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The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy Anchors: Firm-Level Evidence

  • J. Lawrence Broz (a1) and Michael Plouffe (a2)


Analyses of monetary policy posit that exchange-rate pegs, inflation targets, and central bank independence can help anchor private-sector inflation expectations. Yet there are few direct tests of this argument. We offer cross-national, micro-level evidence on the effectiveness of monetary anchors in controlling private-sector inflation concerns. Using firm-level data from eighty-one countries (approximately 10,000 firms), we find evidence that “international” anchors (exchange-rate commitments) correlate significantly with a substantial reduction in private-sector concerns about inflation while “domestic” anchors (inflation targeting and central bank independence) do not. Our conjecture is that private-sector inflation expectations are more responsive to exchange-rate anchors because they are more transparent, more constraining, and more costly than domestic anchoring arrangements.



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The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy Anchors: Firm-Level Evidence

  • J. Lawrence Broz (a1) and Michael Plouffe (a2)


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