39 Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other 253 (2005). See also Venice Commission, Report on the Rule of Law, CDL-AD (2011) 003rev (Apr. 4, 2011).

40 Sergio Carrera et al., The Triangular Relationship between Fundamental Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law in the EU, European Parliament, Libe (2013), at 30.

41 FRA, Fundamental Rights—Annual Report 2013 (2014), at 10.

42 See Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights, 2007 O.J. (C 303/02) 17, at 32.

43 See e.g. ECJ, Case C-309/96, Annibaldi, ECLI:EU:C:1997:631, Judgment of 18 Dec. 1997, para. 13; Joined Cases 60 & 61/84, Cinéthèque, ECLI:EU:C:1985:329, Judgment of 11 July 1985, para. 25.

44 ECJ, Case C-5/88, Wachauf, ECLI:EU:C:1989:321, Judgment of 13 July 1989, para. 19.

45 ECJ, Case C-260/89, ERT, ECLI:EU:C:1991:254, Judgment of 18 June 1991, para. 43.

46 ECJ, Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105, Judgment of 26 Feb. 2013, paras. 18–19. For attempts to systematize the meandering post-Fransson case law, see Nicole Lazzerini, La Carta dei Diritti Fondamentali dell’Unione Europea. I Limiti di Applicazione 183 et seq. (2018); Eleanor Spaventa, The Interpretation of Article 51 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, European Parliament, Peti (2016); Marek Safjan, Dominik Düsterhaus & Antoine Guérin, La Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne et les ordres juridiques nationaux, Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Européen, 219 (2016); Michael Dougan, Judicial Review of Member State Action under the General Principles and the Charter, 52 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1201 (2015); Filippo Fontanelli, The Implementation of European Union Law by Member States under Article 51(1) of the Charter, 20 Colum. J. Eur. L. 193 (2014); Sarmiento, Who’s Afraid of the Charter?, 50 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1267, 1303 (2013).

47 Koen Lenaerts & José A. Gutiérez-Fons, The Place of the Charter in the EU Constitutional Edifice, in The Eu Charter of Fundamental Rights: A Commentary 1559, 1567 (Steve Peers et al. eds., 2014).

48 ECJ, Case C-206/13, Siragusa, ECLI:EU:C:2014:126, Judgment of 6 March 2014, para. 32; Case C-399/11, Melloni, ECLI:EU:C:2013:107, Judgment of 16 Feb. 2013, para. 60; Case 44/79, Hauer, ECLI:EU:C:1979:290, Judgment 13 Dec. 1979, para. 14. For the locus classicus of this critique, see Jason Coppel & Aidan O’Neill, The European Court of Justice: Taking Rights Seriously?, 29 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 669, 670 (1992).

49 On the requirement for a specific provision of EU law actually applying in the case at hand, see e.g. Angela Schwerdtfeger, Art. 51—Anwendungsbereich, in Charta Der Grundrechte Der Europäischen Union paras. 46, 51 (Jürgen Meyer & Sven Hölscheidt eds., 5th ed. 2019); Safjan, Düsterhaus & Guérin, supra note 46, at 223; Marek Safjan, Fields of Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Constitutional Dialogues in the European Union, Eui Distinguished Lecture 2014/02, at 4; Sarmiento, supra note 46, at 1279; Clemens Ladenburger, European Union Institutional Report, in Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbon 141, 163 (Julia Laffranque ed., 2012); Allan Rosas, When is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Applicable at National Level?, 19 Jurisprudence 1269, 1284 (2012).

50 On such a proposal, see Opinion of Advocate General Sharpston, Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano (Sept. 30, 2010); rejecting this line of reasoning, see ECJ, Case C-370/12, Pringle, ECLI:EU:C:2012:756, Judgment of 27 Nov. 2012, paras. 180–181; Case C-198/13, Hernández, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2055, Judgment of 10 July 2014, para. 36.

51 See ECJ, Case C-299/95, Kremzow, ECLI:EU:C:1997:254, Judgment of 19 May 1997, para. 16; Case C-40/11, Iida, ECLI:EU:C:2012:691, Judgment of 8 Nov. 2012, para. 77.

52 ECJ, Case C-34/09, Ruiz Zambrano, ECLI:EU:C:2011:124, Judgment of 8 Mar. 2011, para. 42.

53 See Koen Lenaerts, ‘Civis europaeus sum’: From the Cross-border Link to the Status of Citizen of the Union, in Constitutionalising The Eu Judicial System 213 (Pascal Cardonnel et al. eds., 2012); Peter Van Elsuwege, European Union Citizenship and the Purely Internal Rule Revisited, 7 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 308, 323 (2011); Daniel Dittert, Les droits des citoyens de l’Union vers un statut détaché de tout élément transfrontalier?, 18 Revue des Affaires Européennes 223 (2011).

54 See von Bogdandy et al., supra note 22, at 508.

55 See Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs at para. 46, Case C-168/91, Konstantinidis (Dec. 9, 1992) and Opinion of Attorney General Maduro at paras. 16–21, Case C-380/05, Centro Europa 7 (Sept. 12, 2007). See also Siofra O’Leary, The Relation Between Community Citizenship and the Protection of Fundamental Rights in Community Law, 32 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 519 (1995); Peter Neussl, European Citizenship and Human Rights, 24 Leg. Iss. Econ. Integ. 47 (1997).

56 See Koen Lenaerts & José A. Gutiérrez-Fons, Epilogue on EU Citizenship: Hopes and Fears?, in Eu Citizenship and Federalism 751, 771 et seq. (Dimitry Kochenov ed., 2017). See also Koen Lenaerts, EU Citizenship and Democracy, 7 New J. Eur. Crim. L. 164, 171 (2016); Id., Linking EU Citizenship to Democracy, 11 Croatian Y.B. Eur. L. & Pol’y VII, XVI (2015); Dimitry Kochenov, On Policing Article 2 TEU Compliance, 33 Polish Y.B. Int’l L. 145, 165 (2013); Johanna Croon-Gestefeld, Reverse Solange: Union Citizenship as a Detour on the Route to European Rights Protection against National Infringements, in Eu Citizenship and Federalism, supra, 665.

57 See Martijn van den Brink, EU Citizenship and EU Fundamental Rights, 39 Leg. Iss. Econ. Integ. 273, 283 (2012).

58 von Bogdandy et al., supra note 22, at 515.

59 Id. at 514–518.

60 For a “repositioned” version of Reverse Solange, see Armin von Bogdandy & Luke D. Spieker, Countering the Judicial Silencing of Critics: Article 2 TEU Values, Reverse Solange, and the Responsibilities of National Judges, 15 Eur. Const. L. Rev. (2019); Id., Protecting Fundamental Rights Beyond the Charter. Repositioning the Reverse Solange Doctrine in Light of the CJEU’s Article 2 TEU Case Law, in The Eu Charter of Fundamental Rights in the Member States (Michal Bobek & Jeremias Prassl eds., forthcoming 2020).

61 On the “fundamental status” jurisprudence, see ECJ, Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk, ECLI:EU:C:2001:458, Judgment of 20 Sept. 2001, para. 31; Case C-135/08, Rottmann, ECLI:EU:C:2010:104, Judgment of 2 Mar. 2010, para. 43; extending derived protection to third country nationals, see ECJ, Case C-413/99, Baumbast, ECLI:EU:C:2002:493, Judgment 17 Sept. 2002; Case C-127/08, Metock, ECLI:EU:C:2008:449, Judgment of 25 July 2008; extending protection to economically inactive citizens, see ECJ, Case C-456/02, Trojani, ECLI:EU:C:2004:488, Judgment of 7 Sept. 2004; Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala, ECLI:EU:C:1998:217, Judgment of 12 May 1998.

62 Martijn van den Brink, The Origins and the Potential Federalising Effect of the Substance of Rights Test, in Eu Citizenship and Federalism, supra note 56, 85, 104; Sara Iglesias Sánchez, Fundamental Rights and Citizenship of the Union at a Crossroads, 20 Eur. L.J. 464, 473 (2014); Luca Manigrassi, Vers une citoyenneté européenne fédérale?, Revue du Droit de L’Union Européenne 411 (2011).

63 Eleanor Spaventa, Earned Citizenship, in Eu Citizenship and Federalism, supra note 56, 204, 205.

64 See ECJ, Case C-256/11, Dereci, ECLI:EU:C:2011:734, Judgment of 15 Nov. 2011, para. 64; Case C-434/09, McCarthy, ECLI:EU:C:2011:277, Judgment of 5 May 2011; Case C-87/12, Ymeraga, ECLI:EU:C:2013291, Judgment of 8 May 2013, para. 37; Iida, Case C-40/11 at para. 72.

65 See ECJ, Case C-333/13, Dano, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358, Judgment of 11 Nov. 2014; Case C-67/14, Alimanovic, ECLI:EU:C:2015:597, Judgment of 15 Sept. 2015; Case C-308/14, Commission v. United Kingdom, ECLI:EU:C:2016:436, Judgment of 14 June 2016. See also Daniel Thym, The Judicial Deconstruction of Union Citizenship, in Questioning Eu Citizenship 1 (Daniel Thym ed., 2017); Anastasia Iliopolou-Penot, Deconstructing the Former Edifice of Union Citizenship?, 53 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1007 (2016); Steve Peers, Benefits for EU Citizens: A U-Turn by the Court of Justice, 74 Cambridge L.J. 195, 196 (2015).

66 For possible explanations, see Michael Blauberger et al., ECJ Judges Read the Morning Papers. Explaining the Turnaround of European Citizenship Jurisprudence, 25 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 1422 (2018); Urška Šadl & Mikael R. Madsen, Did the Financial Crisis Change European Citizenship Law?, 22 Eur. L.J. 40 (2016).

67 See Samantha Besson & André Utzinger, Towards European Citizenship, 39 J. Soc. Phil. 185, 187–88, 191 (2008). See generally Linda Bosniak, Status Non-Citizens, in The Oxford Handbook of Citizenship 314, 320 et seq. (Ayelet Shachar et al. eds., 2017).

68 Besson & Utzinger, supra note 67, at 190; Linda Bosniak, Persons and Citizens in Constitutional Thought, 8 Icon 9 (2010).

69 See e.g. Bosniak, supra note 67, at 330; Ruth Rubio-Marín, Human Rights and the Citizen/Non-Citizen Distinction Revisited, in Human Rights and Immigration 1, 12 (Ruth Rubio-Marín ed., 2014); Martijn van den Brink, EU Citizenship and (Fundamental) Rights: Empirical, Normative, and Conceptual Problems, 25 Eur. L.J. 21, 28 (2019).

70 See van den Brink, supra note 69, at 30.

71 Joseph H.H. Weiler, Thou Shalt Not Oppress a Stranger: On the Judicial Protection of the Human Rights of Non-EC-Nationals, 3 Eur. J. Int’l L. 65, 68 (1992).

72 On the difficulties of addressing institutional rule of law or democracy concerns under the Charter, see supra Section B.

73 See Iris Canor, My Brother’s Keeper? Horizontal Solange, 50 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 383 (2013).

74 See Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA on the European Arrest Warrant, 2002 O.J. (L 190) 1.

75 See e.g. Regulation 604/2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection (Dublin III), 2013 O.J. (L 180) 31.

76 See e.g. Regulation 593/2008 on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I), 2008 O.J. (L 177) 6; Regulation 864/2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-contractual Obligations (Rome II), 2007 O.J. (L 199) 40; Regulation 1215/2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters (recast) (Brussels I bis), 2012 O.J. (L 351) 1; Council Regulation 2201/2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility (Brussels II bis), 2003 O.J. (L 338) 1.

77 From the recent debate, see Cecilia Rizcallah, The Challenges to Trust-Based Governance in the European Union, 25 Eur. L.J. 37 (2019); Armin von Bogdandy, Ways to Frame the European Rule of Law, Eur. Const. L. Rev. 675 (2018); Koen Lenaerts, La vie après l´avis: Exploring the Principle of Mutual (Yet Not Blind) Trust, 54 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 805 (2017); Frank Meyer, Der Grundsatz gegenseitigen Vertrauens, 52 Europarecht 163 (2017). For a theoretical underpinning, see Michael Schwarz, Let’s Talk About Trust, Baby! Theorizing Trust and Mutual Recognition in the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 24 Eur. L.J. 124 (2018); Thomas Wischmeyer, Generating Trust Through Law? Judicial Cooperation in the European Union and the “Principle of Mutual Trust”, 17 German L.J. 339 (2017); critically, Martin Nettesheim, Überdehnt der EuGH den Grundsatz gegenseitigen Vertrauens?, 20 Zeitschrift für Europarecht 4 (2018).

78 See e.g. Soering v. United Kingdom, App. No. 14038/88 (July 7, 1929).

79 ECJ, Opinion 2/13, EU Accession to the ECHR II, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454, Opinion of 18 Dec. 2014, para. 191.

80 See Minister for Justice and Equality, Case C-216/18 PPU at para. 37; EU Accession to the ECHR II, Opinion 2/13 at para. 192.

81 See ECJ, Case C-237/15 PPU, Lanigan, ECLI:EU:C:2015:474, Judgment of 16 July 2015, para. 36; Case C-396/11, Radu, ECLI:EU:C:2013:39, Judgment of 29 Jan. 2013, paras. 35–36.

82 ECJ, Case C-477/16 PPU, Kovalkovas, ECLI:EU:C:2016:861, Judgment of 10 Nov. 2016, para. 36. See also ECJ, Case C-452/16 PPU, Poltorak, ECLI:EU:C:2016:858; Judgment of 10 Nov. 2016, para. 35; Case C-453/16 PPU, Özçelik, ECLI:EU:C:2016:860, Judgment of 10 Nov. 2016, para. 31; Joined Cases 508/18 & 82/19 PPU, OG (Parquet de Lübeck), ECLI:EU:C:2019:456, Judgment of 27 May 2019, para. 74.

83 ECJ, Case C-551/15, Pula Parking, ECLI:EU:C:2017:193, Judgment of 9 March 2017, para. 54.

84 See e.g. BVerfG, 2 BvR 2236/04, European Arrest Warrant, Judgment of 18 July 2005, para. 78 (“mutual confidence … does not release the legislature from reacting, in cases in which such confidence … has been profoundly shaken”).

85 EU Accession to the ECHR II, Opinion 2/13 at paras. 191, 194; see also Lenaerts, supra note 77, at 806; Georgios Anagnostaras, Mutual Confidence is Not Blind Trust!, 53 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1675 (2016); Auke Willems, The Court of Justice of the European Union’s Mutual Trust Journey in EU Criminal Law: From a Presumption to (Room for) Rebuttal, 20 German L.J. 468 (2019).

86 ECJ, Joined Cases 404 & 659/15 PPU, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, ECLI:EU:C:2016:198, Judgment of 4 Apr. 2016, para. 88.

87 Id. at para. 89.

88 Id. at para. 92.

89 Under the CEAS, the ECJ applied a similar albeit less nuanced test; see ECJ, Joined Cases C-411 & C-493/10, N.S., ECLI:EU:C:2011:865, Judgment of 21 Dec. 2011, para. 94. In recent jurisprudence, however, the Court increasingly neglected the criterion of “systemic deficiencies”, see ECJ, Case C-578/16 PPU, C.K., ECLI:EU:C:2017:127, Judgment of 16 Feb. 2017; C-163/17, Jawo, ECLI:EU:C:2019:218, Judgment of 19 March 2019, paras. 87–88; Case C-297/17, Ibrahim, ECLI:EU:C:2019:219, Judgment of 19 Mar. 2019, paras. 87–88.

90 Regulations dealing with matters of private international law often contain a public policy exception as a justification for the forum to refuse the application of foreign law or recognition of foreign judgments; see Art. 21 Regulation 593/2008 (Rome I); Art. 26 Regulation 864/2007 (Rome II); Art. 45(1)(a) Regulation 1215/2012 (Brussels I bis); Art. 23 Council Regulation 2201/2003 (Brussels II bis). The ECJ decided that such exceptions apply only in the case of “a manifest breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as being fundamental within that legal order”, see ECJ, Case C-619/10, Trade Agency, ECLI:EU:C:2012:531, Judgment of 6 Sept. 2012, para. 51. See further ECJ, Case C-559/14, Meroni, ECLI:EU:C:2016:349, Judgment of 26 May 2016, para. 42; Case C-681/13, Diageo Brands, ECLI:EU:C:2015:471, Judgment of 4 Sept. 2015; para. 68; Case C-491/10 PPU, Aguirre Zarraga, ECLI:EU:C:2010:828, Judgment of 22 Dec. 2010, paras. 69–70; Case C-420/07, Apostolides, ECLI:EU:C:2009:271, Judgment of 28 Apr. 2009, para. 59; Case C-394/07, Gambazzi, ECLI:EU:C:2009:219, Judgment of 2 April 2009, para. 27; Case C-7/98, Krombach, ECLI:EU:C:2000:164, Judgment of 28 Mar. 2000, para. 37.

91 See Canor, supra note 73.

92 Id. at 395–96.

93 See Elise Muir, Fundamental Rights: An Unsettling EU Competence, 15 Hum. Rights Rev. 25, 35-36 (2014). In the internal market context, see Miguel Poiares Maduro, So Close and Yet so Far: The Paradoxes of Mutual Recognition, 14 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 814, 819 (2007).

94 See e.g. Fritz W. Scharpf, European Governance: Common Concerns vs. the Challenge of Diversity, MPIfG, Working Paper No. 01/6 (2001), at 13; Susanne K. Schmidt, Mutual Recognition as a New Mode of Governance, 14 J. Eur. Pub. Pol’y 667, 672 (2007). Yet, a certain degree of “regulatory competition” is always inherent in mutual recognition regimes, see Rizcallah, supra note 77, at 46; Maduro, supra note 93, at 816; Vassilis Hatzopoulos, From Hard to Soft: Governance in the EU Internal Market, 15 Camb. Y.B. Eur. Leg. Stud. 101, 110–13 (2013).

95 Minister for Justice & Equal. v. Celmer [2018] IEHC 119.

96 Id. at para. 128.

97 See Aranyosi and Căldăraru, Cases 404 & 659/15 PPU at para. 85.

98 Minister for Justice & Equal. v. Celmer [2018] IEHC 119, para. 145.

99 The ECtHR requires postponing surrenders and transfer in case of individual fundamental rights violations under Art. 3 ECHR regardless of systemic deficiencies, see e.g. ECtHR [GC], Tarakhel v. Switzerland, App. 29217/12 (Nov. 4, 2014), para. 101; see further Anna Lübbe, ‘Systemic Flaws’ and Dublin Transfers: Incompatible Tests before the CJEU and the ECtHR?, 27 Int’l J. Refugee L. 135 (2015).

100 Michał Krajewski, Who is Afraid of the European Council? The Court of Justice’s Cautious Approach to Independence of Domestic Judges, 14 Eur. Const. Rev. 792, 805–07 (2018). See also Petra Bárd & Wouter van Ballegooij, Judicial Independence as a Precondition for Mutual Trust?, 9 New J. Eur. Crim. L. 353 (2018); Wendel, Mutual Trust, Essence and Federalism, 15 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 17 (2019).

101 Minister for Justice and Equality, Case C-216/18 PPU at para. 68.

102 But see Wendel, supra note 100, at 29; Theodore Konstadinides, Judicial Independence and the Rule of Law in the Context of Non-execution of a European Arrest Warrant: LM, 56 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 743, 751 (2019).

103 See infra Section D.II. for a more detailed examination of this provision.

104 Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev at paras. 115–16, Case C-192/18, Commission v. Poland (June 20, 2019) (emphasis added); see further Advocate General Tanchev at paras. 92, 125, Case C-558/18, Miasto Łowicz (Sept. 24, 2019).

105 Minister for Justice and Equality, Case C-216/18 PPU at paras. 35, 41, 53; Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, Case C-64/16 at paras. 35, 41; Commission v. Poland, Case C-619/18 R at paras. 49, 54. See also Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev at para. 85, Joined Cases 585, 624 & 625/18, A.K. (June 27, 2019) (“there is a ‘constitutional passarelle’ between the two provisions, and the case-law concerning them inevitably intersects”).

106 See ECJ, Case C-682/15, Berlioz Investment Fund, ECLI:EU:C:2017:373, Judgment of 16 May 2017, para. 44 (“[T]he second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU … corresponds to that right [Art. 47 CFR]”). See further ECJ, Case C-73/16, Puškár, ECLI:EU:C:2017:725, Judgment of 27 Sept. 2017, paras. 57–58; Case C-348/16, Sacko, ECLI:EU:C:2017:591, Judgment of 26 July 2017, paras. 29–30; Case C-685/15, Online Games, ECLI:EU:C:2017:452, Judgment of 14 June 2017, para. 54; Case C-243/15, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie VLK, ECLI:EU:C:2016:838, Judgment of 8 Nov. 2016, para. 50.

107 Krajewski, supra note 100, at 797–99; Wendel, supra note 100, at 44–45; Bárd & van Ballegooij, supra note 100; on a more positive note, see Konstadinides, supra note 102, at 761–62, 764.

108 Minister for Justice and Equality, Case C-216/18 PPU at paras. 70–72.

109 On the weaknesses of the Court’s argument, see Krajewski, supra note 100, at 806 (“An act of secondary law, let alone its recital, cannot modify the power and obligation assigned to the Court … by primary law”).

110 The Court already assessed the existence of “systemic deficiencies” in several cases, see N.S., Joined Cases 411 & 493/10 at paras. 86, 89, 94, 106, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, Joined Cases 404 & 659/15 PPU and ECJ, Case C-220/18 PPU, Generalstaatsanwaltschaft (Conditions de détention en Hongrie), ECLI:EU:C:2018:589, Judgment of 25 July 2018. Generally, the Court can decide on the degree of specificity, see Koen Lenaerts, Ignace Maselis & Kathleen Gutman, EU Procedural Law 231 (2014); Takis Tridimas, Constitutional Review of Member State Action: The Virtues and Vices of an Incomplete Jurisdiction, 9 Icon 737, 749 (2011).

111 This explains the little practical relevance of the Art. 259 TFEU procedure. For a different conception, see Dimitry Kochenov, Biting Intergovernmentalism: The Case for the Reinvention of Article 259 TFEU to Make It a Viable Rule of Law Enforcement Tool, 7 Hague J. Rule L. 153 (2015); Ernst Hirsch Ballin, Mutual Trust. The Virtue of Reciprocity—Strengthening the Acceptance of the Rule of Law through Peer Review, in Reinforcing Rule of Law Oversight, supra note 10, 133.

112 For a division of labor according to the two prongs of the Aranyosi-test, see Wendel, supra note 100, at 41.

113 Id. at 43.

114 Poland refused to fulfil its Dublin-quotas. The European Commission already initiated infringement proceedings, see European Commission, Relocation: Commission Refers the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to the Court of Justice (Dec. 7, 2017), europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-5002_en.htm. The case is currently pending before the ECJ, see Commission v. Poland (C-715/17). See also the case brought by Hungary and Slovakia against the relocation of asylum seekers, ECJ, Joined Cases C-643 & 647/15, Slovak Republic and Hungary v. Council, ECLI:EU:C:2017:631, Judgment of 6 Sept. 2017. See further Wendel, supra note 100, at 36.

115 On this, see Lenaerts, supra note 77, at 824 et seq.; Eva Storskrubb, Mutual Trust and the Dark Horse of Civil Justice, 20 Camb. Y.B. Eur. Leg. Stud. 179, 189 et seq. (2018); Matthias Weller, Mutual Trust: In Search of the Future of European Union Private International Law, 11 J. Priv. Int’l L. 64, 90 et seq., 97–100 (2015).

116 In rare agreement, see European Commission, A New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law, COM(2014) 158 final, at 5; and Council of the European Union, Opinion of the Legal Service: Commission’s Communication on a New EU Framework to Strengthen the Rule of Law: Compatibility with the Treaties, 10296/14, para. 17. See also European Commission, Communication on Art. 7 of the Treaty on European Union, COM(2003) 606 final, at 5; European Convention, Draft of Articles 1 to 16 of the Constitutional Treaty, CONV 528/03, at 11; Marcus Klamert & Dimitry Kochenov, Article 2 TEU, in The Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights—A Commentary 22, 25 (Manuel Kellerbauer, Marcus Klamert & Jonathan Tomkin eds., 2019); Meinhard Hilf & Frank Schorkopf, Art. 2 EUV, in Das Recht der Europäischen Union para. 18 (Eberhard Grabitz, Meinhard Hilf & Martin Nettesheim eds., 2018); Christian Calliess, Art. 2 EUV, in Euv/Aeuv para. 10 (Christian Calliess & Matthias Ruffert eds., 5th ed., 2016); Frank Schorkopf, Homogenität in der Europäischen Union 69 et seq. (2000).

117 See e.g. Egils Levits, Die Europäische Union als Wertegemeinschaft, in Europa 4.0 239 (Thomas Jaeger ed., 2018); Andreas Voßkuhle, The Idea of the European Community of Values (2017); Joseph H.H. Weiler, Taking (Europe’s) Values Seriously, in Law Beyond the State 93 (Rainer Hofmann & Stefan Kadelbach eds., 2016); Armin von Bogdandy, Founding Principles, in Principles of European Constitutional Law 11, 21 (Jürgen Bast & Armin von Bogdandy eds., 2nd ed., 2010); Andrew T. Williams, Taking Values Seriously: Towards a Philosophy of EU Law, 29 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 549 (2009); Christian Calliess, The Transnationalization of Values by European Law, 10 German L.J. 1367 (2009). On European values more generally, see Andrew T. Williams, The Ethos of Europe: Values, Law and Justice in the EU (2010); Chritsof Mandry, Europa als Wertegemeinschaft (2009); Simon Labayle, Les Valeurs de L’Union Européenne (forthcoming 2020).

118 For brief overviews of the Court’s jurisprudence, see e.g. Koen Lenaerts, Die Werte der Europäischen Union in der Rechtsprechung des Gerichtshofs der Europäischen Union, 44 Europaische Grundrechte-Zeitschrift 639 (2017); Salvatore Nicolosi, The Contribution of the Court of Justice to the Codification of the Founding Values of the European Union, 51 Rev. Der. Com. Eur. 613 (2015).

119 Scott Shapiro, Legality 29 (2011).

120 See already draft Art. I-2 of the Constitution of Europe and European Council, Laeken Declaration of 15 Dec. 2001 on the Future of the European Union, 2001 Bull. EU 12/19. Before the Constitution, the term “principles” was used, see Art. 6(1) Nice, Art. F(1) Amsterdam. For the reference to “values” in the context of the Austria crisis, see Martti Ahtisaari, Jochen Frowein & Marcelino Oreja, Report on the Austrian Government’s Commitment to the Common European Values (The Wise Men Report), 40 Int’l Leg. Materials 102, at 120 (2001) (paras. 115, 117) and of EU enlargement, see Declaration on European Identity, 1973 Bull. EC 12/118 (Dec. 14, 1973); Conclusions of the Presidency, European Council, at 7.A.iii) (June 21–22, 1993).

121 See Uwe Pörsken, Plastic Words: The Tyranny of a Modular Language 22, 26 (2004) placing “values” in one line with notions like “identity” or “substance”.

122 On how to distinguish these categories, see e.g. Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms 255 et seq. (1996); Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights 86 et seq. (2009); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 38 et seq. (2013); critically, András Jakab, European Constitutional Language 368 (2016).

123 See Joris Larik, From Speciality to a Constitutional Sense of Purpose: On the Changing Role of the Objectives of the European Union, 63 Int’l & Comp. L.Q. 935 (2014).

124 European Convention, Reactions to draft Articles 1 to 16 of the Constitutional Treaty, CONV 574/1/03, REV 1, at 17. See e.g. the suggestions for amendment by Ernâni Lopes and Manuel Lobo Antunes: “Human dignity, liberty … are principles and not mere values. Only principles may be legally binding and its violation invoked before a Court”; suggestion for amendment by Meglena Kuneva: “Il serait préférable de garder la notion de ‘principes’, bien connue du droit communautaire et qui est employée par l’article 6 du TUE.” See also Plenary Session: Debate on Draft Articles 1 to 16 (Feb. 27–28, 2003), www.europarl.europa.eu/Europe2004/textes/verbatim_030227.htm, see e.g. 4-018 Einem (Parl.-AT): “Herr Präsident! … wir treten dafür ein, lieber von Grundsätzen – principles – statt von Werten – valeurs – zu sprechen” and 4-083 – Kutskova (Gouv.-BG): “Concerning Article 2, we consider it preferable to keep the notion of principles typical of the acquis”.

125 Hilf & Schorkopf, supra note 116, at para. 21 (“noch nicht ausgereifte Durchformung des Unionsrechts”). With regard to “principles,” see von Bogdandy, supra note 117, at 21 (“missing overarching conception of the authors of the Treaty”).

126 Such uncertainties are provoked first and foremost by the Commission itself, see European Commission, supra note 3, at para. 1 (“The Commission, beyond [!] its task to ensure the respect of EU law, is also responsible … for guaranteeing the common values of the Union”) (emphasis added). For such doubts, see also Möllers & Schneider, supra note 14, 125; Levits, supra note 117, at 263; Kochenov, supra note 56, at 149.

127 von Bogdandy, supra note 13, at 522. On the tension between the Art. 7 TEU procedure and the rule of law, see Matthias Niedobitek, Right and Duty to Pursue the “Wrongdoer” and a Possible Abuse of Art. 7 TEU, in Liability of Member States, supra note 118, at 233, 241.

128 von Bogdandy, supra note 117, at 22. See also Roberto Baratta, La “communauté de valeurs” dans l’ordre juridique de l’Union européenne, Revue des Affaires Européennes 81, 89 (2018); Rudolf Streinz, Principles and Values in the European Union, in Liability of Member States for the Violation of Fundamental Values 11 (Armin Hatje & Lubos Tichý eds., 2018); Nicolosi, supra note 118, at 637; Stelio Mangiameli, The Union’s Homogeneity and Its Common Values, in The European Union After Lisbon 21 (Hermann-Josef Blanke & Stelio Mangiameli eds., 2012).

129 This becomes especially apparent in the preamble to the TEU. On one hand, the Treaty drafters draw “inspiration from the … universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law”. On the other hand, they confirm “their attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights … and of the rule of law” (emphasis added).

130 Takis Tridimas, The General Principles of Eu Law 15 (2nd ed., 2006).

131 On the need for a “non-controversial” and thus deliberately open set of values, see European Convention, supra note 116, at 11.

132 See van Gend & Loos, Case C-26/62; more recently, ECJ, Case C-176/12, Association de médiation sociale, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2, Judgment of 15 Jan. 2014, para. 36. On the state of the art, see Paul Craig & Grainne de Búrca, Eu Law 192 (6th ed., 2015).

133 Dimitry Kochenov & Laurent Pech, Monitoring and Enforcement of the Rule of Law in the EU, 11 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 512, 520 (2015).

134 Christian Wohlfahrt, Die Vermutung Unmittelbarer Wirkung des Unionsrechts 14, 162 (2016); Pierre Pescatore, The Doctrine of Direct Effect: An Infant Disease of Community Law, 8 Eur. L. Rev. 155 (1983) (“‘direct effect’ boil[s] down to a question of justiciability. A rule can have direct effect whenever its characteristics are such that it is capable of judicial adjudication”).

135 See e.g. ECJ, Case C-684/16, Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, ECLI:EU:C:2018:874, Judgment of 6 Nov. 2018, para. 74; Case C-569/16, Bauer, ECLI:EU:C:2018:871, Judgment of 6 Nov. 2018, para. 85 (“Article 31(2) of the Charter, is … both mandatory and unconditional in nature”) (emphasis added).

136 ECJ, Case C-414/16, Egenberger, ECLI:EU:C:2018:257, Judgment of 17 Apr. 2018, paras. 76–77; Case C-193/17, Cresco Investigation, ECLI:EU:C:2019:43, Judgment of 22 Jan. 2019, para. 77.

137 Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Case C-684/16 at paras. 74, 78; Bauer, Case C-569/16 at paras. 85, 89.

138 For an approach relying directly on Art. 2 TEU yet specified i.a. via the Copenhagen Criteria, see Hillion, supra note 13, at 66 et seq. This is further what a “systemic infringement action” proposed by Scheppele or Skouris boils down to, see Scheppele, supra note 21; Skouris, supra note 14, at 50. A recent preliminary reference by a Bulgarian court gives an opportunity for clarifying these issues. The question is whether a Member State court can “directly invoke and directly apply Article 2 TEU”, see Corporate Commercial Bank, en liquidation (C-647/18).

139 For first sketches, see Carlos Closa & Dimitry Kochenov, Reinforcing the Rule of Law Oversight in the European Union, in Strengthening the Rule of Law, supra note 14, 173, 182–184; Pech et al., supra note 14, at 198; Enzo Cannizzaro, I ruolo della Corte di giustizia nella tutela dei valori dell’Unione europea, in Liber Amicorum Antonio Tizzano 159 (2018).

140 The ECJ has assessed recommendations (ECJ, Case C-322/88, Grimaldi, ECLI:EU:C:1989:646, Judgment of 13 Dec. 1989, paras. 7–8; Case C-16/16 P, Belgium v. Commission; ECLI:EU:C:2018:79, Judgment of 20 Feb. 2018, para. 44), communications (ECJ, Case C-57/95, France v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:1997:164, Judgment of 20 Mar. 1997, para. 23), guidelines (ECJ, C-233/02, France v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2004:173, Judgment of 23 Mar. 2004, para. 40), memoranda (ECJ, Case C-258/14, Florescu, ECLI:EU:C:2017:448, Judgment of 13 June 2017, para. 30) and even mere announcements (ECJ, Case C-62/14, Gauweiler, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, Judgment of 16 June 2015, para. 27).

141 For an argument in favor of the Court’s jurisdiction, see Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev at para. 50, Case C-619/18 R, Commission v. Poland (Apr. 11, 2019); Schmidt & Bogdanowicz, supra note 21, at 1069–73; Hilf & Schorkopf, supra note 116, at para. 46; Hillion, supra note 13, at 71–73; Müller, supra note 15, at 146; Scheppele, supra note 21, at 114; Skouris, supra note 14, at 50; Waelbroeck & Oliver, supra note 14, at 335; Claudio Franzius, Der Kampf um Demokratie in Polen und Ungarn, 71 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 381, 386 (2018). But see Levits, supra note 117, at 262; Nicolosi, supra note 118, at 643; Bernd Martenczuk, Art. 7 EUV und der Rechtsstaatsrahmen als Instrument der Wahrung der Grundwerte der Union, in Verfassungskrisen in der Europäischen Union 41, 45-46 (Stefan Kadelbach ed., 2018).

142 Against the Court’s jurisdiction beyond the scope of EU law, Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 56, at 774.

143 According to Art. 46(d) TEU (Nice), the ECJ was only competent for what was then Art. 6(2) TEU (Nice) but not for the “principles” laid down in Art. 6(1) TEU (Nice). The Court nonetheless relied on them, see ECJ, Case C-402/05 P, Kadi, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461, Judgment of 3 Sept. 2008, para. 303.

144 On Art. 269 TFEU as “unconstitutional constitutional law,” see Thomas Giegerich, Die Unabhängigkeit der Gerichte als Strukturvorgabe der Unionsverfassung, 22 Zeus 61, 80 (2019).

145 Frank Schorkopf, Wertesicherung in der Europäischen Union, 51 Europarecht 147 (2016).

146 See discussion supra Section C.II. 3.1

147 See e.g. Florescu, Case C-258/14.

148 Opinion of Advocate General Øe at paras. 43–53, Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (May 18, 2017).

149 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, Case 64/16 at para. 36.

150 Id. at para. 29 (emphasis added).

151 Åkerberg Fransson, Case C 617/10 at para. 19. For a more recent example, see ECJ, Case C-117/14, Nisttahuz Poclava, ECLI:EU:C:2015:60, Judgment of 5 Feb. 2015, para. 29.

152 For this interpretation, see Koen Lenaerts, Upholding the Rule of Law through Judicial Dialogue, 38 Y.B. Eur. L. (2019); Id., On Judicial Independence and the Quest for National, Supranational and Transnational Justice, in The Art of Judicial Reasoning. Festschrift in Honour of Carl Baudenbacher 155, 163 (Gunnar Selvik et al. eds., 2019); Thomas von Danwitz, Values and the rule of law: Foundation of the European Union—an Inside Perspective from the ECJ, Revue du Droit de L’Union Européenne 263, 269 (Issue 4) (2018); Levits, supra note 117, at 268. See also Laurent Pech & Sébastien Platon, Judicial Independence under Threat: The Court of Justice to the Rescue in the ASJP Case, 55 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1827, 1837 (2018); Giegerich, supra note 144, at 76; Alberto Miglio, Indipendenza del giudice, crisi dello stato di diritto e tutela giurisdizionale effettiva, 12 Diritti Umani e Diritto Internazionale 421, 426 (2018). On the implications of different scopes under Art. 19(1)(2) TEU and the Charter, see Luke D. Spieker, Commission v. Poland—A Stepping Stone Towards a Strong “Union of Values”?, Verfassungsblog (May 30, 2019); Matteo Bonelli & Monica Claes, Judicial Serendipity: How Portuguese Judges Came to the Rescue of the Polish Judiciary, 14 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 622, 630–32 (2018).

153 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, Case 64/16 at para. 43 (emphasis added); see now even more clearly Commission v. Poland, Case C-619/18 R at para. 51.

154 See also Commission v. Poland, Case C-619/18 R, para. 51; Advocate General Tanchev at paras. 87-88, 94, 125, Case C-558/18, Miasto Łowicz (Sept. 24, 2019).

155 Similarly, von Danwitz, supra note 152, at 269; Pech & Platon, supra note 152, at 1838; Bonelli & Claes, supra note 152, at 623.

156 Pech & Platon, supra note 152, at 1847; Stanislas Adam & Peter Van Elsuwege, L’exigence d’independance du juge, paradigme de l’Union européenne comme union de droit, Journal de Droit Européen 334, 341 (2018).

157 Retracing these two rationales, see Advocate General Tanchev at para. 92, Case C-558/18, Miasto Łowicz (Sept. 24, 2019). See also von Bogdandy & Spieker, supra note 60.

158 Van Gend en Loos, Case C-26/62. See also ECJ, Case C-284/16, Achmea, ECLI:EU:C:2018:158, Judgment of 6 Mar. 2018, para. 36; Opinion 2/13, EU Accession to the ECHR II, Opinion 2/13, para. 176; Opinion 1/09, Unified Patent Litigation System, ECLI:EU:C:2011:123, Opinion of 11 Mar. 2011, paras. 84–85.

159 See ECJ, Case C-106/77, Simmenthal, ECLI:EU:C:1978:49, Judgment of 9 Mar. 1978; Case C-294/83, Les Verts, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166, Judgment of 23 Apr. 1986; Unified Patent Litigation System, Opinion 1/09, para. 80; Nial Fennelly, The National Judge as Judge of the European Union, in The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe 61 (Allan Rosas, Egils Levits & Yves Bot eds., 2013).

160 Lenaerts, On Judicial Independence, supra note 152, at 162.

161 For cases in which the ECJ actually assessed the independence of the referring entity, see e.g. ECJ, Case C-203/14, Consorci Sanitari del Maresme, ECLI:EU:C:2015:664, Judgment of 6 Oct. 2015, para. 19; Case C-222/13, TDC, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2265, Judgment of Oct. 2014, paras. 28–36; Joined Cases C-58 & 59/13, Torresi, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2088, Judgment of 17 July 2014, paras. 18–25; Case C-506/04, Wilson, ECLI:EU:C:2006:587, Judgment of 19 Sept. 2006, paras. 49 et seq.; Case C-407/98, Abrahamsson and Anderson, ECLI:EU:C:2000:367, Judgment of 6 July 2000, paras. 29–37; Case C-103/97, Köllensperger and Atzwanger, ECLI:EU:C:1999:52, Judgment of 4 Feb. 1999, paras. 19–24; see generally Morten Broberg & Niels Fenger, Preliminary References to the European Court of Justice 62 et seq. (2nd ed., 2014).

162 For a sharp critique of these demanding criteria, see the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs at paras. 36–49, Case 50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores (Mar. 21, 2002); Theodore Konstadinides, The Rule of Law in the European Union: The Internal Dimension 111 (2017).

163 See e.g. Takis Tridimas, Bifurcated Justice: The Dual Character of Judicial Protection in EU Law, in The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe, supra note 159, 367.

164 See Koen Lenaerts, The Rule of Law and Coherence of the Judicial System of the European Union, 44 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1625, 1629–30 (2007).

165 See e.g. ECJ, Case C-432/05, Unibet, ECLI:EU:C:2007:163, Judgment of 13 Mar. 2007, paras. 40–43; Case C-213/89, Factortame I, ECLI:EU:C:1990:257, Judgment of 19 June 1990, paras. 19 et seq. See also Anthony Arnull, Remedies Before National Courts, in Oxford Principles of European Union Law 1011 (Robert Schütze & Takis Tridimas eds., 2018); Thomas Jaeger, Gerichtsorganisation und EU-Recht: Eine Standortbestimmung, 53 Europarecht 611 (2018); José Luís da Cruz Vilaça, Le principe de l’effet utile du droit de l’Union dans la jurisprudence de la Cour, in The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe, supra note 159, 279, 300 et seq.

166 For an interpretation placing ASJP in one line with established jurisprudence on the principle of loyal cooperation and effectiveness as enshrined in Art. 4(3) TEU, see Stephan Schill & Christoph Krenn, Art. 4 EUV, in Das Recht der Europäischen Union, supra note 116, paras. 102 et seq.; Jaeger, supra note 165, at 615 et seq.

167 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, Case C-64/16 at para. 32 (emphasis added). Similarly, see Commission v. Poland, C-619/18 R at para. 47 and para. 43: “EU law that implements those values”; Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev at para. 71, Case C-192/18, Commission v. Poland (June 20, 2019) (“[T]he second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, a specific manifestation on the foundational values reflected in Article 2 TEU”); Opinion of Advocate General Tanchev at para. 77, Joined Cases C-585, 624 & 625/18, Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (June 27, 2019); Advocate General Tanchev at para. 92, Case C-558/18, Miasto Łowicz (Sept. 24, 2019) (“Article 19 TEU is a concrete manifestation of the rule of law, one of the fundamental values on which the European Union is founded under Article 2 TEU”).

168 See also Armin von Bogdandy et al., Guest Editorial: A Potential Constitutional Moment for the European Rule of Law—The Importance of Red Lines, 55 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 983 (2018).

169 On Art. 19(1)(2) TEU as a self-standing provision, see Pech & Platon, supra note 152, at 1838, 1848.

170 For an attempt to construe a triggering relationship between Art. 2 TEU and the Charter (Art. 51(1) CFR), see András Jakab, Application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by National Courts in Purely Domestic Cases, in The Enforcement of Eu Law and Values, supra note 14, 252, 255.

171 This would also be the case if Article 2 TEU was operationalized by other provisions, like Charter rights or a specific directive.

172 See supra note 116.

173 See also Luke D. Spieker, From Moral Values to Legal Obligations—On How to Activate the Union’s Common Values in the EU Rule of Law Crisis, Mpil Research Paper No. 2018-24, at 25; von Bogdandy & Spieker, supra note 60.

174 Voßkuhle, supra note 117, at 114; Hilf & Schorkopf, supra note 116, at para. 36; Thomas Schmitz, Die Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union als Konkretisierung der gemeinsamen europäischen Werte, in Die Europäische Union als Wertegemeinschaft 73, 84 (Dieter Blumenwitz et al. eds., 2005).

175 See supra Section C.II.2.

176 See supra Section C.II.1.

177 Minister for Justice and Equality, Case C-216/18 PPU at para. 48. On this continuum between Art. 47 CFR and Art. 2 TEU, see also Wendel, supra note 100, at 27–29.

178 ECJ, Joined Cases C-203 & 698/15, Tele2 Sverige, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970, Judgment of 21 Dec. 2016, para. 93 (“That fundamental right, guaranteed in Article 11 of the Charter, constitutes one of the essential foundations of a pluralist, democratic society, and is one of the values on which, under Article 2 TEU, the Union is founded”). See also ECJ, Case C-163/10, Patriciello, ECLI:EU:C:2011:543, Judgment of 6 Sept. 2011, para. 31. See further the connection between Art. 47 CFR and Art. 2 TEU in ECJ, Case C -72/15, Rosneft, ECLI:EU:C:2017:236, Judgment of 28 Mar. 2017, paras. 72–73.

179 See supra note 28.

180 See, for example, the characterization as “Wandelverfassung” by Hans-Peter Ipsen, Die Verfassungsrolle des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für die Integration, in Der Europäische Gerichtshof als Verfassungsgericht und Rechtsschutzinstanz 29, 32, 51 (Jürgen Schwarze ed., 1983).

181 Sebastian A. E. Martens, Methodenlehre des Unionsrechts 475 (2013); Giulio Itzcovich, The Interpretation of Community Law by the European Court of Justice, 10 German L.J. 537, 549 (2009); Joxerramon Bengoetxea, The Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice 251 (1993).

182 The CJEU does not distinguish between “interpretation” (“Auslegung”) and “development of the law” (“Rechtsfortbildung”), see Martens, supra note 181, at 503; Matthias Jestaedt, Luxemburger Richterrecht, in Gouvernement des Juges—Fluch Oder Segen 21, 33 (Christian Hillgruber ed., 2014).

183 See BVerfG, 2 BvR 687/85, Kloppenburg, Judgment of 8 April 1987, paras. 58–60. See also Lecourt, supra note 17, at 236; Dehousse, supra note 17, at 70; Ulrich Everling, On Judge-Made Law of the European Community’s Courts, in Judicial Review in European Union Law 29 (David O’Keeffe ed., 2000); Koen Lenaerts & Kathleen Gutman, “Federal Common Law” in the European Union, 54 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 7 (2006).

184 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2661/06, Honeywell, Order of 6 July 2010. See also Lenaerts & Gutman, supra note 183, at 45 et seq.; Christian Calliess, Grundlagen, Grenzen und Perspektiven europäischen Richterrechts, 58 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 929, 930 (2005); Wulf-Henning Roth, Verfassung und europäische Methodenlehre, 75 Rabel J. Comp. & Int’l Priv. L. 787, 834 (2011).

185 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2661/06, Honeywell, Order of 6 July 2010, paras. 62, 64 (emphasis added).

186 BVerfG, 2 BvE 13/13, OMT, Judgment of 21 June 2016, para. 161 (emphasis added).

187 Id. at para. 65.

188 Philipp Dann, Thoughts on a Methodology of European Constitutional Law, 6 German L.J. 1453 (2005); on EU private law, see Holger Fleischer, Europäische Methodenlehre: Stand und Perspektiven, 75 Rabel J. Comp. & Int’l Priv. L. 700 (2011).

189 Van Gend den Loos, Case C-26/62. For a typology, see Gunnar Beck, The Legal Reasoning of the Court of Justice 147 et seq. (2013); Koen Lenaerts & José A. Gutiérrez-Fons, To Say What the Law of the EU Is: Methods of Interpretation and the European Court of Justice, 20 Colum. J. Eur. L. 3 (2014); Itzcovich, supra note 181.

190 See e.g. ECJ, Case 283/81, Cilfit, ECLI:EU:C:1982:335, Judgment of 6 Oct. 1982, para. 20. See also Pescatore, supra note 17, at 88 (“decisive criterion of every legal interpretation”).

191 Miguel Poiares Maduro, Interpreting European Law, 1 Eur. J. Leg. Stud. 1, 5 (2007). On the difficulties to separate teleological and systemic interpretation, see Lenaerts & Gutiérrez-Fons, supra note 189, at 17.

192 BVerfG, 2 BvR 2661/06, Honeywell, Order of 6 July 2010, para. 64: “There is particular reason for further development of the law by judges where programmes are fleshed out, gaps are closed ….”

193 On the necessity to fill this “value-gap”, see the introduction of this contribution.

194 See e.g. ECJ, Case C-339/89, Alsthom Atlantique, ECLI:EU:C:1991:28, Judgment of 21 Jan. 1991, paras. 8–9. See also ERT, Case C-260/89, paras. 39–40.

195 See e.g. ECJ, Case C-484/08, Caja de Ahorros, ECLI:EU:C:2010:309, Judgment of 3 June 2010, para. 46 (emphasis added); Case C-293/03, My, ECLIEU:C:2004:821, Judgment of 16 Dec. 2004, para. 29.

196 On this method, see András Jakab, Judicial Reasoning in Constitutional Courts: A European Perspective, 14 German L. J. 1215, 1221 (2013); on the high burdens for justifying its use, see Jakab, supra note 122, at 19.

197 On this discussion, see Allan Rosas & Lorna Armati, EU Constitutional Law Chapter 5 (3rd ed., 2018); Andreas von Arnauld, Normenhierarchien innerhalb des primären Gemeinschaftsrechts, 38 Europarecht 191 (2003); Martin Nettesheim, Normenhierarchien im EU-Recht, 41 Europarecht 737 (2006). Hinting towards the existence of hierarchies, see Kadi, Case C-402/05 P at para. 303; Opinion 1/91, EEA, ECLI:EU:C:1991:490, Opinion of 14 Dec. 1991, para. 6.

198 See e.g. ECJ, Case C-85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche, ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, Judgment of 13 Feb. 1979, para. 125; Case C-53/81, Levin, ECLI:EU:C:1982:105, Judgment of 23 Mar. 1982, para. 15; Case C-6/72, Continental Can, ECLI:EU:C:1973:22, Judgment of 21 Feb. 1973, para. 24.

199 Larik, supra note 123, at 951. See also Jospeh H.H. Weiler, Integration Through Fear, 23 Eur. J. Int’l L. 1 (2012) describing a shift “from something that Europe does to something that Europe is”.

200 On such a “value-oriented” interpretation, see von Bogdandy & Spieker, supra note 60; Michael Potacs, Wertkonforme Auslegung des Unionsrechts, 51 Europarecht 164 (2016); Calliess, supra note 117. With regard to the Charter, see Thomas Ritter, Neue Werteordnung für die Gesetzesauslegung durch den Lissabon-Vertrag, 63 Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1110 (2010).

201 See recently ECJ, Case C-122/17, Smith, ECLI:EU:C:2018:631, Judgment of 7 Aug. 2018, paras. 42−44.

202 This has been confirmed by the ECJ in Bauer, Case C-569/16 at paras. 79−90; Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Case C-684/16 at paras. 75−79; Egenberger, Case C-414/16 at para. 76; Cresco Investigation, Case C-193/17 at para. 76; Association de médiation sociale, C-176/12 at para. 47. With regard to general principles, see ECJ, Case C-441/14, Danks Industri, ECLI:EU:C:2016:278, Judgment of 19 Apr. 2016, para. 27; Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci, ECLI:EU:C:2010:21, Judgment of 19 Jan. 2010, para. 51; Case C-144/04, Mangold, ECLI:EU:C:2005:709, Judgment of 22 Nov. 2005, para. 77.

203 On Article 51(1) CFR requiring an obligation of EU law actually applying in the case at hand, see supra note 49.

204 Mangold, Case C-144/04 at para. 75; Kücükdeveci, Case C-555/07 at para. 23; critically BVerfG, 2 BvR 2661/06, Honeywell, Judgment of 6 July 2010; Danish Supreme Court, 15/2014, Ajos, Judgment of 6 Dec. 2016.

205 Kücükdeveci, Case C-555/07 at para. 25. See also Bauer, Case C-569/16 at para. 53; Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Case C-684/16 at para. 50.

206 Kücükdeveci, Case C-555/07 at para. 21; Cresco Investigation, Case C-193/17 at para. 75; Max-Planck-Gesellschaft, Case C-684/16 at para. 72; Bauer, Case C-569/16 at para. 83; Egenberger, Case C-414/16 at paras. 47, 75; Dansk Industri, Case C-441/14 at para. 35. See also ECJ, Case C-447/09, Prigge, ECLI:EU:C:2011:573, Judgment of 13 Sept. 2011, para. 48; Case C-297-298/10, Hennigs and Mai, ECLI:EU:C:2011:560, Judgment of 8 Sept. 2011, para. 68.

207 See ECJ, Case C-132/11, Tyrolean Airways, ECLI:EU:C:2012:329, Judgment of 7 June 2012, para. 23 (“ … to be examined solely in the light of Directive 2000/78”) (emphasis added).

208 See e.g. the arguments of Poland in Commission v. Poland, Case C-619/18 R at paras. 39−40.

209 Dimitry Kochenov, The EU and the Rule of Law – Naïveté or a Grand Design?, in Constitutionalism and the Rule of Law 419, 443 (Maurice Adams, Anne Meuwese & Ernst Hirsch Ballin eds., 2017).

210 For similar conceptions, see Voßkuhle, supra note 117, at 116-117; Werner Schroeder, The European Union and the Rule of Law—State of Affairs and Ways of Strengthening, in Strengthening the Rule of Law, supra note 14, 3, 11 (“minimum standards”); Gabriel Toggenburg & Jonas Grimheden, Managing the Rule of Law in a Heterogeneous Context, in Strengthening the Rule of Law, supra note 14, 221 (“minimum constitutional cohesion”). See also European Convention, supra note 116, at 11:

This Article can thus only contain a hard core of values meeting two criteria at once: on one hand, they must be so fundamental that they lie at the very heart of a peaceful society practicing tolerance, justice and solidarity; on the other hand, they must have a clear non-controversial legal basis so that the Member States can discern the obligations resulting therefrom.

211 von Bogdandy et al., supra note 22, at 509 et seq. On the notion of “essence,” see further Maja Brkan, The Concept of Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU Legal Order: Peeling the Onion to Its Core, 14 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 332 (2018); Koen Lenaerts, Limits on Limitations: The Essence of Fundamental Rights in the EU, 20 German L.J. 779 (2019). See generally Special Issue 20 German L.J. 763 (2019).

212 See also Felix Hanschmann, Der Begriff der Homogenität in der Verfassungslehre und Europarechtswissenschaft 248 (2008); von Bogdandy, supra note 117, at 40.

213 von Bogdandy et al., supra note 168.

214 See also Council of the European Union, Opinion of the Legal Service, supra note 116, at para. 17.

215 See von Bogdandy & Spieker, supra note 60; Armin von Bogdandy & Michael Ioannidis, Systemic Deficiency in the Rule of Law, 51 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 59 (2014).

216 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, Case 64/16 at para. 30; Minister for Justice and Equality, Case 216/18 PPU at para. 35.

217 Meyer, supra note 77, at 179; Christine Janssens, The Principle of Mutual Recognition in Eu Law 151 (2014); more nuanced Maria Fartunova, La Coopération loyale vue sous le prisme de la reconnaissance mutuelle: quelques réflexions sur les fondements de la construction européenne, 52 Cahiers de Droit Européen 193 (2016); on the intrinsic link between the principles of mutual trust and loyalty, see Sacha Prechal, Mutual Trust Before the Court of Justice of the European Union, 2 European Papers 75, 90−92 (2017); Damien Gerard, Mutual Trust as Constitutionalism?, in Mapping Mutual Trust 69, 76 (Evelien Brouwer & Damien Gerard eds., 2016). But see Lenaerts, supra note 77, at 807, who derives mutual trust from the principle of equality between the Member States.

218 See e.g. ECJ, Case C-5/94, Hedley Lomas, ECLI:EU:C:1996:205, Judgment of 23 May 1996, para. 19. See also Opinion of Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer at para. 45, Case C-297/07, Bourquain (Apr. 8, 2008) (“experience shows that mutual trust applies … fulfilling a role similar to that of loyal cooperation”).

219 See the wording of Article 4(3) TEU. See further ECJ, Case C-339/00, Ireland v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2003:545 Judgment of 16 Oct. 2003, para. 72; Case C-197/13, Spain v. Commission, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2157, Judgment of 4 Sept. 2014, para. 87.

220 For an analysis, see Alexander Somek, The Argument from Transnational Effects I, 16 Eur L.J. 315 (2010).

221 See e.g. Closa, supra note 13, at 18.

222 Vera Jourova, Speech at the High-level Seminar Finland 100 years—Finnish and European perspectives to the Rule of Law (Oct. 31, 2017), ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2014-2019/jourova/announcements/speech-commissioner-jourova-high-level-seminar-finland-100-years-finnish-and-european-perspectives_en.

223 Koen Lenaerts, On Judicial Independence and the Quest for National, Supranational and Transnational Justice, Speech at the National Congress of the Polish Bar (May 20, 2018), www.krs.pl/admin/files/poland_may_2017.pdf.

224 For this perception, see Koen Lenaerts, Upholding the Rule of Law within the EU, Keynote Address at the RECONNECT Conference on Democracy and the Rule of Law in the EU (July 5, 2019), reconnect-europe.eu/events/conference-2019/.

225 Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, The Rise of the State as a Process of Secularization, in Religion, Law, and Democracy. Selected Writings (Mirjam Künkler & Tine Stein eds., forthcoming 2020).

226 Jourova, supra note 222.

* PhD candidate and Research Fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law in Heidelberg. I am grateful to the Dienstagsrunde, especially Armin von Bogdandy, Iris Canor, Pedro Crúz Villalon, Michael Ioannidis, Christoph Krenn, and Eva Neumann as well as Lukas Huthmann, Nicole Lazzerini, Andreas Orator, Anca Mihaela Rusu, Marie-Sophie Schäfer, and Pál Sonnevend for their comments, reactions, and inspirations on this Article and earlier drafts. Section D. draws in parts on Armin von Bogdandy & Luke D. Spieker, Countering the Judicial Silencing of Critics: Article 2 TEU Values, Reverse Solange, and the Responsibilities of National Judges, 15 Eur. Const. L. Rev. (2019).

Keywords

Breathing Life into the Union’s Common Values: On the Judicial Application of Article 2 TEU in the EU Value Crisis

  • Luke Dimitrios Spieker

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