Published online by Cambridge University Press: 04 January 2016
The purpose of this contribution is to provide a critical overview of issues of principle related to the ‘significant disadvantage’ admissibility criterion under 35(3)(b) ECHR, in light of the ongoing debate on the Court's reform. It argues that the admissibility criterion: undermines direct access to justice at the international level; affects the right of individual petition to the Strasbourg Court; constitutes a misunderstanding of the subsidiarity principle within the Convention machinery; urges the Court to consider the merits during the admissibility stage in a sensitive area of adjudication such as human rights; and entails the risk of an indirect classification of rights on the basis of the financial damage suffered by the applicant. The article links these points with the discussion on the Court's reform and considers alternative proposals to reduce its workload. It concludes by underlining that the ‘significant disadvantage’ criterion could be a suitable opportunity to address questions related to the Court's legitimacy, including the ECtHR's precise role and function within the Convention.
1 Protocol 14 contained a number of significant amendments to the Convention: the extension of the term of judges to a non-renewable period of nine years (art 2 of Protocol 14 and art 23(1) ECHR); the competence of single judges to declare applications inadmissible (art 7 of Protocol 14 and art 27 ECHR); the competence of the Committee of Ministers to reduce for a specific period the number of judges sitting at a Chamber to five (art 6 of Protocol 14 and art 26(2) ECHR; the promotion of friendly settlements (art 15 of Protocol 14 and art 39 ECHR); the strengthening of implementation of the Court's judgments, notably with a view to enabling the Committee to refer a matter to the Court (art 16 of Protocol 14 and arts 46(3), (4) and (5) ECHR); the clause enabling the EU accession to the ECHR (art 17 of Protocol 14 and art 59(2) ECHR); and the ‘significant disadvantage’ admissibility criterion. See further Caflisch, L, ‘The Reform of the European Court of Human Rights: Protocol No. 14 and beyond’ 6 HRLR (2006) 403Google Scholar.
2 Council of Europe, ‘Reforming the European Convention of Human Rights: Interlaken, Izmir, Brighton and beyond’ (2014).
3 The Protocols currently have been signed and ratified by a number of contracting parties. For the full list see <www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/213/signatures?p_auth=2v9oiMqb> (Protocol 15) and <www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/214/signatures?p_auth=2v9oiMqb> (Protocol 16).
4 European Court of Human Rights, ‘Annual Report 2014’, available at <echr.coe.int/Documents/Annual_Report_2014_ENG.pdf>.
5 See art 12 of Protocol 14.
6 See art 5 of Protocol 15. For an overall assessment of Protocol 15 see Vogiatzis, N, ‘When “Reform” Meets “Judicial Restraint”: Protocol 15 Amending the European Convention on Human Rights’ 66 NILQ (2015) 127CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
7 Dembour, M-B, ‘“Finishing off” Cases: The Radical Solution to the Problem of the Expanding ECtHR Caseload’ [2002] EHRLR 604Google Scholar.
8 Explanatory Report to Protocol No 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, point 10.
9 ibid, point 80. Some of the criteria are not necessarily subject to interpretation, such as the time limit to bring a case before the Court or that the application should not have been previously examined by the ECtHR.
10 Leach, P, ‘Access to the European Court of Human Rights – From a Legal Entitlement to a Lottery?’ 27 HRLJ (2006) 11Google Scholar.
11 Research Report, ‘The new admissibility criterion under Article 35§3(b) of the Convention: case-law principles two years on’ (Council of Europe 2012) 4, with reference to Ionescu v Romania, App No 36659/04 (decision on admissibility of 1 June 2010) para 35, and Gaglione and Others v Italy, App No 45867/07, 21 December 2010.
12 Research Report (n 11) 4–5 (emphasis added), with reference to Shefer v Russia, App No 45175/04 (decision on admissibility of 13 March 2012). The application of de minimis non curat praetor is rooted in well-established practices of domestic courts; see Ruedin, X-B, ‘De minimis non curat the European Court of Human Rights: the introduction of a new admissibility criterion (Article 12 of Protocol No. 14)’ [2008] EHRLR 80Google Scholar.
13 See, in this respect, S Greer, ‘The New Admissibility Criterion’ in S Besson (ed), The European Court of Human Rights after Protocol 14: Preliminary Assessment and Perspectives (Schulthess 2011) 35; Research Report (n 11); A Buyse, ‘Significantly Insignificant? The Life in the Margins of the Admissibility Criterion in Article 35 § 3(b) ECHR’ in B McGonigle Leyh et al. (eds), The Realization of Human Rights: When Theory Meets Practice. Studies in Honour of Leo Zwaak (Intersentia 2013) 107; Morawa, A, ‘The European Court of Human Rights' Rejection of Petitions Where the Applicant Has Not Suffered a Significant Disadvantage: A Discussion of Desirable and Undesirable Efforts to Safeguard the Operability of the Court’ 1 Journal of Transnational Legal Issues (2013) 1; European Court of Human Rights, ‘Practical Guide on Admissibility Criteria’ (2014) 88–96Google Scholar, available at <www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Admissibility_guide_ENG.pdf>.
14 Shefer (n 12) para 17.
15 Ionescu (n 11) para 34. Other cases where the financial impact was taken into consideration include: Fedotov v Moldova, App No 51838/07 (decision on admissibility of 24 May 2011) para 18; Bazelyuk v Ukraine, App No 49275/08 (decision on admissibility of 27 March 2012); Boelens and Others v Belgium, App No 20007/09 (decision on admissibility of 11 September 2012).
16 Korolev v Russia, App No 25551/05 (decision on admissibility of 1 July 2010).
17 Luchaninova v Ukraine, App No 16347/02, 9 June 2011, para 49; see also Giuran v Romania, App No 24360/04, 21 June 2011, paras 20–24.
18 Van Velden v The Netherlands, App No 30666/08, 19 July 2011, paras 37–39.
19 Giusti vItaly, App No 13175/03, 18 October 2011.
20 See, among others, Ionescu (n 11); Korolev (n 16); Rinck v France, App No 18774/09, 19 October 2011; Holub v Czech Republic, App No 24880/05 (decision on admissibility of 14 December 2010).
21 Giusti (n 19) para 34.
22 Research Report (n 11) 5, with reference notably to Korolev (n 16).
23 Greer (n 13, at 45) noted that the very limited use of the criterion during the first year of its introduction renders this amendment a ‘disappointing failure’; For Buyse (n 13), the new criterion failed to materialize ‘both the fears and the hopes’ of those opposing/supporting it.
24 Morawa (n 13, at 6) observes the lack of development of objective standards by the ECtHR and the use of the criterion on a rather discretionary basis.
25 Explanatory Report (n 8) point 82: ‘This clause, which reflects the principle of subsidiarity, ensures that, for the purposes of the application of the new admissibility criterion, every case will receive a judicial examination whether at the national level or at the European level’. The subsidiarity question is further discussed below.
26 See N Vogiatzis, ‘The Right to Extra-Judicial Redress in EU Law after the EU's Accession to the ECHR: The Legal Framework, Challenges and the Question of the Prior Involvement of the CJEU’ in V Kosta, N Skoutaris and V Tzevelekos (eds), The EU Accession to the ECHR (Hart Publishing 2014) 45.
27 Such an interpretation of art 13 was firstly introduced in Golder v the United Kingdom, App No 4451/70, 21 February 1975, para 33, but was clarified in Silver and Others v the United Kingdom, App Nos 5947/72 et al., 25 March 1983, para 113. The most well-known application of this approach was in Leander v Sweden, App No 9248/81, 26 March 1987; as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies see Raninen v Finland, App No 20972/92, 16 December 1997.
28 Trindade, AA Cançado, ‘The Consolidation of the Procedural Capacity of Individuals in the Evolution of the International Protection of Human Rights: Present State and Perspectives at the Turn of the Century’ 30 ColumHumRtsLRev (1998) 1, 13–14Google Scholar.
29 A Peters, ‘Membership in the Global Constitutional Community’ in J Klabbers, A Peters, and G Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University Press 2011) 161.
30 Moorhead, R and Pleasence, P, ‘Access to Justice after Universalism: An Introduction’ 30 Journal of Law and Society (2003) 1CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
31 Hessbruegge, JA, ‘The Historical Development of the Doctrines of Attribution and Due Diligence in International Law’ 36 NYUJIntL&Pol (2004) 265, 275Google Scholar.
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33 P Leach, Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2005) 84.
34 See Rule 59(3) of the Rules of Court and Rule 58 for inter-State applications. The latest version (June 2015) of the Rules can be accessed at <www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Rules_Court_ENG.pdf>.
35 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights adjudicates on cases brought to it only by the states and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (art 61 of the American Convention on Human Rights), while individuals or non-governmental organizations may lodge petitions with the Commission (art 44 of the American Convention). Under art 5(1) of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights the Commission, States, and African Intergovernmental Organizations can access the Court, but States (under article 34(6) of the Protocol) can make a declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive individual applications. It is also noted that the United Nations human rights treaty bodies that monitor the implementation of international human rights treaties, such as the Human Rights Committee (for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) or the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (for the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) may receive individual complaints (‘communications’) through Optional Protocols, but the findings of these bodies are generally considered to be of a non-judicial character; for the latter point see O'Flaherty, M, ‘The Concluding Observations of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (2006) 6 HRLR 27Google Scholar, in particular 32–7.
36 Wildhaber, L, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and International Law’ 56 ICLQ (2007) 217CrossRefGoogle Scholar, 227.
37 M Scheinin, ‘Access to Justice before International Human Rights Bodies: Reflections on the Practice of the UN Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights’ in F Francioni (ed), Access to Justice as a Human Right (Oxford University Press 2007) 135, 145.
38 Cançado Trindade (n 28) 10–11.
39 Scheinin (n 37) 146–7, with reference to Kurt v Turkey, App No 24276/94, 25 May 1998, para 165 and Petra v Romania, App No 27273/95, 23 September 1998.
40 Cançado Trindade (n 28) 11.
41 Cichowski, R, ‘Courts, Rights, and Democratic Participation’ 39 CompPolStud (2006) 50, 69Google Scholar.
42 Greer and Wildhaber (n 32) 664.
43 ibid.
44 E Storskrubb and J Ziller, ‘Access to Justice in European Comparative Law’ in Francioni (n 37) 177, 203.
45 Romano, C, ‘The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Pieces of the Puzzle’ 31 NYUJIntlL&Pol (1999) 709, 746Google Scholar.
46 See Helfer, L and Slaughter, A-M, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’ 107 YaleLJ (1997) 273Google Scholar.
47 Drzemczewski, A, ‘The sui generis Nature of the European Convention on Human Rights’ 29 ICLQ (1980) 54CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
48 Loizidou v Turkey, App No 15318/89, 23 March 1995, para 75.
49 Wildhaber (n 36) 220, 230; see also Al-Adsani v the United Kingdom, App No 35763/97, 21 November 2001, para 55.
50 Wildhaber (n 36) 230–1.
51 F Vanneste, ‘A New Inadmissibility Ground’ in P Lemmens and W Vandenhole (eds), Protocol No. 14 and the Reform of the European Court of Human Rights (Intersentia 2005) 70.
52 Leach (n 10) 22.
53 de Londras, F, ‘Dual Functionality and the Persistent Frailty of the European Court of Human Rights’ [2013] EHRLR 38, 40Google Scholar.
54 Greer and Wildhaber (n 32) 664–6.
55 ibid 684–7.
56 Dzehtsiarou, K and Greene, A, ‘Restructuring the European Court of Human Rights: preserving the right of individual petition and promoting constitutionalism’ [2013] PL 710, 712Google Scholar.
57 Leach (n 10) 18–19.
58 Compare, for example, Bratza, N, ‘The Relationship between the UK courts and Strasbourg’ [2011] EHRLR 505Google Scholar; Elliott, M, ‘After Brighton: Between a Rock and a Hard Place’ [2012] PL 619Google Scholar.
59 Morawa (n 13) 18.
60 The feasibility of the workload is certainly a valid claim but it is questionable whether the individual right of petition should be restricted before other alternatives are exhausted; considerations relating to the relevancy of compensation or other ways of relief probably point against the introduction of an admissibility criterion on the basis of the damage suffered, as will be shown below.
61 Nicol, D, ‘Original Intent and the European Convention on Human Rights’ [2005] PL 152Google Scholar.
62 Drzemczewski (n 47).
63 Kjeldgaard-Pedersen, A, ‘The Evolution of the Right of Individuals to Seise the European Court of Human Rights’ 12 Journal of the History of International Law (2010) 267CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
64 ibid 305–6.
65 ibid.
66 Carozza, P, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law’ 97 AJIL (2003) 38, 57–8CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
67 See, for example, Benvenisti, E, ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards’ 31 NYUJIntlLaw&Pol (1999) 843Google Scholar.
68 As already noted, this sentence will be deleted post-Protocol 15 ECHR.
69 CDDH, ‘Guaranteeing the long-term effectiveness of the European Court of Human Rights – Implementation of the Declaration adopted by the Committee of Ministers at its 112th Session’ (2003) CDDH(2003)026 Addendum I Final, at 8.
70 ibid 8–9. Beyond the CDDH, commentators have confirmed that the ‘significant disadvantage’ criterion was indeed seen as an expression of the subsidiarity principle; see Morawa (n 13) 6; Ruedin (n 12) 104.
71 Spielmann, D, ‘Allowing the Right Margin: The European Court of Human Rights and the National Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European review?’ 14 CYELS (2011–12) 381, 415Google Scholar.
72 Spielmann, D, ‘Whither the Margin of Appreciation?’ 67 CLP (2014) 49, 57Google Scholar.
73 Council of Europe (n 2) 266.
74 See Woolf, Lord, ‘Review of the Working Methods of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) 31–47Google Scholar, on the promotion of Alternative Dispute Resolution and/or Ombudsman institutions at the domestic level as a means to reduce the ECtHR's workload. This issue is returned to below.
75 Helfer goes beyond the subsidiarity principle to consider ‘embeddedness’ at the national level, that is, the ‘redesigning of the Council of Europe's supervisory system to embed the ECtHR more firmly in national legal systems’; see Helfer, L, ‘Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights: Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime’ 19 EJIL (2008) 125CrossRefGoogle Scholar, notably 130–1.
76 See art 46 ECHR.
77 Ruedin (n 12) 93; although Ruedin—exploring case law before the adoption of Protocol 14—considers the application of de minimis conceivable within the Convention.
78 Explanatory Report (n 8) point 83.
79 ibid, point 79.
80 ibid.
81 Research Report (n 11) 4.
82 Explanatory Report (n 8) point 81 (emphasis added).
83 For example, the eclipse of the deadline or the assessment that the alleged violation has to be committed by one of the contracting parties.
84 The question has not received sufficient attention within EU legal scholarship, but for the practice of the CJEU compare O'Keeffe, D, ‘Is the Spirit of Article 177 under Attack? Preliminary References and Admissibility’ 23 ELRev (1998) 509Google Scholar; Tridimas, T and Gari, G, ‘Winners and Losers in Luxembourg: A Statistical Analysis of Judicial Review before the European Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance (2001–2005)’ 35 ELRev (2010) 131Google Scholar.
85 Gerards, J, ‘Inadmissibility Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: A Critique of the Lack of Reasoning’ 14 HRLR (2014) 148Google Scholar, 154 (with regard to manifestly ill-founded applications, a point returned to below).
86 Buyse (n 13), with reference to Migalska v Poland, App No 10368/05, 4 December 2012, paras 60–66.
87 Migalska v Poland, para 64. See also Zborovský v Slovakia, App No 14325/08, 23 October 2012, para 39.
88 Research Report (n 11) 4.
89 See, in this respect, Price v the United Kingdom, App No 33394/96, 10 July 2001, para 24; Jalloh v Germany, App No 54810/00, 11 July 2006, para 67.
90 See, for example, Mavronicola, N, ‘What Is an “Absolute Right”? Deciphering Absoluteness in the Context of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ 12 HRLR (2012) 723Google Scholar.
91 Bankovic and Others v Belgium and Others, App No 52207/99 (decision on admissibility of 12 December 2001).
92 Y Shany, ‘Jurisdiction and Admissibility’ in C Romano, K Alter and Y Shany (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (Oxford University Press 2014) 779, 789.
93 Compare, however, the Court's different approach regarding its jurisdiction in Al-Skeini and Others v the United Kingdom, App No 55721/07, 7 July 2011; Al-Jedda v the United Kingdom, App No 27021/08, 7 July 2011.
94 Keller, H, Fischer, A and Kühne, D, ‘Debating the Future of the European Court of Human Rights after the Interlaken Conference: Two Innovative Proposals’ 21 EJIL (2011) 1025, 1029CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
95 Art 7 of Protocol 14 and art 27 ECHR.
96 Gerards (n 85) 148; Keller et al. (n 94) 1047, noting that the Court's legitimacy is undermined, and proposing transparent criteria in the Rules of Court on manifestly ill-founded applications.
97 Gerards (n 85) 154.
98 ibid 155.
99 Admissibility Guide (n 13) 82ff.
100 ibid 82.
101 ibid.
102 ibid 37; see also Miroļubovs and Others v Latvia, App No 798/05, 15 September 2009, para 62.
103 See, for instance, Bock v Germany, App No 22051/07 (decision on admissibility of 19 January 2010).
104 For a discussion of relevant cases see, in particular, Leach (n 33) 79–81.
105 H Keller, M Forowicz and L Engi, Friendly Settlements before the European Court of Human Rights: Theory and Practice (Oxford University Press 2010) 38, with reference to former art 38(1)(b) ECHR.
106 Shany (n 92) 802.
107 ibid.
108 If the European Ombudsman considers that a complaint is admissible, but there are no ‘grounds for inquiry’, she will not examine the case. The Ombudsman's discretion stems directly from art 228 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which grants the Ombudsman the power to examine complaints for which he or she ‘finds grounds’. By contrast, the Strasbourg Court under art 19 ECHR has to ‘ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention and the Protocols thereto’, acting as a European court of last resort for the protection of human rights. It might be wondered whether dispensing with admissibility in accordance with straightforward criteria, and leaving any decision involving a discretionary assessment of the case to a further step before the ‘merits stage’ is a methodological practice that could at least be examined as an option by the ECtHR.
109 Vanneste (n 51) 79.
110 Explanatory Report (n 8) point 39.
111 Art 15(2) ECHR refers to: the right to life (art 2 ECHR), except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war; freedom from torture (art 3 ECHR); freedom from slavery (art 4(1) ECHR); and the right not to be punished without law (art 7 ECHR).
112 Ruedin (n 12) 101.
113 Caflisch (n 1) 414.
114 ibid.
115 See the discussion above at (nn 14–24).
116 See, among others, D Shelton, ‘International Law and “Relative Normativity”’ in M Evans (ed), International Law (Oxford University Press 2014) 142ff; Bianchi, A, ‘Human Rights and the Magic of jus cogens’ 19 EJIL (2008) 491CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
117 Al-Adsani v the United Kingdom, App No 35763/97, 21 November 2001, paras 60–61 (with respect to prohibition of torture). The Inter-American Court of Human Rights has taken a significantly broader, if not risky, for some, approach—see, for example, Bianchi (n 116) 506. Among its notable contributions the reader is referred to Goiburú et al v Paraguay, 22 September 2006, para 131, granting jus cogens status to access to justice.
118 See, for example, Brems, E, ‘Conflicting Human Rights: An Exploration in the Context of the Right to a Fair Trial in the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ 27 HumRtsQ (2005) 294Google Scholar.
119 It has been argued that proportionality solves conflicts by establishing ‘occasional priorities’: see Tzevelekos, V, ‘Revisiting the Humanisation of International Law: Limits and Potential: Obligations erga omnes, Hierarchy of Rules and the Principle of Due Diligence as the Basis for Further Humanisation’ 6 Erasmus Law Review (2013) 62Google Scholar, 70ff.
120 It is, nonetheless, noted that the Court has examined cases despite the trivial nature of the issues because important questions on the interpretation and application of these rights were raised; see, for example, Živić v Serbia, App No 37204/08, 13 September 2011, para 40; Nicoleta Gheorghe v Romania, App No 23470/05, 3 April 2012, para 24.
121 D Shelton, Remedies in International Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press 2006) 270.
122 ibid 280–5. As Helfer points out (n 75, at 147), such practice created ‘a “sovereignty shield” that limited the Court's intrusiveness’.
123 See Broniowski v Poland, App No 31443/96, 22 June 2004.
124 See Colandrea, V, ‘On the Power of the European Court of Human Rights to Order Specific Non-Monetary Measures: Some Remarks in Light of the Assanidze, Broniowski and Sejdovic Cases’ 7 HRLR (2007) 396Google Scholar.
125 See Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2), App No 74025/01, 6 October 2005; see also more recently McHugh and Others v United Kingdom, App No 51987/08 and 1,014 others, 10 February 2015.
126 See notably the application of the doctrine in arts 8–11 ECHR.
127 Benvenisti (n 67).
128 Mahoney, P, ‘Universality Versus Subsidiarity in the Strasbourg Case Law on Free Speech: Explaining Some Recent Judgments’ [1997] EHRLR 364Google Scholar.
129 ibid 369 (emphasis in original).
130 Spano, R, ‘Universality or Diversity of Human Rights? Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity’ 14 HRLR (2014) 487, 491Google Scholar.
131 Annual Report 2014 (n 4) 5.
132 Dzehtsiarou and Greene (n 56) 710–19, in particular 718.
133 See Case C-185/95 P, Baustahlgewebe GmbH v Commission, [1998] ECR I-08417, para 41.
134 See art 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and art 257 TFEU.
135 See Annex I to Protocol No 3 of the Lisbon Treaty.
136 See art 263(4) TFEU and Case 25/62, Plaumann v Commission [1963] ECR 95; Case C-263/02 P, Jégo-Quéré v Commission [2004] ECR I-3425; Case C-583/11 P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami v Parliament and Council, Judgment of the Court of 3 October 2013.
137 Lord Woolf (n 74) 28.
138 Helfer (n 75) 155–6.
139 Report of the Group of Wise Persons to the Committee of Ministers (2006) CM(2006)203 available at <https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1063779>.
140 A Mowbray, ‘Beyond Protocol 14’ 6 HRLR (2006) 578, 582.
141 ibid 583.
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143 See art 1 of Protocol 16.
144 Arts 4 and 5 of Protocol 16.
145 Dzehtsiarou, K and O'Meara, N, ‘Advisory Jurisdiction and the European Court of Human Rights: A Magic Bullet for Dialogue and Docket-Control?’ 34 LS (2014) 444Google Scholar.
146 Nicol (n 61).
147 Kjeldgaard-Pedersen (n 63).
148 Helfer (n 75) 128.
149 Caflisch (n 1) 415. Caflisch was proven right; the High-Level Conferences in Interlaken, Izmir, and Brighton attempted a new reform after Protocol 14, and, at the time of writing (and even assuming that Protocols 15 and 16 will be easily ratified, which is far from certain) it is unclear whether any of the two Protocols will significantly decrease the ECtHR's workload.
150 Greer (n 13) 46.
151 See Council of Europe (n 2).
