Hostname: page-component-8448b6f56d-qsmjn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-04-17T03:50:09.578Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The partisan paradox and the U.S. tariff, 1877–1934

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 May 2009

David Epstein  and
Sharyn O'Halloran
David Epstein
Affiliation:
A Post-Doctorate Fellow in Positive Political Economy at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Assistant Professor of Political Science at Columbia University, New York.
Sharyn O'Halloran
Affiliation:
A Post-Doctorate Fellow in Positive Political Economy at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Assistant Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at Columbia University, New York.
Get access

Abstract

Whereas historical accounts of U.S. tariff policy from 1877 to 1934 emphasize the pivotal role of parties, previous quantitative studies have failed to identify significant partisan effects. A formal model of policymaking in which strong parties aggregate voters' preferences provides empirical equations to test for partisan effects. Subsequent time series analysis shows that, even after controlling for interest group demands, partisan control of government did significantly affect the tariff. Moreover, during the period under study, the two political parties enacted tariff policies that benefited different sets of producer groups at the expense of others. Thus, political institutions did play a significant role in shaping the interests that influence U.S. foreign economic policy.

Type
Articles
Information
International Organization , Volume 50 , Issue 2 , Spring 1996 , pp. 301 - 324
Copyright
Copyright © The IO Foundation 1996

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Alesina, Alberto, and Rosenthal, Howard. 1994. Partisan politics, divided government, and the economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Baack, Bennett D., and Ray, Edward J.. 1983. The political economy of tariff policy: A case study of the United States. Explorations in Economic History 20:73–93.Google Scholar
Baack, Bennett D., and Ray, Edward J.. 1985. Special interests and the adoption of the income tax in the United States. Journal of Economic History 45:607–25.Google Scholar
Balke, Nathan S., and Gordon, Robert. 1989. The estimation of prewar gross national product: Methodology and new evidence. Journal of Political Economy 97:38–92.Google Scholar
Baron, David. 1991. Majoritarian incentives, pork barrel programs, and procedural control. American Journal of Political Science 35:57–90.Google Scholar
Baron, David. 1994. Electoral competition with informed and uninformed voters. American Political Science Review 88:33–47.Google Scholar
Berry, Thomas S. 1988. Production and population since 1789: Revised GNP series in constant dollars. Bostwick working paper no. 6. Richmond, Va.: Bostwick.Google Scholar
Besley, Timothy, and Coate, Stephen. 1994. An economic model of representative democracy. Princeton University, Princeton, N.J. Typescript.Google Scholar
Black, Duncan. 1958. The theory of committees and elections. London: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Bohara, Alok, and Kaempfer, William. 1991. A test of tariff endogeneity in the United States. American Economic Review 81:952–60.Google Scholar
Brady, David. 1973. Congressional voting in a partisan era. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.Google Scholar
Brady, David. 1988. Critical elections and congressional policy making. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
Brady, David, and Epstein, David. 1995. Intra-party preferences, heterogeneity, and the origins of the modern Congress: Progressive reformers in the House and Senate, 1890–1920. Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. Typescript.Google Scholar
Brady, David, Cooper, Joseph, and Hurley, Patricia. 1979. The decline of party in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1887–1968. Legislative Studies Quarterly 4:381–407.Google Scholar
Cassing, James, McKeown, Timothy J., and Ochs, Jack. 1986. The political economy of the tariff cycle. American Political Science Review 80:841–62.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Collie, Melissa, and Brady, David. 1985. The decline of partisan voting coalitions in the House of Representatives. In Congress reconsidered, edited by Dodd, Lawrence and Oppenheimer, Bruce. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press.Google Scholar
Conybeare, John A. C. 1991. Voting for protection: An electoral model of tariff policy. International Organization 45:57–81.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, Gary W., and McCubbins, Mathew D.. 1993. Parties and committees in the U.S. House of Representatives. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Destler, I. M. 1992. American trade politics. Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics.Google Scholar
Downs, Anthony. 1957. An economic theory of democracy. New York: Harper and Row.Google Scholar
Eichengreen, Barry. 1989. The political economy of the Smoot-Hawley tariff. Research in Economic History 12:1–43.Google Scholar
Fedderson, Tim. 1992. A voting model implying Duverger's law and positive turnout. American Journal of Political Science 36:938–62.Google Scholar
Fenno, Richard R. 1973. Congressmen in committees. Boston: Little, Brown.Google Scholar
Ferejohn, John. 1986. Logrolling in an institutional context: A case study of food stamp legislation. In Congress and policy change, edited by Wright, Gerald, Rieselbach, Leroy, and Dodd, Lawrence. New York: Agathon Press.Google Scholar
Findlay, Ronald, and Wellisz, Stanislaw. 1982. Endogenous tariffs, the political economy of trade restrictions, and welfare. In Import competition and response, edited by Bhagwati, Jagdish. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Fiorina, Morris P. 1992. Divided government. London: Macmillan Press.Google Scholar
Fuller, Wayne A. 1976. Introduction to statistical time series. New York: Wiley.Google Scholar
Gallman, Robert E. 1966. Gross national product in the United States, 1834–1909. Output, employment, and productivity in the United States after 1800, in Studies in Income and Wealth, vol. 30. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Gardner, Grant, and Kimbrough, Kent. 1989. The behavior of U.S. tariff rates. American Economic Review 79:211–18.Google Scholar
Gardner, Grant, and Kimbrough, Kent. 1992. Tax smoothing and tariff behavior in the United States. Journal of Macroeconomics 14:711–29.Google Scholar
Goldstein, Judith. 1988. Ideas, institutions, and American trade policy. International Organization 42:179–217.Google Scholar
Hansen, John Mark. 1990. Taxation and the political economy of the tariff. International Organization 44:527–51.Google Scholar
Hansen, Wendy. 1990. The International Trade Commission and the politics of protection. American Political Science Review 84:21–16.Google Scholar
Hurley, Patricia, and Wilson, Rick. 1989. Partisan voting patterns in the U.S. Senate, 1877–1986. Legislative Studies Quarterly 14:225–50.Google Scholar
Kendrick, John W. 1961. Productivity trends in the United States. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Kuznets, Simon. 1946. National products since 1869. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.Google Scholar
Lake, David. 1988. Power, protection, and free trade: International sources of U.S. commercial strategy, 1887–1939. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
MacKinnon, James. 1991. Critical values for cointegration tests. In Long-run economic relationships: Readings in cointegration, edited by Engle, Robert F. and Granger, C. W. J.. London: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Magee, Stephen, Brock, William, and Young, Leslie. 1989. Black hole tariffs and endogenous policy theory: Political economy in general equilibrium. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Mayer, Wolfgang. 1984. Endogenous tariff formation. American Economic Review 74:970–85.Google Scholar
Mayhew, David. 1974. Congress: The electoral connection. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
McKeown, Timothy. 1984. Firms and tariff regime change: Explaining the demand for protection. World Politics 36:215–33.Google Scholar
Nelson, Douglas. 1988. Endogenous tariff theory: A critical survey. American Journal of Political Science 32:796–837.Google Scholar
O'Halloran, Sharyn. 1994. Politics, process, and American trade policy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pastor, Robert. 1980. Congress and the politics of U.S. foreign economic policy, 1926–1976. Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Pincus, Jonathan. 1975. Pressure groups and the pattern of tariffs. Journal of Political Economy 83:757–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pincus, Jonathan. 1977. Pressure groups and politics in antebellum tariffs. New York: Columbia University Press.Google Scholar
Porter, Kirk H. 1924. National party platforms. New York: Macmillan.Google Scholar
Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. Political cleavages and changing exposure to trade. American Political Science Review 81:1121–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rohde, David. 1991. Parties and leaders in the postreform House. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Romer, Christina D. 1989. The prewar business cycle reconsidered: New estimates of gross national product, 1869–1908. Journal of Political Economy 97:1–37.Google Scholar
Schattschneider, E. E. 1935. Politics, pressures, and the tariff. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books.Google Scholar
Simmons, Beth. 1994. Who adjusts? Domestic sources of foreign economic policy in the interwar years. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Stanwood, Edward. 1903. American tariff controversies in the nineteenth century. New York: Russell and Russell.Google Scholar
Stewart, Charles. Lessons from the post-Civil War era. In The politics of divided government, edited by Cox, Gary W. and Kernel, Samuel. San Francisco: Westview Press, 1991.Google Scholar
Taussig, F. W. 1931. The tariff history of the United States. New York: Augustus M. Kelley.Google Scholar
Thompson, Richard. 1888. The history of protective tariff laws. New York and London: Garland Publishing.Google Scholar
Verdier, Daniel. 1994. Democracy and international trade: Britain, France and the United States, 1860–1990. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.Google Scholar
Weingast, Barry, and Marshall, William. 1988. The industrial organization of Congress. Journal of Political Economy 96:132–63.Google Scholar