² Von Bogdandy, Armin, ‘Law and Politics in the WTO: Strategies to Cope with a Deficient Relationship’, Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, 5 (2001), pp. 609–74.Google Scholar

³ While the decisions of international institutions have an effect on the citizens, the only form of legitimation available today is a highly indirect one derived from the (democratically elected) national governments (and their representatives in international organizations), rather than from the collectivity of world citizens.

⁴ Legitimacy can be understood as a general compliance of the people with decisions of a political order that goes beyond coercion or the contingent representation of interests. Normatively, democratic legitimacy results from a rational agreement among free and equal citizens.

⁵ Robert Howse is one of several authors who argue that the provisions of the WTO and their interpretation by the dispute settlement body can be understood not as usurping legitimate democratic choices for stricter regulations, but as enhancing the quality of deliberation among citizens about risk and control, although only at the level of membership ( Howse, R., ‘Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the World Trade Organization’, Michigan Law Review, 98: 7 (2000), pp. 2329–57CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

⁶ Stijn Smismans, ‘The European Economic and Social Committee: towards Deliberative Democracy via a Functional Assembly’, European Integration Online Papers, 4: 12 (2002).

⁷ The prevalent design of a western parliamentary mass democracy has been criticized extensively for being remote from citizens, for not reflecting their true concerns, and for fostering an empirical trend away from the active citoyen towards the passive and disinterested bourgeois. In the view of participatory democrats, interest aggregation dominates over the value-oriented discussion seeking political consensus and novel solutions to problems through a cooperative and creative process of dialogical exchange; see Carol Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970; Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1984.

⁸ Robert A. Dahl, ‘Can International Organizations Be Democratic? A Skeptic's View’, in I. Shapiro and C. Hacker-Cordon (eds), Democracy's Edges, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp. 19–36.

⁹ Stein, Eric, ‘International Integration and Democracy: No Love at First Sight’, American Journal of International Law, 95: 3 (2001), pp. 489–534.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ Given the huge differences in the size of the populations of different countries, no system of representation could give equal weight to the vote of each citizen and prevent small countries from being outvoted by larger countries.

¹¹ Only few believe that international institutions not only should, but actually can be, democratized in this sense, e.g., Falk, Richard and Strauss, Andrew, ‘Toward Global Parliament’, Foreign Affairs, 80: 1 (2001), pp. 212–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹² Haas, Peter M., ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination’, International Organization, 46: 1 (1992), pp. 1–35.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹³ However, it cannot be regarded as democratic: Even if we trust experts and scientists – for example in ‘comitology’ within the EU (see Joerges, Christian and Neyer, Jürgen, ‘Transforming Strategic Interaction into Deliberative Problem-solving: European Comitology in the Foodstuffs Sector’, Journal of European Public Policy, 4: 4 (1997), pp. 609–25CrossRefGoogle Scholar) – to advocate norms that, in their view, serve the common good of a polity and not some particular interest, their assessment and their view of the good still prevails.

¹⁴ Thompson, Michael and Rayner, Steve, ‘Risk and Governance Part I: The Discourses of Climate Change’, Government and Opposition, 33: 2 (1998), pp. 139–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁵ Steffek, Jens, ‘The Legitimation of International Governance: a Discourse Approach’, European Journal of International Relations, 9: 2 (2003), pp. 249–75.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁶ Joshua Cohen and Charles F. Sabel, ‘Sovereignity and Solidarity: EU and US’, in J. Zeitlin and D. Trubek (eds), Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy. European and American Experiments, London, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 249–75.

¹⁷ Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1996, p. 360.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 367.

¹⁹ Patrizia Nanz, ‘Legitimation of Transnational Governance Regimes: Foodstuff regulation at the WTO’, in C. Joerges, I. Sand and G. Teubner (eds), Constitutionalism and Transnational Governance, Oxford, Hart Publishing, forthcoming 2004.

²⁰ Patrizia Nanz, ‘Europolis. Constitutional Patriotism beyond the Nation State’, PhD dissertation, European University Institute, Florence, 2001.

²¹ Charnovitz, Steve, ‘Two Centuries of Participation: NGOs and International Governance’, Michigan Journal of International Law, 18: 1 (1997), pp. 183–286.Google Scholar

²² John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organization, London, Pinter, 1998, p. 47.

²³ Wilkinson, Rorden, ‘The WTO in Crisis. Exploring the Dimensions of Institutional Inertia’, Journal of World Trade, 35: 3 (2001), pp. 397–419.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

²⁴ Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, ‘The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and the World Trade Organization: Problems of Democratic Legitimacy’, in R. Porter et al. (eds), Efficiency, Equity and Legitimacy: the Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution, 2001, pp. 264–93.

²⁵ Green room consultations normally involve 10 to 25 out of more than 140 members.

²⁶ Marceau, Gabrielle and Pedersen, Peter N., ‘Is the WTO Open and Transparent?’, Journal of World Trade, 33: 1 (1999), pp. 5–49;Google Scholar see also WTO document WT/L/162 (23 July 1996).

²⁷ The decision on speeding up the derestriction procedure was taken in May 2002, see WTO document WT/L/452.

²⁸ See One World Trust (ed.), Global Accountability Report, London, One World Trust, 2003, p. 15.

²⁹ Diana Tussie and Maria P. Riggirozzi, ‘Pressing Ahead with New Procedures for Old Machinery: Global Governance and Civil Society’, in V. Rittberger (ed.), Global Governance and the United Nations System, Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 2001, pp. 158–80.

³⁰ Peter Willetts, ‘Civil Society Networks in Global Governance: Remedying the World Trade Organisation's Deviance from Global Norms’, presentation for the Colloquium on International Governance, Palais des Nations, Geneva, 20 September 2002.

³¹ Sebastian Oberthür et al., Participation of Non-Governmental Organisations in International Environmental Co-operation, Berlin, Erich Schmidt Verlag, 2002, pp. 117–41.

³² Elisabeth Türk, ‘The Role of NGOs in International Governance. NGOs and Developing Country WTO Members: Is there Potential for Alliance?’, in S. Griller (ed.), International Economic Governance and Non-Economic Concerns: New Challenges for the International Legal Order, Vienna and New York, Springer, 2003, pp. 162–211.

³³ Bellmann, Christoph and Gerster, Richard, ‘Accountability in the World Trade Organization’, Journal of World Trade, 30: 6 (1996), pp. 31–74.Google Scholar

³⁴ A prominent example for respected and widely used independent information on trade is the newsletter ‘Bridges’, published by the International Center for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD), see . See also the newsletter ‘Harmonization Alert’ published by the organization Public Citizen.

³⁵ For example, not even the representatives of international governmental organizations such as the United Nations Environment Programme are admitted as observers to the meetings of the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment.

³⁶ A symposium on the ‘Doha Development Agenda’ took place from 29 April to 1 May 2002 in Geneva, see also .

³⁷ See the Appelate Body's report on amicus curiae briefs of 8 November 2000, and WTO document WT/DS135/9 on the procedure of amicus brief submission; see also Petros C. Mavroidis, ‘Amicus Curiae Briefs before the WTO: Much Ado About Nothing’, in A. v. Bogdandy, P. C. Mavroidis and Y. Mény (eds), European Integration and International Coordination: Studies in Transnational Economic Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Den Haag, Kluwer Law International, pp. 317–29.

³⁸ Jens Steffek, ‘Free Trade as a Moral Choice: How Conflicts of Principle Have Troubled Transatlantic Economic Relations in the Past, and How a “Council on Trade and Ethics” Could Help Prevent them in the Future’, in European University Institute (ed.), Preventing Transatlantic Trade Disputes: Four Prize-winning Essays, Florence, European University Institute, 2001, pp. 45–55.

³⁹ There are already some efforts at training developing country delegations, and in particular those without permanent representation in Geneva. Since 1998 the Geneva-based Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation (AITIC) provides technical assistance to developing country delegates. The WTO itself holds training sessions for member governments without permanent representation, the so-called ‘Geneva weeks’. In 2001, the Advisory Centre on WTO Law was established as a law office specializing in international economic law, providing legal services and training exclusively to developing countries and economies-in-transition.

⁴⁰ See Miles Kahler's contribution to this issue.