Published online by Cambridge University Press: 15 July 2010
For several months after the September 2005 publication of twelve cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, the debate was largely confined to a Danish context. Early international protests of the cartoons were voiced by government officials in several countries, including Pakistan, Iran, and Egypt. However, until late December 2005, in what I will call phase one of the controversy, Danish Muslims fought a primarily domestic battle for some kind of recognition from the newspaper and the Danish government that the cartoons had hurt religious feelings. In October 2005 an ad hoc coalition of Danish Muslim organizations, with The Community of Islamic Faith (Det Islamiske Trossamfund) and its affiliated imams at the lead, tried to put pressure on the Danish government through ambassadors from Muslim countries posted in Denmark. The ambassadors' request for a meeting with the Danish prime minister was turned down, as were other attempts by Danish Muslims to raise claims with the government.
Author's Note: An earlier version of this article was presented in May 2007 at the international conference “Muslim Mobilization and Claims-Making in Secular Europe and Beyond: An Inter-Disciplinary Challenge?” at the Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies of the European University Institute in Florence. The conference was organized by Valérie Amiraux and Lasse Lindekilde in the framework of the MUSMINE initiative. The author thanks Professor Werner Schiffauer, Professor Donatella della Porta, and three anonymous referees for very helpful suggestions and insightful comments on earlier versions of this article.
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22 Muslimer vil skabe forsoning, website of Muslims in Dialogue, http://www.m-i-d.dk/ (accessed 9 February 2006).
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32 Ahmed Akkari, interview with the author, 27 December 2006.
33 Quoted in Elisabeth Lumby, “Muslimer i oprør over Islamisk Trossamfund” (Muslims in Uproar over The Community of Islamic Faith), Berlingske Tidende, 21 February 2008, 3.
