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Home State Regulation of Environmental Human Rights Harms As Transnational Private Regulatory Governance*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 March 2019

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Home state mechanisms designed to address harms arising from overseas resource extraction have recently been considered in Canada. This paper will examine whether such mechanisms could be viewed as an example of transnational private regulatory governance, and the implications of doing so for our understanding of both public international law and transnational private regulatory governance. After first briefly unpacking the idea of transnational private regulatory governance, the paper will compare common understandings of the scope of home state jurisdiction to regulate transnational corporations under international human rights and international environmental law. Recent developments in Canadian law and policy culminating in the creation of a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Counsellor for the international operations of the Canadian extractive industry will then be described. This Canadian experience will serve an example of home state-based transnational private regulatory governance.

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Articles
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Copyright © 2011 by German Law Journal GbR 

References

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89 Ibid, s. 6(3). The five stages are: (a) initial assessment; (b) informal mediation; (c) fact-finding; (d) access to formal mediation; and (e) reporting (ibid, s 6(4)). The CSR Counsellor may exercise discretion and decide not to deal with a request for review, but must consider listed factors when conducting a review. Ibid ss. 6(5), (6)(6).Google Scholar

90 Order in Council, ibid, s 6(8). Before issuing the public statement, the Counsellor is to inform the parties of the result and share the statement with the Ministers of International Trade and Natural Resources, as well as the Minister of International Cooperation if relevant: see s. 6(9). The Minister of International Trade may direct the Counsellor to study additional matters: see s. 6(10).Google Scholar

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121 But see critique of government coming to the table as a stakeholder equal to industry, rather than acknowledging its responsibility to regulate in the public interest. Seck in YHRDLJ, supra note 44, at 184.Google Scholar

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