Why are researchers studying the health effects of economic change reaching markedly varying conclusions? To understand these differences, we first systematically searched Web of Science for the literature on recessions and health yielding 461 articles and 14,401 cited documents. We then undertook a network analysis of co-citation pattern by disciplines, journals and backgrounds of the authors, followed by a chronological review of the literature, to trace the evolution of ideas. We then examined the extent to which earlier literature predicted what has happened in the 2007–2012 crisis. Our analysis finds the literature is dominated by disciplinary silos, with economics studies predominantly citing each other and relative isolation of psychiatry and substance abuse journals. Different philosophical approaches to assessing causality appear to contribute to varying interpretations, a tendency that is unlikely to be resolved without a shift in research norms. We conclude by calling for more inter-disciplinary research that combines empirical findings with a search for plausible mechanisms. This approach would evaluate not only the effects of economic shocks but also the mechanisms that offer protection against them.

This Special Section of Health Economics, Policy and Law begins with an article on the different ways in which one might incentivise improved performance among health care providers. I asked five experts on performance management, Gwyn Bevan, Tim Doran, Peter Smith, Sandra Tanenbaum and Karsten Vrangbaek, to write brief reactions to the article and to the notion of performance management in health care in general. The commentators were given an open remit to be as critical as they wished to be, and their reactions can be found in the pages that follow. I would like to thank Albert Weale for reviewing all of the articles, and Katie Brennan for serving as the catalyst for this collection.

This short commentary on Oliver’s review of incentives relates that review to four models of governance: Trust and Altruism (T&A), Choice and Competition (C&C), Naming and Shaming (N&S) and Targets and Terror (T&T).

Financial and reputational incentives are increasingly common components in strategies to performance manage the medical profession. Judging the impacts of incentives is challenging, however, and the science of framework design remains in its infancy. Oliver’s taxonomy therefore offers a useful and timely guide to the approaches that are most likely to be successful (and unsuccessful) in the field of health care. The use of incentives to date has focused on process measures and a narrow range of outcomes, a pragmatic approach that has produced some substantial quality gains within the constraints of existing health care systems. Improvement of specific technical aspects of quality may, however, have been achieved at the expense of trust, cooperation and benevolence. Deficits in these indispensible virtues will undermine any attempt to performance manage the medical and allied professions.