Skip to main content
×
Home
    • Aa
    • Aa

Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression

  • Emilie M. Hafner-Burton (a1)
Abstract

A growing number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have come to play a significant role in governing state compliance with human rights. When they supply hard standards that tie material benefits of integration to compliance with human rights principles, PTAs are more effective than softer human rights agreements (HRAs) in changing repressive behaviors. PTAs improve members' human rights through coercion, by supplying the instruments and resources to change actors' incentives to promote reforms that would not otherwise be implemented. I develop three hypotheses: (1) state commitment to HRAs and (2) PTAs supplying soft human rights standards (not tied to market benefits) do not systematically produce improvement in human rights behaviors, while (3) state commitment to PTAs supplying hard human rights standards does often produce better practices. I draw on several cases to illustrate the processes of influence and test the argument on the experience of 177 states during the period 1972 to 2002.I would like to thank Mike Colaresi, Dan Drezner, David Lake, Lisa Martin, Walter Mattli, John Meyer, Mark Pollack, Erik Voeten, Jim Vreeland, and two anonymous reviewers for their detailed and thoughtful comments on various drafts of this manuscript, as well as the many other people who have helped me by asking hard questions along the way. I would also like to thank Michael Barnett, Charles Franklin, and Jon Pevehouse for advice during the dissertation research that supports this article, and Alexander H. Montgomery for assistance in data management. All faults are my own. For generous assistance in the collection of data, I thank the National Science Foundation (SES 2CDZ414 and SES 0135422), John Meyer, and Francisco Ramirez. For support during the writing of the article, I thank Nuffield College at Oxford University, and most importantly, Lynn Eden and Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Copyright
Linked references
Hide All

This list contains references from the content that can be linked to their source. For a full set of references and notes please see the PDF or HTML where available.

Abbott, Kenneth W, and DuncanSnidal. 2001. International ‘Standards’ and International Governance. Journal of European Public Policy8 (3):34570.

Chayes, Abram, and Antonia HandlerChayes. 1990. From Law Enforcement to Dispute Settlement: A New Approach to Arms Control Verification and Compliance. International Security14 (4):14764.

Cingranelli, David L., and David L.Richards. 1999. Respect for Human Rights After the End of the Cold War. Journal of Peace Research36 (5):51134.

Cottier, Thomas. 2002. Trade and Human Rights: A Relationship to Discover. Journal of International Economic Law5 (1):11132.

Donnelly, Jack. 1986. International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis. International Organization40 (3):599642.

Downs, George W., David M.Rocke, and Peter N.Barsoom. 1996. Is the Good News About Compliance Good News about Cooperation?International Organization50 (3):379406.

Eaton, Jonathan, and MaximEngers. 1999. Sanctions: Some Simply Analytics. American Economic Review89 (2):40914.

Finnemore, Martha, and KathrynSikkink. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. International Organization52 (4):887917.

Franck, Thomas M.1988. Legitimacy in the International System. American Journal of International Law82 (4):70558.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M.2005. Right or Robust? The Sensitive Nature of Political Repression in an Era of Globalization. Journal of Peace Research. Available at 〈http://www.stanford.edu/∼emiliehb〉. Accessed 28 March 2005.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., and KiyoteruTsutsui. 2005. Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises. American Journal of Sociology110 (5):13731411. Available at 〈http://www.stanford.edu/∼emiliehb〉. Accessed 28 March 2005.

Hathaway, Oona A.2002. Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?Yale Law Journal111 (8):19352042.

Helfer, Laurence R., and Anne-MarieSlaughter. 1997. Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication. Yale Law Journal107 (2):273391.

Henderson, Conway W.1991. Conditions Affecting the Use of Political Repression. Journal of Conflict Resolution35 (1):12042.

Howard, Rhoda, and JackDonnelly. 1986. Human Dignity, Human Rights, and Political Regimes. American Political Science Review80 (3):80118.

Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2001. Treating International Institutions as Social Environments. International Studies Quarterly45 (4):48990.

Koh, Harold Hongju. 1996–97. Why Do Nations Obey International Law?Yale Law Journal106 (8):2599659.

Mansfield, Edward D.1998. The Proliferation of Preferential Trading Agreements. Journal of Conflict Resolution42 (5):52343.

McCrudden, Christopher, and AnneDavies. 2000. A Perspective on Trade and Labour Rights. Journal of International Economic Law3 (1):4362.

Mearsheimer, John J.1994/1995. The False Promise of International Institutions. International Security19 (3):549.

Meyer, John W., JohnBoli, George M.Thomas, and Francisco O.Ramirez. 1997. World Society and the Nation-State. American Journal of Sociology103 (1):14481.

Mitchell, Neil, and JamesMcCormick. 1988. Economic and Political Explanations of Human Rights Violations. World Politics40 (4):47698.

Mitchell, Ronald B.1993. Compliance Theory: A Synthesis. Review of European Community and International Environmental Law2 (4):32734.

Moravcsik, Andrew. 1995. Explaining International Human Rights Regimes: Liberal Theory and Western Europe. European Journal of International Relations1 (2):15789.

Oneal, John R., and Bruce M.Russett. 1999. The Kantian Peace—The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations, 1885–1992. World Politics52 (1):137.

Payne, Rodger A.2001. Persuasion, Frames, and Norm Construction. European Journal of International Relations7 (1):3761.

Poe, Steven C., and C. NealTate. 1994. Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis. American Political Science Review88 (4):85372.

Poe, Steven, C. NealTate, and Linda CampKeith. 1999. Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993. International Studies Quarterly43 (2):291313.

Price, Richard. 1998. Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines. International Organization52 (3):61344.

Richards, David L., Ronald D.Gelleny, and David H.Sacko. 2001. Money with a Mean Streak? Foreign Economic Penetration and Government Respect for Human Rights in Developing Countries. International Studies Quarterly45 (2):21939.

Schwitzgebel, Eric. 1999. Gradual Belief Change in Children. Human Development42 (1):28396.

Slusher, Morgan, and Craig A.Anderson. 1996. Using Causal Persuasive Arguments to Change Beliefs and Teach New Information: The Mediating Role of Explanation Availability and Evaluation Bias in the Acceptance of Knowledge. Journal of Educational Psychology88 (1):11022.

Recommend this journal

Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.

International Organization
  • ISSN: 0020-8183
  • EISSN: 1531-5088
  • URL: /core/journals/international-organization
Please enter your name
Please enter a valid email address
Who would you like to send this to? *
×

Metrics

Altmetric attention score