¹ See Schmitt, Carl, Constitutional Theory (Jeffrey Seitzer ed., 2008). Ideas like “exceptional moments” or the need to preserve a special kind of “political stability” will be part of several Brazilian court rulings mentioned in this Article. For an analysis of Brazilian and Latin American judiciaries from an “exceptionalism” explanation based on Georgio Agamben, see Serrano, Pedro, Autoritarismo e Golpes na America Latina: Breve Ensaio sobre Jurisdição e Exceção (2016).Google Scholar

² For a pluralistic description of President Dilma Rousseff's ousting as coup, see A Resistência ao Golpe de 2016 (Carol Proner et al. eds., 2016). For the opposite perspective, see Melo, Marcos, Crisis and integrity in Brazil, 27 J. Democr. 2, 50–65 (2016).Google Scholar

³ For an approach that recognizes the existence of other forms of constitutionalism other than the liberal one, see Tushnet, Mark, Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 100 Cornell L. Rev., 390–462 (2014–15). This article will presuppose a strong relationship between constitutionalism and stability in order to remedy one of the recurring problems that Latin American constitutionalism must address, that is, political instability. Such an assumption goes directly against what some scholars have been arguing in what has been called the “new Latin American constitutionalism”. See Roberto Pastor & Rubén Dalmau, El Nuevo Constitucionalismo Latinoamericano: Fundamentos para Una Contrucción Doctrinal, 9 Revista General de Derecho Público Comparado, 1–24 (2011). For this debate in American constitutionalism, see Griffin, Stephen, American Constitutionalism (1996); Responding to Imperfection (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).Google Scholar

⁴ See generally Luhmann, Niklas, Law As a Social System (2004).Google Scholar

⁵ See Dworkin, Ronald, Taking Rights Seriously 82 (1977).Google Scholar

⁶ Jessé Souza, A Radiografia Do Golpe (2016). For another analysis on the judiciary's role in the parliamentary coup in Brazil in 2016, see Martins, Miguel, Entrevista: Boaventura De Souza Santos, Carta Capital (Nov. 2, 2016), http://www.cartacapital.com.br/politica/o-que-mais-custa-aceitar-e-a-participacao-do-judiciario-no-golpe. In the words of SantosGoogle Scholar

In the Brazilian case, what is hard to accept is the aggressive participation of the judiciary in the coup's occurrence in view of two factors that formed the great historical opportunity for the judicial branch to affirm itself as one of the safest cornerstones of Brazilian democracy. On one hand, it was during the PT's [Partido dos Trabalhadores, ‘Workers Party‘] government that the judicial and criminal investigation system was significantly improved, not only financially but also institutionally. On the other hand, it was clear right from the start that Dilma Rousseff did not commit any crime of responsibility that could justify the impeachment. The conditions to start a vehement fight against corruption without compromising the political instability were created and, on the contrary, enhanced democracy. Why was this opportunity so grossly wasted? The judicial branch owes an answer to Brazilian society.Google Scholar

Free translation from: “No caso do Brasil, o que mais custa a aceitar é a participação agressiva do sistema judiciário na concretização do golpe, tendo em vista dois fatores que constituíam a grande oportunidade histórica de o sistema judicial se afirmar como um dos pilares mais seguros da democracia brasileira. Por um lado, foi durante os governos PT que o sistema judicial e de investigação criminal recebeu o maior reforço não só financeiro como institucional. Por outro lado, era evidente desde o início que Dilma Rousseff não tinha cometido qualquer crime de responsabilidade que justificasse o impedimento. Estavam criadas as condições para encetar uma luta veemente contra a corrupção sem perturbar a normalidade democrática e, pelo contrário, fortalecendo a democracia. Por que é que esta oportunidade foi tão grosseiramente desperdiçada? O sistema judicial deve uma resposta à sociedade brasileira ….”Google Scholar

⁷ See Hirschl, Ran, Towards Juristocracy (2004).Google Scholar

⁸ See Aníbal Pérez-liñán, Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America 68 (2007)Google Scholar

Despite their name, legislative coups against the president are not always conducted by the legislators themselves. In most historical circumstances, the members of Congress have simply offered congressional support for a military conspiracy. This leads to an important distinction between proactive legislators, those who initiate and control the confrontation with the president, and reactive legislators, those who jump on the bandwagon of a confrontation driven by the military or by other social actor[s].Google Scholar

It is striking that Pérez-Liñán used the Brazilian example of 1955 to describe his idea of a legislative coup; we will see, however, that what happened in 2016 depended much more on the role played by other institutional and social actors, such as judges.Google Scholar

⁹ Collor, in Brazil, in 1992; Perez, in Venezuela, in 1993; Samper, in Colombia, in 1996; Bucaram, in Ecuador, in 1997; Cubas Grau, in Paraguay, in 1999; González Macchi, in Paraguay, in 2002; Lozada, in Bolivia, in 2003; Mesa, in Bolivia, in 2005; Lugo, in Paraguay, in 2012; Molina, in Guatemala, in 2015. In the middle of crisis, Fujimori, in Peru, in 2000, and De la Rua, in Argentina, in 2001, renounced. Id. at 189.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Pérez-Liñan declared that presently in Brazil the PMDB (Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, Brazilian Democratic Movement Party, which recently changed his name for the one adopted during the dictatorship, MDB, Movimento Democrático Brasileiro or Brazilian Democratic Movemente) freed the genius from the “constitutional lamp,” allowing any executive branch chief (in the Union, in the States, and in the Municipalities) to face impeachment processes in the future. See Lupion, Bruno, O gênio está solto, e não será fácil controlá-Lo, diz pesquisador de impeachments na América Latina, Nexo (Apr. 24, 2016), https://www.nexojornal.com.br/expresso/2016/04/24/O-gênio-está-solto-e-não-será-fácil-controlá-lo-dizpesquisador-de-impeachments-na-América-Latina.Google Scholar

¹¹ See Tushnet, Mark & Khosla, Madhav, Introduction to Unstable Constitutionalism: Law and Politics in South Asia, 5 (Mark Tushnet & Madhav Khosla eds., 2015).Google Scholar

¹² Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, supra note 8, at 203.Google Scholar

¹³ We shall return to this point in the further topics.Google Scholar

¹⁴ For the protests, see Romero, Simon, Protesters Across Brazil Call for President Dilma Rousseff's Ouster, Times, N.Y., (Mar. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/14/world/americas/brazil-dilma-rousseff-protests.html?_r=0.Google Scholar

¹⁵ See Watts, Jonathan, Brazil President Closer to Impeachment as Coalition Partner Quits, Guardian, (Mar. 29, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/29/brazil-president-dilma-rousseff-closer-impeachment-coalition-partner-quits.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Cunha was also cited in the Panama Papers. See The Power Players, Int'l Consortium of Investigative Journalists, https://panamapapers.icij.org/the_power_players/, in the section relatives/associates of politicians/public officials.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Jonathan Watts, Speaker of Brazil's Lower House Eduardo Cunha Suspended, Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/05/speaker-of-brazils-lower-house-eduardo-cunha-suspended; Jonathan Watts, Brazilian Politician Who Led Rousseff Impeachment Is Expelled from Office, Guardian (May 5, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/13/eduardo-cunha-brazilian-politician-impeachment-dilma-rousseff-expelled; Matt Sandy, Brazilian Politician Who Led Rousseff Impeachment Arrested on Corruption Charges, Guardian (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/19/eduardo-cunha-arrested-corruption-charges-brazil; Brazilian Politician Who Orchestrated Ousting of Rousseff Sentenced To Prison, Guardian (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/30/brazil-eduardo-cunha-guilty-prison-dilma-rousseff-impeachment.Google Scholar

¹⁸ See Reuters, Senior Brazilian Senator and Billionaire CEO Both Arrested for Corruption, Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/26/senior-brazilian-senator-and-billionaire-ceo-arrested-for-corruption. We shall discuss Amaral's arrest later.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Jonathan Watts, Brazil Minister Ousted After Secret Tape Reveals Plot to Topple President Rousseff, Guardian (Nov. 25, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/23/brazil-dilma-rousseff-plot-secret-phone-transcript-impeachment.Google Scholar

²⁰ See Brazil Mensalão Trial: Ex Lula Aide Dirceu Condemned, BBC News (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-20305926. In the case of President Lula's former Minister, José Dirceu, the Brazilian Supreme Court referred to a controversial interpretation of the German Criminal Law, the control theory of perpetration, specifically the branch entitled functional domination of the act. Professor Claus Roxin was the person in Germany who was responsible for systematizing the theory. See Roxin, Claus, Crimes as Part of Organized Power Structures, 9 J. Int. Crim. Just., 193–205 (2011).Google Scholar

²¹ See Addley, Esther, Why's Brazil Government in Crisis? - The Guardian Briefing, Guardian (Mar. 17, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/17/brazil-government-crisis-briefing-dilma-rousseff-lula-petrobas.Google Scholar

²² See Editorial on The Guardian View on Dilma Rousseff's Impeachment: A Tragedy and a Scandal, Guardian (Apr. 18, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/apr/18/theguardian-view-on-dilma-rousseffs-impeachment-a-tragedy-and-a-scandal; Jens Glüsing, Staakrise in Brasilien: Kalter Putsch, Spiegel On Line; Editorial on In Brazil, the Real Crime is Corruption, Miami Herald (Apr. 23, 2016), http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/editorials/article73445397.html.Google Scholar

²³ I would like to thank Thomas Bustamante for clarifying some of the further issues concerning the supposedly impeachable acts. See Bustamante, Thomas, Democracy and the Rule of Law When Dialogue Is No Longer Possible: Is Brazil's 2016 Impeachment Process a Coup? 16 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).Google Scholar

²⁴ Brazil, Statute Law nº 12.952 of 2014.Google Scholar

²⁵ Bustamante, supra note 23, at 16.Google Scholar

²⁶ Brazil, Statute Law nº 13.242 of 2015.Google Scholar

²⁷ Braz. Const. of 1988, tit. IV, ch. 2, article 85, n. VI, and tit. VI, ch. II, article 85. See the version translated by Keith Rosenn for the Constitute Project, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2015?lang=en (I will use the same source for translation of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 hereafter). For interest purposes, the norms will be reproduced here: Article 85Google Scholar

Acts of the President of the Republic that are attempts against the Federal Constitution are impeachable offenses, especially those against the:Google Scholar

(…)Google Scholar

VI. the budgetary law;Google Scholar

(…)Google Scholar

Article 167Google Scholar

It is prohibited to:Google Scholar

(…)Google Scholar

V. open a supplemental or special appropriation without prior legislative authorization and without indication of the respective funds[;].Google Scholar

Brazil, Statute Law nº 1.079 of 1950 (translated by the author). The original Portuguese version can be found here: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L1079.htm.Google Scholar

Article 10Google Scholar

These are crimes of responsibility against the budgetary law:Google Scholar

(…)Google Scholar

4 – Violate, clearly, and in any way, the budgetary statute disposition.Google Scholar

Article 11Google Scholar

These are crimes against the maintenance and legal spending of public money:Google Scholar

(…)Google Scholar

2 – Open credit without legal funding or without the legal requirements[;].Google Scholar

²⁸ Those are the norms of the Statute Law nº 1.079 of 1950 (translated by the author. The original Portuguese version can be found here: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L1079.htm)Google Scholar

Article 11Google Scholar

These are crimes against the maintenance and legal spending of public money:Google Scholar

(…)Google Scholar

3 – Get a loan, issue currency or insurance policies or commit credit operation without legal requirements.Google Scholar

²⁹ See Dilma, Out!, Economist (Apr. 23, 2016), http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21697284-few-pro-impeachment-congressmen-cited-specific-charges-dilma-out?fsrc=scn%2Ftw%2Fte%2Fpe%2Fed%2Fdilmaout; Antonio Jiménez Barca, Más del 50% de los Diputados Brasileños Tiene Cuentas Pendientes con la Justicia, El Pais (Apr. 25, 2016), http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2016/04/23/actualidad/1461428271_674627.html?rel=lom. One of the deputies even dedicated his vote to Dilma Rousseff's former torturer, Carlos Alberto Brilhante Ustra, someone who was condemned in a civil lawsuit for perpetrating torture against the Brazilian Teles family. The shameless speech provoked an outrageous debate. Several associations from Latin America and other parts of the world condemned the declaration and asked for the deputy's punishment, agreeing with the initiative proposed by the Latin America Transitional Justice Network Executive Secretariat (http://www.rlajt.com/noticia/334/.html).Google Scholar

³⁰ The Brazilian Supreme Court President is due to preside over the Senate's impeachment process trial. See Braz. Const., tit. IV, ch. 1, article 52, sole paragraph.Google Scholar

³¹ AC 4.039, Brazilian Supreme Court, Nov. 24, 2015, http://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/noticianoticiastf/anexo/acao_cautelar_4039.pdf. It is notable that Justice Teori Zavascki would die in a plane crash in January 2017. See Watts, Jonathan, Brazil Supreme Court Justice Overseeing Vast Corruption Case Dies in Plane Crash, Guardian (Jan. 19, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/19/brazil-supreme-court-corruption-case-teori-zavascki-dies-plane-crash.Google Scholar

³² There are several Brazilian Supreme Court rulings that affirm this idea. For instance, see HC 112.454, Brazilian Supreme Court, Mar. 19, 2013, http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP=TP&docID=3625670.Google Scholar

³³ Braz. Statute Law nº 12.850 of 2013, http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2011-2014/2013/lei/l12850.htm.Google Scholar

³⁴ Braz. Const. tit. IV, ch. 1, article 53.Google Scholar

Article 53Google Scholar

The Deputies and Senators shall enjoy civil and criminal immunity for any of their opinions, words and votes.Google Scholar

§1° From the date of their investiture, Deputies and Senators shall be judged by the Supreme Federal Tribunal.Google Scholar

§2° From the date of their investiture, members of the National Congress may not be arrested, except in flagrante delicto for a non-bailable crime. In this case, the police record shall be sent within twenty-four hours to the respective Chamber, which, by a majority vote of its members, shall decide as to imprisonment.Google Scholar

³⁵ Braz. Crim. Code, book I, tit. IX, ch. VI, article 324, n. IV.Google Scholar

³⁶ See HC 89.417, Brazilian Supreme Court, Aug. 22, 2008, http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP=AC&docID=395000, 917 [“à excepcionalidade do quadro há de corresponder a excepcionalidade da forma de interpretar e aplicar os princípios e regras do sistema constitucional ….”] [“to the exceptionality of the situation must correspond the exceptionality of the interpretation and application of constitutional system principles and rules ….”].Google Scholar

³⁷ See AC 4.070, Brazilian Supreme Court, May 5, 2017, http://www.ebc.com.br/sites/_portalebc2014/files/atoms/files/ac4070.pdf.Google Scholar

³⁸ See Braz. Crim. Code, book I, tit. IX, article 282.Google Scholar

³⁹ See Braz. Const. tit. IV, ch. 2, article 86, § 1º, number 1.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ See AC 4.070, Brazilian Supreme Court, May 5, 2017, http://www.ebc.com.br/sites/_portalebc2014/files/atoms/files/ac4070.pdf 72–73Google Scholar

Decide-se aqui uma situação extraordinária, excepcional e, por isso, pontual e individualizada… Mesmo que não haja previsão específica, com assento constitucional, a respeito do afastamento, pela jurisdição criminal, de parlamentares do exercício de seu mandato, ou a imposição de afastamento do Presidente da Câmara dos Deputados quando o seu ocupante venha a ser processado criminalmente, está demonstrado que, no caso, ambas se fazem claramente devidas.Google Scholar

⁴¹ The ADPF, a claim of non-compliance with a fundamental precept in a direct translation (arguição de descumprimento de preceito fundamental) is one of the ways of provoking the Brazilian Supreme Court to decide constitutional matters based on a concentrated or European model of constitutional review.Google Scholar

⁴² See ADPF 402, Brazilian Supreme Court, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoAndamento.asp?incidente=4975492.Google Scholar

⁴³ See Consultor Jurídico, Fachin Afasta Aécio e Loures; Pedidos de Prisão Preventiva Foram Negados, https://www.conjur.com.br/2017-mai-18/fachin-afasta-aecio-deputado-pedidos-prisao-plenario.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ See Júlia Affonso & Fausto Macedo, Aécio tem ‘fortes elos com o Brasil’ e 'carreira política elogiável, diz Marco Aurélio (June 30, 2017), O Estado de S. Paulo, http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/aecio-tem-fortes-elos-como-brasil-e-carreira-politica-elogiavel-diz-marco-aurelio/.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ See Federal, Supremo Tribunal, 1^a Turma determina afastamento do senador Aécio Neves do cargo, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=356966; see also AC 4.327, Brazilian Supreme Court, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoAndamento.asp?incidente=5188006.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ It is important to elucidate that, like several other courts in the world, the Brazilian Supreme Court, in constitutional review procedures, goes far beyond the binomial constitutionality/unconstitutionality, using remedies like the ‘interpretation according to the Constitution’ or Italian techniques such as the sentenze additive or German techniques such as the Apellentscheidung. For an overview of all those techniques, see Meyer, Emilio, Decisão e Jurisdição Constitucional (2017).Google Scholar

⁴⁷ See Notícias do STF, Federal, Supremo Tribunal, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=358853; see also ADI 5.526, Brazilian Supreme Court, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoAndamento.asp?incidente=4982736.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ See O Globo, Aécio Neves diz em nota que recebeu ‘com serenidade’ decisão do Senado, https://oglobo.globo.com/brasil/aecio-neves-diz-em-nota-que-recebeu-com-serenidade-decisao-do-senado-21959044.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ See Ministra decide em mandados de segurança contra divisão de sanções no impeachment, Supremo Tribunal Federal (Sep. 8, 2016), http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/cms/verNoticiaDetalhe.asp?idConteudo=324885.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ See Court, Brazilian Supreme, MS 34.441, Oct. 21, 2016, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoPeca.asp?id=310585765&tipoApp=.pdf.Google Scholar

⁵¹ There is a huge gap in the proper rulings for the judicial docket in Brazil and the ways to control it. See Arguelhes, Diego & Hartman, Ivar, Timing Control Without Docket Control: How Individual Justices Shape Brazilian Supreme Court's Agenda, 5 JLC 1, 105–40 (2017) (discussing how Brazilian Supreme Court Justices have the power to control the court's agenda by formal and informal means).Google Scholar

⁵² Juliano Zaiden Benvindo, Brazil's Increasingly Politicized Supreme Court, Int'l J. Const. L. Blog (Feb. 16, 2017), http://www.iconnectblog.com/2017/02/brazils-increasingly-politicized-supreme-court/ Google Scholar

After some suspense and bets, amid a political crisis and a criminal investigation involving many bigwigs in Congress, President Michel Temer nominated Alexandre de Moraes, the justice minister of his government and a political figure affiliated with the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (PSDB), to the Supreme Court. His political background notwithstanding, his legal credentials are also in question. Even though he is a professor of constitutional law at the University of São Paulo and has written some books in the field, scholars and the media have mentioned the shallowness of his work and have even exposed the occurrence of plagiarism. His nomination is emblematic of the moment Brazil is currently experiencing and points to how the current government seems to be taking advantage of the Supreme Court's institutional flaws and its soaring power to set up a political court. This is a critical moment in Brazilian democracy. If there is any hope, however, it lies in the fact that, now more than ever, Brazilians have started to critically discuss who will be their next Supreme Court justice.Google Scholar

⁵³ Brazilian Supreme Court Internal Rules, part I, tit. I, ch. V, section II, article 21, n. V. See http://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/legislacaoRegimentoInterno/anexo/RISTFintegral.pdf.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ See Court, Brazilian Supreme, MS 21.689, Dec. 16, 1993, http://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/sobrestfconhecastfjulgamentohistorico/anexo/ms21689.pdf.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ “One who enters government service does not cease to be a &;person&; within the Fifth Amendment, and an impeachment for offenses outside constitutional authorization would deny him the protection afforded by &;due process.&; It would be passing strange to conclude that a citizen may invoke the judicial &;bulwark&; against a twenty-dollar fine but not against an unconstitutional impeachment, removal from and perpetual disqualification to hold federal office.” Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems, 116–17 (1973).Google Scholar

⁵⁶ Congresso em Foco, Ministros do STF criticam referências a “golpe,” Congresso em Foco, http://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/noticias/ministros-do-stf-criticam-referencias-a-golpe/.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ The Brazilian Supreme Court ruled on the same impeachment procedure in the ADPF (a kind of concentrated model of constitutional review) nº 378 right at the start of the procedure. In this case, the court was much more prolix, relying on the idea that there was not, at the time, a need to discuss the merits of the accusations. See Court, Brazilian Supreme, ADPF 378, Dec. 17, 2016, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoAndamento.asp?incidente=4899156. Since the merits of the impeachment process were not, until now, ruled by the Brazilian Supreme Court, the only forecast we can make is that the court, relying in its conservative background, will not discuss the seriousness of the accusation and will repeat its precedent from 1993, whose foundations rely in the American “political question doctrine.” For an overview of this doctrine, see Issacharoff, Samuel, Fragile Democracies: Contested Power in the Era of Constitutional Courts, 152 (2015).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ Braz. Const., tit. II, ch. I, article 5, n. LVII. See the translation by Keith Rosenn for the Constitute Project, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Brazil_2015?lang=en,Google Scholar

Article 5Google Scholar

Everyone is equal before the law, with no distinction whatsoever, guaranteeing to Brazilians and foreigners residing in the Country the inviolability of the rights to life, liberty, equality, security and property, on the following terms:Google Scholar

…Google Scholar

LVII. no one shall be considered guilty until his criminal conviction has become final and non-appealable[;]Google Scholar

Some Constitutions make explicit associations between the presumption of innocence and “res judicata.” Albany's Constitution of 1988 demands a final ruling to set aside the presumption of innocence (article 30). Angola's Constitution of 2010 establishes the presumption of innocence until a final decision be involved by “res judicata” (article 67, no. 2). The Bulgarian Constitution of 1991 also demands a final ruling (article 31, no. 3); the Croatian Constitution of 1991, article 28, mentions a final judgment to set aside the presumption of innocence; similar clauses are found in the Dominican Republic's Constitution of 2010 (article 69, no. 3), Ecuador's Constitution of 2008 (article 76, no. 2); Italy's Constitution of 1947 (article 27); Poland's Constitution of 1997 (article 42, no. 3); the Portuguese Constitution of 1976 (article 32, no. 2); and Romania's Constitution of 1991 (article 23, no. 11) (all data collected at https://www.constituteproject.org/?lang=en).Google Scholar

⁵⁹ See Court, Brazilian Supreme, HC 84.078, Feb. 5, 2009, http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP=AC&docID=608531.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ See Court, Brazilian Supreme, HC 126.292, Feb. 17, 2016, http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP=TP&docID=10964246.Google Scholar

⁶¹ However, it is important to notice that another way of getting access to these courts and having some success is filing a habeas corpus writ.Google Scholar

⁶² See Alexy, Robert, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (2002); Meyer, supra note 46, at 219; Juliano Benvindo, On the Limits of Constitutional Adjudication: Deconstructing Balancing and Judicial Activism (2010). For a broader perspective on the use of the proportionality, see Barak, Aharon, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations (2012) and Proportionality: New Frontiers, New Challenges (Vicki Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds. 2017).Google Scholar

⁶³ All of them, with different points of view. For the idea of “constitutional mutation” in German Public Law, see Flávio Pedron, Mutação Constitucional na Crise do Positivismo Jurídico (2012); see also Caldwell, Peter, Popular Sovereignty and the Crisis of German Constitutional Law: The Theory & Practice of Weimar Constitutionalism (1997); Arthur Jacobson & Bernhard Schlink, Weimar: A Jurisprudence of Crisis (2002).Google Scholar

⁶⁴ See Court, Brazilian Supreme, MC in ADC's 43 and 44, (Barroso, J.), http://s.conjur.com.br/dl/voto-ministro-barroso-prisao-antes.pdf.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ See Court, Brasilian Supreme, HC 152.752, April 5, 2018, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoAndamento.asp?numero=152752&classe=HC&origem=AP&recurso=0&tipoJulgamento=M. See, also, Lênio Streck and Emilio Meyer, ‘O HC de Lula — maioria transformada em minoria: a “colegialidade” em ação!', Conjur, 2018, https://www.conjur.com.br/2018-abr-05/opiniao-hc-lula-maioria-transformada-minoria. The criminal complaint against Lula is filled with irregularities, beyond Moro's suspect competence. In the same Operation Carwash, appeals in the Fourth Federal Court of Appeals took 96 days to be tried; Lula's appeal was tried in 42 days (Estelita Carazzai and Joelmir Tavares, ‘Recurso de Lula foi o que mais répido chegou à 2^a instância', Folha de S. Paulo, 2017, https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2017/08/1912821-recurso-de-lula-foi-o-que-mais-rapido-chegou-a-2-instancia.shtml. For further information on Lula's advocates perspective, see Robertson, Geoffrey, ‘The Case for Lula: He Deserves a Fair Trial, Not Persecution’, Foreign Affairs, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/brazil/2017-04-19/case-lula.Google Scholar

⁶⁶ See Ernesto Londoño and Shasta Darlington, ‘Lula, Brazil's Ex-President, Can Be Jailed, Court Rules’, NY Times, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/world/americas/brazil-lula-corruption-prison.html.Google Scholar

⁶⁷ Brazilian Fourth Federal Courts of Appeals, HC 502561440.2018.4.04.0000/PR, 8 July 2018, http://estaticog1.globo.com/2018/07/08/DESPADEC.pdf.Google Scholar

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⁷⁰ Brazilian Fourth Federal Courts of Appeals, HC 502561440.2018.4.04.0000/PR, 8 July 2018, https://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/especial/noticias/desembargador-volta-a-ordenar-soltura-de-lula-apos-gebran-negar-habeas-corpus/.Google Scholar

⁷¹ Brazilian Fourth Federal Courts of Appeals, SL 5025635-16.2018.4.04.0000/PR, 8 July 2018, https://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/wp-content/uploads/sites/41/2018/07/THOMPSON.pdf.Google Scholar

⁷² See Sérgio Fernando Moro, Considerações sobre a operação mani puliti, 26 R. Cej. 56, 56–62 (2004). See also Margarida Lacombe & José Ribas Vieira, A estratégia institucional do Juiz Sérgio Moro descrita por ele mesmo, Jota, https://jota.info/artigos/estrategia-institucional-juiz-sergio-moro-descrita-por-ele-mesmo-28032016.Google Scholar

⁷³ See Pedro Canário, Criticadas por Gilmar, preventivas da “lava jato” duram em média 9, 3 meses, Conjur, http://www.conjur.com.br/2017-fev-07/criticadas-preventivas-lava-jato-duram-media-93-meses.Google Scholar

⁷⁴ Brazilian Constitution, tit. II, ch. 1, article 5, n. LXXVIII.Google Scholar

⁷⁵ In April 2015, 204 habeas corpus actions were filed, but only 5 were granted in place of definitive rulings. See Júlia Affonso, Fausto Macedo, & Ricardo Brandt, Contra a Lava Jato, investigados pediram 204 habeas corpus, mas ganharam apenas dois, O Estado de S. Paulo, http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/contra-a-lava-jato-investigados-pediram-204-habeas-corpus-mas-ganharam-apenas-dois/. In a habeas corpus writ tried by the Brazilian Superior Court (Superior Tribunal de Justiça), Justice Felix Fischer mentioned, albeit avoiding speaking in terms of an “exception judgment,” the need to recognize the “circumstances and peculiarities of the situation,” quoting another judge who classified the fact as something singular in the last 50 years. Brazilian Superior Court, HC 75.286, https://ww2.stj.jus.br/processo/revista/documento/mediado/?componente=ITA&sequencial=1552055&num_registro=201602276315&data=20161114&formato=PDF.Google Scholar

⁷⁶ See Brasil, 13^th Federal Court of Curitiba, PEDIDO DE QUEBRA DE SIGILO DE DADOS E/OU TELEFÔNICOS 5006205-98.2016.4.04.7000/PR, http://s.conjur.com.br/dl/decisao-levantamento-sigilo.pdf.Google Scholar

⁷⁷ See Castro, Fernando, Samuel Nunes, & Vladimir Netto, Moro derruba sigilo e divulga grampo de ligação entre Lula e Dilma; ouça, G1, http://g1.globo.com/pr/parana/noticia/2016/03/pf-libera-documento-que-mostra-ligacao-entre-lula-e-dilma.html; Ricardo Brandt, Fausto Macedo, & Julia Affonso, Lava Jato pegou conversas de Lula e Dilma no telefone; ouça, O Estado de S. Paulo, http://politica.estadao.com.br/blogs/fausto-macedo/ouca-lula-e-dilma-no-telefone/; Filipe Coutinho, Thiago Bronzato, & Daniel Haidar, Dilma cai em escuta da PF em conversa com Lula. Ouça, Época, http://epoca.globo.com/tempo/noticia/2016/03/dilma-cai-em-grampo-da-pf-em-conversa-com-lula.html.Google Scholar

⁷⁸ Braz. Const., tit. IV, ch. III, section II, article 102, n. I, letter ‘c’.Google Scholar

⁷⁹ See Court, Brazilian Supreme, MS's 34.070 and 34.071, March 18, 2016, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoPeca.asp?id=308995627&tipoApp=.pdf.Google Scholar

⁸⁰ See Meyer, Emilio, A Colcha de Retalhos de Gilmar Mendes, Jota, https://www.jota.info/opiniao-e-analise/artigos/colcha-de-retalhos-de-gilmar-mendes-26032016.Google Scholar

⁸¹ Interestingly, in November 2017, long after Rousseff was impeached and Lula indicted, Judge Moro would publicly declare that he had no regrets on the disclosure. See Stochero, Tahiane, Moro diz não se arrepender de ter divulgado áudio entre Lula e Dilma, G1, https://g1.globo.com/sp/sao-paulo/noticia/moro-diz-nao-se-arrepender-de-ter-divulgado-audio-entre-lula-e-dilma.ghtml.Google Scholar

⁸² See Court, Brazilian Supreme, RECL. 23.457, June 13, 2016, http://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/noticianoticiastf/anexo/rcl23457.pdf. See, also, Braz. Const., tit. II, ch. I, article 5, n. XII, and Braz. Statute Law n° 9.296 of 1996.Google Scholar

⁸³ See Braz. Complementary Law nº 35 of 1979, tit. III, ch. I, article 35, n. I; Braz. National Magistrates Ethics Code, ch. IV, article 12, and ch. VIII, article 25; Braz. National Magistrates Council Resolution nº 59 of 2008.Google Scholar

⁸⁴ See Brazilian Fourth Federal Courts of Appeals, PA CORTE ESPECIAL 0003021-32.2016.4.04.8000, Sep. 23, 2016, http://s.conjur.com.br/dl/lava-jato-nao-seguir-regras-casos.pdf.Google Scholar

⁸⁵ See Grau, Eros, Por que Tenho Medo dos Juízes (2016).Google Scholar

⁸⁶ See Conselho Nacional de Justiça, Censo do Poder Judiciário: VIDE – Vetores Iniciais e Dados Estatísticos (2014), http://www.cnj.jus.br/images/dpj/CensoJudiciario.final.pdf.Google Scholar

⁸⁷ See Thiago Resende & Raphael di Cunto, Lewandowski Obtém Apoio de Líderes na Câmara ao Reajuste do Judiciário, Valor Econômico (Apr. 26, 2016), http://www.valor.com.br/politica/4539721/lewandowski-obtem-apoio-de-lideres-na-camara-ao-reajuste-do-judiciario.Google Scholar

⁸⁸ Judiciário fica mais caro e leva 1,3% do PIB; juiz custa R$ 46 mil/mês, UOL Notícias (Oct. 17, 2016), http://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2016/10/17/judiciario-fica-mais-caro-e-leva-13-do-pib-juiz-custa-r-46-milmes.htm.Google Scholar

⁸⁹ Fábio Góis, Temer sanciona sem vetos projeto que concede aumento de 41% a servidores do Judiciário, Congresso em Foco (July 21, 2016), http://congressoemfoco.uol.com.br/noticias/temer-sanciona-sem-vetos-projeto-que-concede-aumento-de-41-a-servidores-do-judiciario/.Google Scholar

⁹⁰ Brazilian Supreme Court, AO 1.773 (Sep. 18, 2014), http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoPeca.asp?id=261622279&tipoApp=.pdf.Google Scholar

⁹¹ See Recondo, Felipe, Por liminar, auxílio-moradia de juízes já custa R$ 860 milhões, Jota, http://jota.info/por-liminar-auxilio-moradia-de-juizes-ja-custa-r-860-milhoes.Google Scholar

⁹² See Pompeu, Ana, Fux retira processos sobre auxílio-moradia da pauta do Plenário do Supremo, Conjur, https://www.conjur.com.br/2018-mar-21/fux-retira-processos-auxilio-moradia-pauta-pleno-stf.Google Scholar

⁹³ The first results can be found at Luciano da Ros, O custo da Justiça no Brasil: uma análise comparativa exploratória, 9 Observatory of Soc. and Pol. Elites in Brazil Newsl. 1, 1–15 (2015).Google Scholar

⁹⁴ In a dollar rate of R$ 3.09.Google Scholar

⁹⁵ Braz. Const., tit. III, chap. VII, article 379, § 4º.Google Scholar

⁹⁶ Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, IBGE divulga o rendimento domiciliar per capita 2016, ftp://ftp.ibge.gov.br/Trabalho_e_Rendimento/Pesquisa_Nacional_por_Amostra_de_Domicilios_continua/Renda_domiciliar_per_capita/Renda_domiciliar_per_capita_2016.pdf.Google Scholar

⁹⁷ Souza, supra note 6, at 121; Jessé Souza, A Tolice da Inteligência Brasileira (2015).Google Scholar

⁹⁸ Ruti Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice: Contemporary Essays 182 (2014).Google Scholar

⁹⁹ Leonardo Barbosa, História Constitucional Brasileira 205 (2012).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁰ Alexandre Carvalho, Juscorporativismo: os juízes e o judiciário na Assembleia Nacional Constituinte, 114 Revista Brasileira de Estudos Políticos 31, 31–77 (2017). See generally Schinke, Vanessa, Judiciário e Autoritarismo: Regime Autoritário (1964–1985), Democracia e Permanências (2016).Google Scholar

¹⁰¹ Id. at 43.Google Scholar

¹⁰² Id. at 50.Google Scholar

¹⁰³ Braz. Const., tit. IV, ch. III, article 92, I-A and 103-B.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁴ See Pereira, Anthony, Political (In)Justice: Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law in Brazil, Chile, and Argentina (2005).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁵ See Meyer, Emilio, Ditadura e Responsabilização (2012); Emilio Meyer, Criminal Responsibility in Brazilian Transitional Justice: A Constitutional Interpretative Process under the Paradigm of International Human Rights Law, 4 Idon. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 1, 41–71 (2017); Yi Shin Tang, International Justice Through Domestic Courts, 9 Int. J. Tran. Just. 2, 259–77 (2015).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁶ See Justiça de Transição em Perspectiva Transnacional (Emilio Meyer ed., 2017). Brazil was condemned for maintaining that the Amnesty Law of 1979 reached state perpetrators by the Inter-American Court of Human rights in two opportunities: in 2010, in Case of Gomes Lund et al. (“Guerrilha do Araguaia”) v. Brazil (http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_219_ing.pdf), and in 2018, in Caso Herzog e Outros v. Brasil (http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_353_por.pdf).Google Scholar

¹⁰⁷ For instance, the cases decided by the Brazilian Supreme Court when it recognized the constitutionality of gay marriage, the legitimacy of public manifestations in favor of decriminalizing marijuana usage, and the illegitimacy of private companies financing elections. See Court, Brazilian Supreme, ADI 4.277 and ADPF 132, http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP=AC&docID=628633; Brazilian Supreme Court, ADPF 187, http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP=TP&docID=5956195; Brazilian Supreme Court, ADI 4.650, http://www.stf.jus.br/portal/processo/verProcessoPeca.asp?id=308746530&tipoApp=.pdf.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁸ See Serrano, supra note 1.Google Scholar

¹⁰⁹ Roberto Gargarella, La Sala de Máquinas de la Constitución: Dos Siglos de Constitucionalismo en América Latina 360 (2014). One must be aware, however, that Gargarella does not explore sufficiently the potential devices of democratization that were available recently in countries like Brazil, Ecuador or Bolivia.Google Scholar

¹¹⁰ The situation can get worse if we add other conditions: Economic and political crises; parliamentary crises where a party (the MDB) that was the result of every kind of opposition to the dictatorship and would become the best example of any kind of arrangement to remain in power during a democracy; the absence of popular control in main public policies, especially those related to infrastructure, generating high levels of corruption. See Avritzer, Leonardo, Impasses da Democracia no Brasil (2016) (discussing social mobilization maneuvered by media concentration, especially social mobilization focused on demonizing the state and glorifying market).Google Scholar

¹¹¹ Issacharoff, supra note 58, at 12 (2015). The second role can be illustrated by control over the enforcement of constitutional rules against dominant parties inherited from the authoritarian regime. In this sense, Brazil faces a double confrontation: a) coalition presidentialism based on the pulverization of political parties creates serious obstacles for the President to gain parliamentary support. See Sérgio Abranches, Presidencialismo de coalizão: o dilema institucional brasileiro, 31 Revista de Ciências Sociais 1, 4–34 (1988); José Antonio Cheibub & Fernando Limongi, Legislative-Executive Relations, in Comparative Constitutional Law 222 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) b) the presence of a political party, the MDB, born as the oppositional party during the dictatorship of 1964–1985. If during the dictatorial period, the MDB encompassed all progressive forces that could oppose the regime, during the 1980s the permission for the multiparty system's return ensured that MDB could represent not social movements but Brazil's political elite. This is something that can be seen by its role in the “Centrão” (big center) during the ANC, which was a way of preventing the social and popular forces that appeared in the constitutional design moment from leading all the deliberations. Since José Sarney's presidency, [a former member of the dictatorship party, the ARENA (Aliança Renovadora Nacional), who was chosen to represent the MDB only for political circumstances], the MDB has developed a physiological performance supposedly needed in the name of governability. This way of conducting politics became dominant. The PMDB was always the force that supported or exercised the executive branch: It did so with the FHC (1994–2002); Lula (2002–2010, but mainly after 2005, when the “Mensalão” scandal was brought to light); Rousseff (2010–2016, with Michel Temer, from the PMDB, as her Vice-President for the two terms and ultimately betraying her); and, finally, Temer (2016–2017, with the PMDB, in the executive branch, putting into action the right's austerity program with the support of the once opposition political party, the PSDB). See Nobre, Marcos, Imobilismo em Movimento: da Abertura Democrática ao Governo Dilma (2013). As we mentioned, PMDB recently readopted its original anacronym, MDB.Google Scholar

¹¹² Issacharoff, supra note 58, at 10.Google Scholar

¹¹³ Issacharoff, supra note 58, at 194.Google Scholar

¹¹⁴ 48 U.S. 1 (1849).Google Scholar

¹¹⁵ Under the U.S. Constitution (article II, section 4), the President can be impeached for treason, bribery or high crimes and misdemeanors. For the Andrew Johnson and Bill Clinton cases, the same phrase, ‘high crimes and misdemeanors,’ gave space for accusations that brought presidential acts to political light. In the case of Johnson, it is important to remember that the impeachment articles would rely on the supposed violation of the Tenure of Office Act; this means that an act with juridical effects should be present from the beginning. In Clinton's situation, ‘perjurious, false and misleading testimony’ and, also, ‘obstructing justice’ would not only have a juridical character but also a criminal one, although it was grave enough to remove the President from office. That is, for the phrase ‘high crimes and misdemeanors,’ a juridical qualification should stand, even if not a criminal one: The question is if, for the safety of democratic procedures, courts can avoid impeachment processes used only for controversial or illegal political aims. See Stephens, Otis, Jr. & John Scheb II, American Constitutional Law: Sources of Power and Restraint 174 (2008). Although Tribe recognizes that no judicial oversight is due in impeachment processes, he calls for a congressional responsibility on interpreting ‘high crimes and misdemeanors’ to avoid understanding it as “[a] … category … purely politicized in character or definition ….” [Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 154 (2000)]. It seems to me that, on one hand, the object of impeachment articles must put the constitutional project in peril, must be a grave act; on the other hand, if the offenses do not have to be criminal, for the reasons the President can be severely punished and presidentialism calls for executive stability, criminal procedural guarantees must be granted to the accused. An accusation that, for the sake of being constructed, must rely on reading several different statutes, depend on a court's surprisingly overruling, dismiss clear Presidential decisions on a complicated chain of command or stay in the realm of political administration or budget politics, cannot simply be read as an impeachment offense. That is why courts must, in cases like these, oversee the procedural rules and the basic substantial accusation.Google Scholar

¹¹⁶ Czech Const., ch. II, article 65, 2.Google Scholar

¹¹⁷ Klaus was impeached by the Senate on March 4, 2013; three days later, his term was over. The Czech Republic Constitutional Court holding was handed down on March 28, 2013. It is interesting to compare this case with Brazil's ex-President Fernando Collor: While Collor resigned right after the Senate session that would try him had started, the Brazilian Supreme Court decided that even if he could no longer be condemned to losing office, there was no obstacle in the Brazilian Constitution to apply to him the exclusion from public offices for eight years established in article 52. See Court, Brazilian Supreme, MS 21.689, Dec. 16, 1993, http://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/sobrestfconhecastfjulgamentohistorico/anexo/ms21689.pdf.Google Scholar

¹¹⁸ S. Korea Const., ch. III, article 65, 2 and 3; ch. VI, article 1, 2.Google Scholar

¹¹⁹ Issacharoff, supra note 58, at 199.Google Scholar

¹²⁰ See Boadle, Anthony & Brito, Ricardo, Brazil Electoral Court Dismisses Case That Could Have Ousted President, Reuters (June 9, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-brazil-politics-ruling-idUSKBN19033V.Google Scholar

¹²¹ See Maus, Ingeborg, Judiciário como superego da sociedade: o papel da atividade jurisprudencial na “sociedade órfã”, 58 Novos Estudos Cebrap, 183–202 (2000); Jürgen Habermas, ‘Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy‘ §6 (1996).Google Scholar

¹²² See Cattoni, Marcelo, Devido Processo Legislativo'(3^rd ed., Fórum 2016); Álvaro Cruz, Jurisdição Constitucional Democrática (2^nd ed., Arraes Editores 2015); Lênio Streck, Jurisdição Constitucional e Decisão Jurídica (3^rd ed., RT, 2013); Meyer, supra note 46.Google Scholar

¹²³ Issacharoff, supra note 58, at 246. In 2014, the Rousseff/Temer (PT/MDB, mostly) slate beat the Aécio/Nunes slate (PSDB) by a small margin of 3.3% of the total votes. See Watts, Jonathan, Brazilian Election: One Battle ver but Another Begins for Dilma Rousseff, Guardian (Oct. 27, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/27/dilma-rouseff-brazil-election-president-battle.Google Scholar

¹²⁴ In analyzing a lawsuit against the constitutional amendment procedure that created an austerity program for the next 20 years in Brazil (Braz. Const. Amend. nº 95 of 2016), Justice Barroso denied any aggression to the entrenchment clauses established in the Brazilian Constitution (article 60, § 4º, among them, fundamental rights and popular periodical vote) and affirmed his own view on the necessity of austerity measures and the “size” of the Brazilian state (Brazilian Supreme Court, MS 34.448, Oct. 10, 2016, http://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/noticiaNoticiaStf/anexo/MS34448.pdf). The argument sounded much more like a free adherence to the institutional economic models designed by Hirschl by which judicial review should act as the guarantor of investors' main interests regarding how an economy should function. For an analysis that reads the constitutional amendment as a ‘dismemberment’ of social rights that are part of the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, see Albert, Richard, Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, 43 YJIL 1, 41–43 (2018).Google Scholar

Also in 2016, the Brazilian Supreme Court promoted severe limits to public servants' right to strike, allowing state agencies to discount wage values correspondent to days that were not worked (Brazilian Supreme Court, RE 693.456, Oct. 27, 2016, http://www.stf.jus.br/arquivo/cms/noticiaNoticiaStf/anexo/RE693456.pdf). Justice Fux mentioned the economic crises Brazil was facing and the possibility of worker uprisings. The Brazilian Supreme Court's approach to economic issues and its increasing judicialization of politics can be compared with the U.S. Supreme Court's point of view and with the constitutionalization movement in Israel that happened pari passu with economic liberalization.Google Scholar

Indeed, the pro-constitutionalization stance of Israel's economic elite is not be surprising given the American experience of “market friendly” constitutional jurisprudence. The U.S. Supreme Court—the most frequently cited producer of constitutional rights jurisprudence in western world— has long been a zealous guardian of economic liberties and has maintained its historic position on the right of the American spectrum of economic thought.Google Scholar

As in other western countries, there has also been a sustained attempt by economic elites in Israel in recent years to dismantle the country's local version of the Keynesian welfare state and to install market-oriented economic policies ….“ (Hirschl, supra note 7, at 61).Google Scholar

¹²⁵ See United Democratic Movement v. The President of the Republic of South Africa, 2003 (1) SALR 495 (CC) (S. Afr.).Google Scholar

¹²⁶ Brazilian Supreme Court, MS's 26.602, 26.603 and 26.604, Apr. 10, 2007, http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP=AC&docID=555539.Google Scholar

¹²⁷ See Issacharoff's observation on South African Constitutional Court democracy's restrictive account and compare it to what Brazilian Supreme Court had been refusing to do concerning Rousseff's impeachment. (“Unfortunately, the challenge of creating a substantive constitutional doctrine of democratic integrity proved a step too far, at least initially. Instead, the court retreated to a formalist account of the constitution as guaranteeing primarily procedural norms and individual rights and not a broader commitment to democratic engagement”) (Issacharoff, supra note 58, at 252).Google Scholar

¹²⁸ Argentina, Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación (CSJN) (National Supreme Court of Justice), CSJ 368/1998, (Feb. 14, 2017), http://www.cij.gov.ar/nota-24822.html.Google Scholar

¹²⁹ Venezuela, El Tribunal Supremo de Justicia, Sala Constitucional, Recursos de Interpretación (Mar. 3, 2017).Google Scholar

¹³⁰ Hirschl, supra note 7, at 11. Hirschl presents six main scenarios of constitutionalization: a) the reconstruction wave post World War II; b) the independence scenario of post-colonial countries; c) the single transition scenario from authoritarian to democratic rule, including that of Brazil; d) the dual transition scenario from both authoritarian and socialist models; e) the incorporation scenario that captures the situations of countries that were impacted by international and supranational norms, like Sweden, Denmark, and the United Kingdom; and f) the “no apparent” scenario with constitutional reforms that do not significantly change political and economic regimes, like Canada and New Zealand.Google Scholar

¹³¹ Souza divides Brazilian society into the following categories: a) the economic and moneyed class or elite; b) the medium class that serves the domination of the moneyed elite in disfavor of the popular classes; c) a working class; and d) the excluded class, which is situated under the dignity qualification. The sociologist uses Bourdieu's ideas to create these categories, referring not only to economic capital but also to cultural and personal relationship capital. The medium class, in which judges could be included, uses a great amount of cultural capital but also, of course, needs economic and social capital. See Souza, supra note 6, at 59–60.Google Scholar

¹³² See Supremo Tribunal Federal (S.T.F.) (highest court of appeals on constitutional matters), MI 372, Aug. 1, 1994, http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP=AC&docID=81794 (Braz.)Google Scholar

¹³³ See Supremo Tribunal Federal (S.T.F.), ADI 4.277 and ADPF 132, May 5, 2011, http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP=AC&docID=628633; Supremo Tribunal Federal (S.T.F.), ADPF 187, June 15, 2011, http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP=TP&docID=5956195; Supremo Tribunal Federal (S.T.F.), ADPF 54, Apr. 12, 2012, http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP=TP&docID=3707334; Supremo Tribunal Federal (S.T.F.) (highest court of appeals on constitutional matters), ADI 3.510, May 29, 2008, http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP=AC&docID=611723; Supremo Tribunal Federal (S.T.F.), ADPF 186, Apr. 26, 2012, http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP=TP&docID=6984693; see also Paulo lotti, STF: Um Tribunal Amigo “Apenas” de Liberdades Individuais?, Justificando (July 11, 2018), http://justificando.cartacapital.com.br/2016/10/28/stf-um-tribunal-amigo-apenas-de-liberdades-individuais-de-autonomia-privada/.Google Scholar

¹³⁴ The Brazilian Supreme Court recognizes that if due legislative process is not applied by the National Congress, Deputies and Senator can appeal to the court to suspend or interrupt the proposal. See the leading case, prior to the Constitution of 1988: Brazilian Supreme Court, MS 20.257, http://redir.stf.jus.br/paginadorpub/paginador.jsp?docTP=AC&docID=85046.Google Scholar

¹³⁵ See Hirschl, supra note 7, at 44.Google Scholar

¹³⁶ See Tushnet, Mark & Khosla, Madhav, Introduction to Unstable Constitutionalism: Law and Politics in South Asia, 5 (Mark Tushnet & Madhav Khosla eds., 2015).Google Scholar

¹³⁷ Osama Siddique, The Judicialization of Politics in Pakistan: The Supreme Court After the Lawyer's Movement, in Unstable Constitutionalism: Law and Politics in South Asia, 160 (Mark Tushnet & Madhav Khosla eds., 2015).Google Scholar

¹³⁸ See Braz. Const., tit I, article 1º, n. III; article 3º, n. III; article 4º, sole paragraph; tit. II, ch. I, arts. 5º; ch. III, arts. 6º until 11; tit. VII, ch. I, article 170; tit. VIII, ch. VI, article 225.Google Scholar

¹³⁹ The Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Edson Fachin allowed the Federal Attorney General to investigate eight Temer Ministers, including House of Representatives and Federal Senate presidents, twenty-four senators, forty federal deputies, three state governors, and former Presidents Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Lula, and Dilma Rousseff (Dilma, Lula e FHC têm pedido de investigação na Lava Jato encaminhado a outras instâncias, UOL (Apr. 11, 2017), https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2017/04/11/fachin-encaminha-pedidos-de-abertura-de-inquerito-de-dilma-lula-e-fhc-a-outros-foros.htm.Google Scholar

¹⁴⁰ This is not, of course, a Brazilian privilege. See Levitsky, Steve & Zibllat, Daniel, How Democracies Die? (2018); David Runciman, How Democracies End (2018).Google Scholar