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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 March 2019
On July 18, 2001, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (German Federal Constitutional Court) will issue its ruling in the application for a temporary injunction, brought by the Länder (Federal States) of Bavaria and Saxony, to block the August 1 effective date of the new federal Lebenspartnerschaftgesetz (LPartG — Registered Lifetime Partnership Act for Homosexual Relationships). This act has been the subject of considerable controversy including the claims at the heart of the Federal States' challenge to the constitutionality of the statute. This article will: (a) briefly survey the social evolution that has necessitated the regulations in this statute; (b) describe some of the statute's provisions; and (c) end by summarizing some of the sometimes harsh and often very emotional arguments involved in the debate over the LPartG and raised as part of the challenge to the statute's constitutionality in the proceedings before the Federal Constitutional Court.
(1) Article 32 of the Bundesverfassungsgerichtgesetz (BVerfGG – Federal Constitutional Court Act) oultines the procedure for obtaining a temporary injunction from the Federal Constitutional Court: “In a dispute the Federal constitutional Court may deal with a matter provisionally by means of a temporary injunction if this is urgently needed to avert serious detriment, ward off iminenet force of for any other important reason of the common good.”Google Scholar
(2) See the website of the Federal Ministry of Justice on this particular topic (text in English): http://www.bmj.bund.de/misc/e sasepa.htmGoogle Scholar
(3) The substantive challenge to the statute is an abstract judicial review proceeding brought by the two Federal States that doubt the “substantive compatibility of federal law … with the Basic Law [constitution].” Article 93(1)(2) of the Grundgesetz (Basic Law). In principle, the Court's ruling on the requested temporary injunction should have no effect on and should not influence the Court's consideration of the underlying substantive application, which will proceed through the normal channels and at the normal pace of the Court's docket after the Court's ruling on the requested temporary injunction.Google Scholar
(4) BVerfGE 6, 389.Google Scholar
(5) Dudgeon, v. The United Kingdom, No. 07525/76, http://hudoc.echr.coe.int (European Court of Human Rights, February 24, 1983).Google Scholar
(6) Kaiser, , JURISTENZEITUNG 2001, p. 617.Google Scholar
(7) Section 1353 para. 1 sent. 1 BGB.Google Scholar
(8) Kaiser, JURISTENZEITUNG 2001, p. 620.Google Scholar
(9) Scholz/Uhle, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2001, p. 394, 395.Google Scholar
(10) Dreier, GG, Band 1 1996, Art 6 Rn. 26.Google Scholar
(11) Scholz/Uhle, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2001, 394, 395.Google Scholar
(12) This phrase has been used by the press, e.g. DIE WELT 03/29/2001.Google Scholar
(13) Beck, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2001, p. 1894, 1898.Google Scholar
(14) Beck, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2001, p. 1894, 1899.Google Scholar
(15) Beck, NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT 2001, p. 1894, 1900.Google Scholar
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