15 Lewis, C. S., The Problem of Pain (London: HarperCollins, 1998, 1st ed. 1940) 35Google Scholar. After strongly affirming the doctrine of God's impassibility, Lewis suddenly “backs off” (Nicholas Wolterstorff, “C. S. Lewis on the Problem of Suffering,” The Chronicle of the Oxford University C. S. Lewis Society [2010] 3–20, at 5). Lewis then almost qualifies this doctrine: “Hence, if God sometimes speaks as though the Impassible could suffer passion and eternal fullness could be in want, and in want of those beings on whom it bestows all from their bare existence upwards, this can only mean, if it means anything intelligible by us, that God of mere miracle has made himself able so to hunger and created in Himself that which we can satisfy. . . . Before and behind all the relations of God to man, as we now learn them from Christianity, yawns the abyss of a Divine act of pure giving—the election of man, from nonentity, to be the beloved of God, and therefore (in some sense) the needed and desired of God, who but for that act needs and desires nothing” (Problem of Pain, 35–36 [italics added]).