So much commentary and discussion concerning the significance of religious language has been marketed for consumption during the two decades since Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations first altered the grounds of inquiry in contemporary philosophy of religion that any new contribution to the subject is apt to kindle as much excitement as the average Sunday sermon. The progressive exhaustion of the topic, it may be argued, has resulted largely from this shift, inasmuch as philosophers of religion have thereby so narrowed the horizons of their researches in pursuing the “logical” dimensions of religious utterances that, once this side of the issue has been thoroughly charted, nothing substantial is left to explore. It does not require any prophetic cry in the wilderness to contend, therefore, in the manner that I propose here that (1) the “logical” or neo-Wittgensteinian approach to the problem of religious language must be transcended and that (2) any new perspective need not renounce with counter-revolutionary animus the achievements of analytic philosophy in this field, but merely attempt to arrive at a more subtle understanding of how religious language is employed.

Introduction. Bloodless offerings of the most various kinds of food are a common and well-known feature of Greek sacrifice at all periods. The Greeks themselves thought of them as gifts for the gods (Plato, Euthyphr. 14c). The gift was delivered by simply putting it in a place, usually a shrine, where the god was present to receive it. This form of consecration has been given the appropriate technical name of “deposition,” to distinguish it from other methods of consecrating food-offerings to the gods — such as burning them or simply throwing them away.

This essay addresses the problem of the relation between membership and moral responsibility in the interpretation of the doctrines of original sin and atonement by Jonathan Edwards. Focusing on his image of a tree and its branches to typify the solidarity of men as sinners (“in Adam”) and as saints (“in Christ”), I will argue that Edwards defines the “nature” of man in organic and historical terms which modify significantly both the biological images of infection and regeneration in the Augustinian-Calvinist tradition and the juridical terms of federal headship in Puritan covenant theology. Edwards defines “membership” in the race of Adam, as well as in the body of Christ, as a form of participation in a history which is decisively shaped by the disposition of its organizing figure. Yet, in formulating the doctrines of original sin and atonement, Edwards is careful to maintain the balance between disposition as a generic characteristic and action as an individual responsibility. Edwards' theory of solidarity, informed by a sense of history as the medium of ethical relationship, is an instructive attempt to clarify the relation between curse and disobedience, as well as that between grace and faithfulness.