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The Ulama–State Relations in Iran: 1921–1941

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 January 2009

Mohammad H. Faghfoory
Affiliation:
AlexandriaVirginia

Extract

The role of the ulama in Iranian politics during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has been studied extensively. Particularly the rise of the ulama's social influence and power in the Tobacco Movement (1891–1892) and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905–1911 has been investigated at length. Much less attention has been devoted to examining the relationship between the ulama and the state after the Constitutional Revolution, and the role of the religious community in Reza Khan's assumption of power and his subsequent accession to the throne in 1925.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1987

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References

Author's note: I would like to express my sincere thanks to Professor Nikki R. Keddie, who read an earlier draft of this paper, made generous and perceptive comments, and suggested its publication. I also thank Dr. Yann Richard for his useful comments and suggestions. However, the responsibility for the views and errors is solely mine.Google Scholar

1 On the Tobacco uprising of 1891–1892 consult Adamiyyat, Fereidun, Shurish bar imtiaz name-i reggie (Tehran, 1360/1981),Google Scholar and Keddie, Nikki R., Religion and Rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest of 1891–1892 (London, 1966).Google Scholar On the role of the ulama in the Constitutional Revolution see Kasravi, Ahmad, Tarikh-i mashruteh Iran, 8th ed. (Tehran, 1349/1970);Google ScholarAlgar, Hamid, Religion and State in Iran: 1785–1906 (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1972).Google Scholar See also Lambton, Ann K. S., “The Persian Ulama and the Consitutional Reform,” in Le shiʿisme imamite: Colloque de Strasburg, 05 6–9, 1968 (Paris, 1970);Google Scholar and Arjomand, S. A., “The Ulama's Traditionalist Opposition to Parliamentarianism,” Middle Eastern Studies, 17, 2 (04 1981), 174–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 See Faghfoory, Mohammad H., “The Role of the Ulama in Twentieth Century Iran with Particular Reference to Ayatullah Haj Sayyid Abul-Qasim Kashani,” Ph. D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Department of History, 1978, chapter 2.Google Scholar See also Akhavi, Shahrough, Religion and Politics in Contemporary Iran: Clergy-State Relations in the Pahlavi Period (New York, 1980), chapter 2;Google Scholar and Fischer, Michael, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution (Cambridge, Mass., 1980).Google Scholar

3 See Bahar, Malik al Shuʿara, Tarikh-i mukhtasar-i ahzab-i siyasi-i Iran (Tehran, 1323/1944), pp. 100, 102–3.Google Scholar See also Makki, Husayn, Tarikh-i bist saleh-i Iran (Tehran, 1324/1945), vol. I, pp. 206, 212.Google Scholar

4 Abdullah Mostowfi states that Sayyid Ziya intended to carry out a coup d'état against Reza Khan with the help of Armenians. On these charges and Sayyid Ziya's relations with Armenians see Mostowfi, Abdullah, Sharh-i zindigani-i man (Tehran, 1325/1946), vol. 3, part 1, p. 362.Google Scholar See also Hallaj, Hasan, Tarikh-i tahavvolat-i siyasi Iran dar qurun-i muʿasir (Tehran, n.d.) pp. 8385.Google Scholar

5 See Bahar, Tarikh-i mukhtasar-i ahzab, p. 100.Google Scholar See also Makki, , Tarikh-i bist saleh, vol. I, p. 205.Google Scholar

6 Makki, , Tarikh-i bist saleh, vol. 2, pp. 330–31.Google Scholar

7 Ibid., p. 319.

8 Ibid., pp. 330–32. See also Abrahamian, Ervand, “The Crowd in Iranian Politics: 1905–1953,” Past and Present, 41 (12 1968), 201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

9 Bey, Essad, Reza Shah (London, 1938), p. 106.Google Scholar

10 Makki, , Tarikh-i bist saleh, vol. 2, p. 332.Google Scholar

11 Ibid., p. 340.

12 Dowlatabadi, Yahya, Tarikh-i ʿasr-i hazir ya hayat-i yahya (Tehran, 1331/1952), vol. 3, pp. 350–51.Google Scholar

13 Makki, , Tarikh-i bist saleh, vol. 2, p. 320.Google Scholar See also Abrahamian, Ervand, “The Crowd,” 201.Google Scholar In his memoirs Hedayat reports that “it is Wednesday and anarchy prevails everywhere in Tehran. It is said that the British oppose republicanism but the Soviets support it. The meeting of the republicanists has turned into a scandal. Anti-republican forces surrounded the Majlis. Everywhere the people tear off the republican flags.” See Hedayat, Mahdi Quli Kah, Khatirat va khatarat (Tehran, 1344/1965), pp. 363–66.Google Scholar

14 Ibid., p. 367.

15 Hedayat says that “this speech reminds us of a similar maneuver by Nadir Shah Afshar in Dasht-i Mughan.”Google ScholarIbid.

16 Makki, , Tarikh-i bist saleh, vol. 2, p. 344.Google Scholar Also see Hedayat, Khatirat va khatarat, p. 368.Google Scholar Translation of the text of this speech is available in Wilber, Donald, Riza Shah: Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran (New York, 1975), p. 79.Google Scholar

17 Hedayat, Khatirat va khatarat, p. 368.Google Scholar See also Mostowfi, Abdullah, Sharh-i zindigani-i man, 2nd ed. (Tehran, 1343/1964), vol. 3, p. 290.Google Scholar

18 Muhammad Razi reports that after Ayatollah Haʾiri settled in Qum, the city became a point of attraction for many well-known ulama. Many prominent Ayatollahs came to Qum and held classes in the hawzah-yi ʿilmiyya. Among the most respected of these ulama, according to Razi, were Ayatollahs Reza Masjid Shahi, Isfahani, Abul-Hasan Angaji, Sayyid Hasan Jabal ʿAmili Hajj Muhammad Husayn Kashif al-Qitaʿ, and many others. See Razi, Muhammad, Athar al-hujja (Qum, 1332/1953), vol. 1, pp. 7684.Google Scholar

19 Dowlatabadi, , Hayat-i yahya, vol. 3, p. 289.Google Scholar

20 Ibid., pp. 289–92. For the text of this letter see Akhavi, Religion and Politics, pp. 30–31.Google Scholar

21 Habl al-matin, as quoted in Parizi, M. B., Talashi-i azadi: zindigani-i Moshir al-Dowlah (Tehran, 1347/1968), pp. 427–28.Google Scholar

22 Makki, , Tarikh-i bisi saleh, vol. 1, p. 272.Google Scholar

23 Mostowfi, , Sharh-i zindigani-i man, vol. 3, pp. 240–42.Google Scholar See also Qudsi, Hasan Iʿzam, Kitab-i khatirat-i man, (Tehran, 1342/1963), vol. 2, p. 48.Google Scholar

25 Mahmud Khan Amir lqtidar was once a mullah himself and personally knew many leading ulama of Isfahan. He was also acquainted with their mentality and knew that the mullahs would retreat whenever they faced a strong government. He dealt with them from a position of strength and ruled with an iron hand as the military governor of Isfahan. Also, by pursuing a simple life contrary to that of the wealthy mullahs of the city, he won the sympathy and friendship of the rank and file people in Isfahan. See Dowlatabadi, , Hayat-i yahya, vol. 3, pp. 294–95.Google Scholar

26 Tahmasib, Abdullah Amir, Tarikh-i shahanshahi-i aʿlahazrat Reza Shah Pahlavi (Tehran, 1305/1926), pp. 5253.Google Scholar

27 Rooznamah-i Panir (a newspaper published in India), as quoted in Bastani Parizi, Talash-i azadi, p. 424.Google Scholar

28 The portrait is printed in Bahar, Tarikh-i mukhrasar-i ahzab. The text of this telegram is available in Tahmasib, Amir, Tarikh-i shahanshahi, p. 95. See also pp. 58–59 and 97.Google Scholar

29 Dowlatabadi, , Hayat-i yahya, vol. 3, pp. 365–66.Google Scholar

30 Amir Tahmasib records the names of many ayatollahs and lesser mullahs who sent telegrams in support of Reza Khan against Ahmad Shah. See Tarikh-i shahanshahi, pp. 57–58 and 90–91.Google Scholar

31 Dowlatabadi, , Hayat-i yahya, vol. 3, pp. 333–34.Google Scholar See also Noori, Ibrahim Khajah, Bazigaran-i 'asr tala'ie (Tehran, nd.), p. 248.Google Scholar

32 Dowlatabadi, , Hayat-i yahya, vol. 3, p. 285.Google Scholar

33 Habl al-matin, #8 as quoted in Parizi, Bastani, Talash-i azadi, pp. 430–31.Google Scholar

34 Every possible means was used to create fear and insecurity among Reza Khan's opponents. Vaʿiz Qazvini, publisher of a newspaper in Qazvin, was a genuine nationalist and in his writings frequently attacked Reza Khan. In Aban 1304/October 1925 two days before Reza Khan's election as the new shah, Vaʿiz Qazvini was assassinated by a plot engineered by the secret police. The plot was carried out by a famous criminal of Tehran known as Husayn Fishangchi (the Bullet Holder). This terrorism frightened many of Reza Khan's opponents and forced them to remain silent. For details of this terrorist act see Dowlatabadi, , Hayat-i yahya, vol. 3, pp. 376–79.Google Scholar

35 Mudhakirat-i Majlis, Aban 9, 1304/October 31, 1925, as quoted in Parizi, Bastani, Talash-i azadi, pp. 453–54.Google Scholar

36 Tahmasib, Amir, Tarikh-i shahanshahi, pp. 91–208.Google Scholar

37 Ibid., pp. 301–2.

38 Ibid., pp. 328–29. In a telegram to the Court, Ayatollah Muhammad Reza Zanjani called the day of Reza Khan's appointment as the Shah by the Majlis “the day that the holy religion of Islam was perfected.” See ibid., pp. 303–4. For more telegrams sent to the court by the ulama on this occasion see pp. 305–74.

39 Hikmat, Ali Asghar, Si khatirah as ʿasr-i farkhondah-i Pahiavi (Tehran, 1355/1976), p. 199.Google Scholar For the list of the deputies of the Constituent Assembly see Tahmasib, Amir, Tarikh-i shahanshahi, pp. 430–48. Of twenty-five deputies elected for Tehran, seven were from among the ulama. They were Ayatollahs Sayyid Abul-Qasim Kashani, Shirazi, Tehrani, Yazdi, Behbahani, ʿAbdul-Rahim Kashani, and Mullah Assadullah.Google Scholar

40 Tahmasib, Amir, Tarikh-i shanhanshahi, pp. 628–33.Google Scholar Hikmat provides an interesting report on the coronation ceremony of Reza Khan: “when the crown was brought before the Shah, Ayatullah Haj Mirza Yahya Khoʾie–a member of the five-man committee in the Majlis to supervise legislation–took the crown and wanted to crown the Shah. He wanted to highlight the influence of the ulama on and friendship with the new Shah. Reza Shah was clever. He disappointed Khoʾie and the ulama by taking the crown from him and putting it on his head.” See Hikmat, Si khatirah, pp. 192–93.Google Scholar

41 Bahar, , Divan-i ashʿar (Tehran, 1335/1956), p. 359.Google Scholar

42 Wilber, Donald, Riza Shah, p. 107.Google Scholar

43 The text of the speech is available in Tahmasib, Amir, Tarikh-i shahanshahi, pp. 394–95.Google Scholar

44 Ibid., p. 705.

45 Pahiavi, Reza Shah, Yaddashtha-yi Reza Shah, translated from the Arabic by Istakhri, M. H. (Tehran, 1336/1957), p. 75.Google Scholar

46 Dowlat-i ʿaliyyeh-i Iran, vizarat-i maʿarif va sanayeʿ-i mustazrafa: lhsaiʾye-i maʿarif va madaris, 1307/1928,Google Scholar as quoted in Akhavi, Religion and Politics, p. 37.Google Scholar

47 Hedayat, Khatirat va khatarat, p. 376. See also p. 367.Google Scholar

48 Ettela'at Year Book, Havadis-i mohim dar yek rubʿe qarn (Tehran, Mehr 1329/September 1950), p. 26.Google Scholar

49 Hedayat, Khatirat va khatarat, pp. 376–78.Google Scholar

51 Ettela'at Year Book, Havadis-i mohim, pp. 26–27.Google Scholar

52 For an account of modernization program under Reza Shah see Banani, Amin, The Modernization of Iran, 1921–1941 (Stanford, 1961).Google Scholar

53 On anticlerical and nationalistic tendencies see Kasravi, Ahmad, Din va danish, 2nd ed. (Tehran, 1339/1959):Google ScholarDin va siyasar, 2nd ed. (Tehran, 1348/1969):Google Scholar and Yek din va yek darafsh (Tehran, 1351/1972).Google Scholar

54 For a biography of Sayyid Hasan Mudarris and his relations with Reza Shah see Makki, Husayn, Mudarris: qahraman-i azadi (Tehran, 1357/1978).Google Scholar See also Farrokh, Mahdi, Khatirat-i siyasi (Tehran, 1347/1968), pp. 230–31,Google Scholar and Mostowfi, , Sharh-i zindigani man, vol. 3, p. 248.Google Scholar For an account of other ulama's opposition to modernization see Razi, , Athar al-hujja, vol. 1, pp. 2831.Google Scholar

55 Razi, , Athar al-hujja, vol. 1, pp. 4851.Google Scholar

56 Ibid., p. 114.

57 The clerical community justified its passivity and lack of resistance toward the government's policies on the basis of their own weakness and the government's strength. The following poem was the slogan of the ulama after 1929. In several interviews that I conducted in 1976 with Ayatollah Hajj Sayyid Abulfazl Zanjani and several other ulama, the same poem was repeated in response to the above question: Dar kaf-i sheer-i nar-i khunkhareʾie ghayr-i taslim o riza koo chareʾie. [In the hands of a bloodthirsty lion what is to be done but submission.]Google Scholar

58 Regarding this incident, which resulted in the murder of Major Robert Imbrie, the American Consul General, by the mullahs and the mob, see Qudsi, Iʿzam, Kitab-i khatirat-i man, vol. 2, p. 669,Google Scholar and Dowlatabadi, , Hayat-i yahya, vol. 3, p. 269.Google Scholar See also Zirinsky, Michael P., ‘Blood, Power and Hypocrisy: The Murder of Robert Imbrie and American Relations with Pahlavi Iran, 1924,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, 18 (08 1986), 275–92.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

59 Qudsi reports that “in Yazd and its surroundings the Zoroasterians are expected to salute Muslims. If a Zoroasterian is riding on a horse and a Muslim passes by, he must dismount and remain still until the Muslim disappears. The mullahs encourage this kind of practice to enhance their own status. Is this the way the Prophet—Peace be upon Him—treated the non-Muslims? These un-Islamic practices must be abandoned and people must be educated to learn proper social behavior.” See Qudsi, Kitab-i khatirat-i man, p. 104.Google Scholar

60 The ulama bitterly opposed the allocation of 600 tomans in the annual budget of 1925/1306 for music education in each public school. Muʿtazid al-Islam, a mullah deputy in the Majlis, particularly insisted on abolition of this program. The Majlis simply ignored him and other mullahs' warnings on this issue. See Ettelaʿat Year Book, Havadis-i mohim, p. 31.Google Scholar

61 Even the ayatollahs were not exempt from this practice. Razi describes how Ayatollah Mahdi Hakim was treated by the bus driver on a journey from Qum to Tehran. See Athar al-huija, vol. 1, p. 118. Ayatollah Sayyid Abulfazl Zanjani and Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad Kashani also pointed to this experience in personal interviews that I had with them in the summer of 1976.Google Scholar

62 In order to create further dissension among the mullahs, the government purchased their support and cooperation through bribing some and granting others positions in government departments. Qudsi reports that several mullahs were admitted to the Bureau of Registration after adequate training. On some occasions the government acted as arbitrator and mediator to resolve ulama's differences with each other. See Qudsi, Kitab-i khatirat-i man, pp. 119, 123.Google Scholar

63 Ibid., pp. 229–31. See also Razi, , Athar al-hujja, vol. 1, pp. 70, and 229–31.Google Scholar