The establishment of cosmology as a science provides a parallel to the building-up of the scientific status of astrobiology. The rise of astrobiological studies is explicitly based on a transdisciplinary approach that reminds of the Copernican Revolution, which eroded the basis of a closed Aristotelian worldview and reinforced the notion that the frontiers between disciplines are artificial. Given the intrinsic complexity of the astrobiological studies, with its multifactorial evidences and theoretical/experimental approaches, multi- and interdisciplinary perspectives are mandatory. Insulated expertise cannot grasp the vastness of the astrobiological issues. This need for integration among disciplines and research areas is antagonistic to excessive specialization and compartmentalization, allowing astrobiology to be qualified as a truly transdisciplinary enterprise. The present paper discusses the scientific status of astrobiological studies, based on the view that every kind of life, Earth-based or not, should be considered in a cosmic context. A confluence between ‘astro’ and ‘bio’ seeks the understanding of life as an emerging phenomenon in the universe. Thus, a new epistemological niche is opened, pointing to the development of a pluralistic vision for the philosophy of astrobiology.

Kant was not the first in whom the ‘starry heavens’ above us inspired awe and wonder. For Kant, who was firmly convinced of the existence of inhabitants of other worlds, these heavens were inhabited. He is certain that ‘If it were possible to settle by any sort of experience whether there are inhabitants of at least some of the planets that we see, I might well bet everything that I have on it. Hence I say that it is not merely an opinion but a strong belief (on the correctness of which I would wager many advantages in life) that there are also inhabitants of other worlds.’ In this statement by Kant in no less a work than the Critique of Pure Reason one can, on the one hand, recognize a reflection of Kant's earlier convictions and expositions, on the other hand, the context of the citation and the contemporary background are, of course, relevant. Following the example of Kant, this paper investigates the meaning of such reflections about inhabitants of alien worlds, which due to advances in planetary astronomy are today again on the agenda. Consideration of this subject also represents a challenge for theology.

This paper analyses the use of wonder in the TV-series Cosmos: A Personal Voyage (1980). Popular science has been studied extensively (e.g. Broks 2006; Leane 2007; Perrault 2013), and wonder has been studied moderately (e.g. Daston & Park 1998; Fuller 2006; Vasalou 2015). However, there are very few studies of wonder in popular science. This paper explores how and why wonder is used in Cosmos, with the wider aim of understanding uses of wonder in popular science. The studies that discuss wonder in popular science (Fahnestock 1986; Perrault 2013) argue that wonder is used to enthuse the audience about science, but they do not discuss why wonder has this ability, nor whether wonder has other functions. This paper argues that Fuller's (2006) psychological and evolutionary account of wonder can elucidate why wonder has the ability to enthuse; it discerns three senses of ‘wonder’ (related to objects, emotions and attitudes); and it discusses other functions of wonder (existential, aesthetic and ethical). Due to the centrality of astrobiological questions in Cosmos, this paper also highlights the relation of these questions to the senses and functions of wonder in Cosmos.

Cleland and Chyba published a classic piece in 2002 that began a movement I call definitional pessimism, where it is argued that there is no point in attempting anything like a general definition of life. This paper offers a critical response to the pessimist position in general and the influential arguments offered by Cleland and her collaborators in particular. One such argument is that all definitions of life fall short of an ideal in which necessary and sufficient conditions produce unambiguous categorizations that dispose of all counterexamples. But this concept of definition is controversial within philosophy; a fact that greatly diminishes the force of the admonition that biologists should conform to such an ideal. Moreover, biology may well be fundamentally different from logic and the physical sciences from which this ideal is drawn, to the point where definitional conformity misrepresents biological reality. Another idea often pushed is that the prospects for definitional success concerning life are on a par with medieval alchemy's attempts to define matter – that is, doomed to fail for lack of a unifying scientific theory. But this comparison to alchemy is both historically inaccurate and unfair. Planetary science before the discovery of the first exoplanets offers a much better analogy, with much more optimistic conclusions. The pessimists also make much of the desirability of using microbes as models for any universal concept of life, from which they conclude that certain types of ‘Darwinian’ evolutionary definitions are inadequate. But this argument posits an unrealistic ideal, as no account of life can both be universal and do justice to the sorts of precise causal mechanisms microbes exemplify. The character of biology and the demand for universality in definitions of life thus probably accords better with functional rather than structural categories. The bottom line is that there is simply no viable alternative, either pragmatically or theoretically, to the pursuit of definitions. If nothing else, the empirical data the pessimists demand will be a very long time coming and scientists will of necessity continue to employ definitions of life in the interim. Chastising them for this will only drive their ideas underground where they can escape critical analysis, making the problems caused by problematic conceptions of life worse.

The question of the origin of life interested people for centuries. All existing views on this subject can be classified into different areas of human knowledge about the world: natural sciences, philosophy, and theology (religion). It is interesting to look at them closer and to classify all the typical groups of the theories about the origins of life. We can then see links existing between them and relationships that indicate their own nature. Nowadays, driving forces of prebiological chemical evolution and the mode of explanation of the transition ‘non-life into life’ give a great variety of solutions. The differences between the theories, however, as well as the current controversies in the scientific community (what ‘in the beginning’ was?; where and when the prebiotic evolution may took place? etc.) will be shown as of secondary importance for the theories’ systematization in comparison with several much more profound philosophical assumptions underlying the origin-of-life-studies. My proposal to organize and classify different types of the theories of genesis of life allows for extracting conceptions of different kind: metaphysical and scientific, and also for comparing them with each other. Some of them answer the question of the emergence of life in general and others on the question of the origin of life on the Earth only. In the perspective of contemporary scientific research on the origin of life it seems interesting that two main ideas concerning the problem of the origin of life, spontaneous generation and panspermia, are still present as presuppositions of certain theories but have been modified. Thus a ‘philosophical key’ seems to be the most appropriate to systematize all kinds of theories on the origin of life. This paper is an attempt to justify the position adopted. Most important conclusion is that the philosophical basis or implications, which are irreducibly present and possible to be found within the scientific theories of the origin of life, indicates that this problem is not just the strictly scientific one; it is the philosophical problem, too; thus it cannot be fully solved merely through referring to the empirical aspect of biogenesis.

Faced with a choice between attempting to seed another world with terrestrially-sourced microbes (with which we would have a shared origin) and microbes sourced from elsewhere within the solar system (whose origins might therefore differ), would we have any non-instrumental ethical reason to favour the terrestrial microbes? What follows will argue that in relation to the goals of promoting life similar to our own, or even simply microbial life, we might conceivably make such an appeal and do so in a defensible manner. However, in no case would such a consideration operate as a silencer for rival considerations (such as likelihood of success, enhancing diversity or historical justice). The thought experiment serves to highlight the diversity of considerations which are in play in ethical deliberation about matters of astrobiology and the role of practical wisdom rather than trumping considerations.

At the beginning of the 21st century we witness considerable global developments in space exploration and a new era has begun: the New Space Age. The principal symbols of that age are firstly internationalization of space activities, secondly commercial utilization of space technologies, and lastly emergence of outer space economy. This paper presents selected signposts of the New Space Age. Three cases of recent outer space enterprises: recovery of asteroid resources (exo-mining), post-cremation memorial spaceflight (exo-burials) and first extraterrestrial advert (exo-marketing), are introduced in order to emphasize the monetary and social dimension of commercial application of space technologies. To give an illustration of these trends, this paper provides a brief socioculturally minded account of three outer space undertakings that are interpreted as signposts of the new era.

Various Mars missions have detected Cl atoms, chlorides and perchlorates in martian surface materials. The global soils, in particular, always contain significant levels of observable Cl. Direct evidence points to this Cl being in the form of both chlorides and perchlorates, and possibly also chlorates and other oxychlorines. The most widespread measurements have been of Cl atoms, and cannot discern the chemical form. However, from separate evidence of perchlorate obtained at high latitudes (Phoenix lander) and low latitudes (Curiosity rover), it is likely that perchlorates are widespread, albeit in varying proportions relative to the total amount of ubiquitous Cl.

The search for intelligent life or any type of life involves processes with nonlinear chaotic behaviours throughout the Universe. Through the sensitive dependence condition, chaotic dynamics are also difficult or impossible to duplicate, forecast and predict. Similar evolution patterns will result in completely different outcomes. Even, the intelligent life evolution pattern, based on carbon, DNA–RNA–protein, will differ from all possible sequences. In the present paper, the stochastic dyadic Cantor set models the many possible variations of such chaotic behaviours in the Universe, yielding to a tendency to zero, for any scenario of intelligent life evolution. The probability of the development of the exact microscopic and macroscopic scenario that is capable of supporting intelligent life or any other type of life in any planet is vanishingly small. Thus, the present analysis suggests that mankind, as an extremely statistically uncommon occurrence, is unique and alone in the Universe.

We address the possibility that intelligent civilizations that destroy themselves could present signatures observable by humanity. Placing limits on the number of self-destroyed civilizations in the Milky Way has strong implications for the final three terms in Drake's Equation, and would allow us to identify which classes of solution to Fermi's Paradox fit with the evidence (or lack thereof). Using the Earth as an example, we consider a variety of scenarios in which humans could extinguish their own technological civilization. Each scenario presents some form of observable signature that could be probed by astronomical campaigns to detect and characterize extrasolar planetary systems. Some observables are unlikely to be detected at interstellar distances, but some scenarios are likely to produce significant changes in atmospheric composition that could be detected serendipitously with next-generation telescopes. In some cases, the timing of the observation would prove crucial to detection, as the decay of signatures is rapid compared with humanity's communication lifetime. In others, the signatures persist on far longer timescales.

A well-developed theory of evolutionary biology requires understanding of the origins of life on Earth. However, the initial conditions (ontology) and causal (epistemology) bases on which physiology proceeded have more recently been called into question, given the teleologic nature of Darwinian evolutionary thinking. When evolutionary development is focused on cellular communication, a distinctly different perspective unfolds. The cellular communicative-molecular approach affords a logical progression for the evolutionary narrative based on the basic physiologic properties of the cell.

Critical to this appraisal is recognition of the cell as a fundamental reiterative unit of reciprocating communication that receives information from and reacts to epiphenomena to solve problems. Following the course of vertebrate physiology from its unicellular origins instead of its overt phenotypic appearances and functional associations provides a robust, predictive picture for the means by which complex physiology evolved from unicellular organisms. With this foreknowledge of physiologic principles, we can determine the fundamentals of Physiology based on cellular first principles using a logical, predictable method. Thus, evolutionary creativity on our planet can be viewed as a paradoxical product of boundary conditions that permit homeostatic moments of varying length and amplitude that can productively absorb a variety of epigenetic impacts to meet environmental challenges.