1. Krasner, Stephen D., “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,” in Krasner, , ed., International Regimes (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. ”1. The book contains all the articles originally published in the journal International Organization 36 (Spring 1982). Subsequent citations will be to the book rather than the special issue of the journal. For a recent critique of regime analysis, see Kratochwil, Friedrich and Ruggie, John Gerard, “International Organization: A State of the Art on an Art of the State,” International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 753–75.
2. Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner, ibid., pp. 173–195. See also two other related works by Jervis, : “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 31 (01 1978), pp. 167–186; and “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation,” World Politics 38 (10 1985), pp. 58–78. Also see Evera, Stephen Van, “Why Cooperation Failed in 1914,” World Politics 38 (10 1985), pp. 80–117; and Downs, George W. et al. , “Arms Races and Cooperation,” World Politics 38 (10 1985), pp. 118–146.
3. Some of the recent literature on non-proliferation in which a “regime” is presumed to exist includes: Nye, Joseph S., “Maintaining the Non-Proliferation Regime,” International Organization 35 (Winter 1981), pp. 15–38; Potter, William C., Nuclear Power and Proliferation: An Interdisciplinary Approach (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgescher, 1982); Beckman, Robert L., Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Congress and the Control of Peaceful Nuclear Activities (Boulder: Westview, 1985); Snyder, Jed C. and Wells, Samuel F., eds., Limiting Nuclear Proliferation (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1985); and Jones, Rodney W. et al. , The Nuclear Suppliers and Non-Proliferation: International Policy Choices (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington, 1985).
4. The definition of the theory of hegemonic stability used in this article draws largely from the work of Robert O. Keohane, who has given the theory its intellectual prominence through his criticisms and revisions. See Keohane, and Nye, Joseph S., Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little Brown, 1977), pp. 38–53; Keohane, , “The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and Changes in International Economic Regimes,” in Holsti, Ole R. et al. , eds., Change in the International System, (Boulder: Westview, 1980), pp. 131–162; Keohane, , “The Demand for International Regimes,” in Krasner, , International Regimes, pp. 141–172; and Keohane, , After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). For a sophisiticated, historically-based theory of why hegemons decline, see Gilpin, Robert, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). A recent article that critiques the theory of hegemonic stability in rigorous detail is Snidal, Duncan, “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” International Organization 39 (Autumn 1985) pp. 579–614.
5. Axelrod, Robert and Keohane, Robert O., “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics 38 (10 1985), pp. 252–253.
6. Keohane, , After Hegemony, pp. 85–109; see also Keohane, “The Demand for International Regimes.” For two thoughtful reviews of the functional theory, see Young, Oran R., “International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions,” World Politics 39 (10 1986), p. 104–122; and Rosenau, James N., “Before Cooperation: Hegemons, Regimes, and Habit-Driven Actors in World Politics,” International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986), pp. 849–894.
7. See note 3 for current literature that addresses these issues in depth. For recent reviews of the 1985 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, see the following articles in Arms Control Today 15 (10 1985): Lewis A. Dunn, “Standing up for the NPT”; Charles N. Van Doren, “Outlook Brightens for the NPT Regime”; and Leonard S. Spector, “Unfinished Business at the NPT Review.” See also Reiss, Mitchell, “Beyond the 1985 NPT Review Conference,” Survival 27 (09/10 1985); and Dunn, Lewis A., “Building on Success: the NPT at Fifteen,” Survival 28 (05/06, 1986).
8. For a discussion of the ambiguity surrounding these key terms, see Haas, Ernst B., “The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept, or Propaganda?” World Politics 6 (07 1953); Wolfers, Arnold, “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol,” in Wolfers, , Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press1, 1962); and Keohane, Robert O., “Reciprocity in International Relations,” International Organization 40 (Winter 1986).
9. Ruggie, John Gerard, “International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends,” International Organization 34 (Summer, 1975), p. 570.
10. Krasner, , “Structural Causes,” p. 2.
12. Jervis, “Security Regimes,” passim.
13. Krasner, , “Structural Causes,” p. 3; see also Ruggie, John Gerard, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” in Krasner, , International Regimes, pp. 195–231.
14. Nye, , “Maintaining the Non-proliferation Regime” pp. 15–16. The view that few nuclear weapon states is better than more is by no means universally shared. A prominent international relations scholar who argues the opposite is Kenneth N. Waltz; see “What Will the Spread of Nuclear Weapons Do to the World?” in King, John Kerry, ed., International Political Effects of the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979); and Waltz, , The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981). A scholar whose recent work argues for the “management” of proliferation instead of its prevention, especially in the Middle East, is Shai Feldman; see Israel's Nuclear Deterrence: A Strategy for the 1980s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); and “Managing Nuclear Proliferation,” in Snyder, and Wells, , Limiting Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 301–318. For a recent consideration of whether more or fewer nuclear weapon states would be desirable, see Berkowitz, Bruce D., “Proliferation, Deterrence and the Likelihood of War,” Journal of Conflict Resolution (03 1985), pp. 57–82.
15. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements: Texts and Histories of Negotiations (Washington: ACDA, 1982), pp. 91–95.
16. See Quester, George, “Nuclear Proliferation: Linkages and Solutions,” International Organization 33 (Autumn 1979), passim.
17. See Dunn, Lewis A., “Some Reflections on the ‘Dove's Dilemma,’” International Organization 35 (Winter 1981), passim.
18. Nye, , “Maintaining the Non-Proliferation Regime,” p. 17.
19. See Snyder, Jed C., “Iraq,” and Cronin, Richard P., “India and Pakistan,” in Snyder, and Wells, , Limiting Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 3–42, 59–88.
20. For the consequences of American legislation on U.S. relations with certain emerging nuclear states, and the impact of that legislation on those nascent nuclear programs, see Spector, Leonard S., Nuclear Proliferation Today (Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger, 1984).
21. See Beckman, Nuclear Non-Proliferation, passim. For a prefiguration of the Carter administration's non-proliferation policy, see the Ford/Mitre report by the Nuclear Energy Study Group, Nuclear Power: Issues and Choices (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977).
22. Jervis, , “Security Regimes,” p. 178.
23. Most of these conditions are drawn from Jervis, ibid., passim; also see the sources cited in note 2.
24. Jervis, , “Security Regimes,” p. 178.
26. Strange, Susan, “Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis,” in Krasner, , International Regimes, p. 345.
27. Krasner, , “Structural Causes,” p. 7; also in that same volume see the arguments of Stein, Arthur A., “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World,” pp. 115–140; and Keohane, , “The Demand for International Regimes,” pp. 141–172.
28. For a discussion of the absolute versus relative size of hegemons and the contrast between coercive and benevolent leadership in the formation of regimes, see Snidal, , “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” pp. 588–590.
29. Keohane, and Nye, , Power and Interdependence, p. 44 (emphasis added); see also Keohane, , After Hegemony, pp. 32–39.
30. See Keohane, and Nye, , Power and Interdependence, pp. 38–60.
31. Snidal, , “The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory,” p. 593.
32. Gilpin, War and Change, passim.
33. Clausen, Peter A., “US Nuclear Exports and the Non-Proliferation Regime,” in Snyder, and Wells, , Limiting Nuclear Proliferation, p. 190.
34. See Beckman, , Nuclear Non-Proliferation, pp. 29–35.
35. For introductions to the “trade regime,” see Lipson, Charles, “The Transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime Change,” in Krasner, , International Regimes, pp. 233–272; and Jock A. Finlayson and Mark W. Zacher, “The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions,” in Krasner, ibid., pp. 273–314; also in the Krasner volume, see Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order.”
36. In contrast to this line of reasoning David H. Blake and Robert S. Walters argue that the postwar multilateral agreements on trade and money were designed to “facilitate the perpetuation of American preeminence,” The Politics of Global Economic Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), p. 2.
37. Safeguards were initially administered on a bilateral basis by the United States and then transferred to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) after the agency's inspection procedures were established in 1960.
38. This is not to say that the United States did not attempt to “dissuade” countries, such as France, from pursuing a nuclear weapons program. France, with its own domestic sources of uranium and privileged access to sources in former French colonies, was not completely at the mercy of the stranglehold on uranium supplies that the United States and Britain (through the Commonwealth) held, but it was vulnerable. In 1956 and 1965, France attempted to purchase Canadian uranium on an unrestricted basis. Both times the United States objected, and both times the sale fell through. Eventually, the Canadian government decided that all sales of uranium to any state, including the United States, would be subject to a peaceful-uses-only clause. In the “Honeywell incident” (also in 1965), the United States prevented the sale of computers to France that could aid the efforts to build a force de frappé. See Scheinman, Lawrence, Atomic Energy in France Under the Fourth Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 176–84; and Scheinman, , “Security and a Transnational System: The Case of Nuclear Energy,” International Organization 25 (Summer 1971), pp. 637–638.
39. On the U.S.-U.S.S.R. context, see Henry Sokolski, “Atoms for Peace: A Non-Proliferation Primer?” Arms Control (September 1980), passim.
40. On the politics of the NPT negotiations, see Young, Elizabeth, A Farewell to Arms Control (Hammondsworth, U.K.: Penguin, 1972); and Quester, George, The Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973). For an insightful treatment of the tensions between American alliance and non-proliferation policies, see Bader, William, The United States and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Pegasus, 1968).
41. On the “reactor wars” and U.S. penetration in the European market, see Bupp, Irvin C. and Derian, Jean-Claude, Light Water: How the Nuclear Dream Dissolved (New York: Basic, 1978); and Nau, Henry, National Politics and International Technology: Nuclear Reactor Development in Western Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974).
42. Jaskow, Paul, “The International Nuclear Industry Today,” Foreign Affairs 54 (Summer 1976), p. 792.
43. Haas, Ernst B., “Why Collaborate? Issue Linkage and International Regimes,” World Politics 33 (04 1980), p. 371.
44. Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 45.
45. The question of whether the United States is still a hegemon is not yet a closed question. See Strange, Susan, “Still an Extraordinary Power: America's Role in a Global Monetary System,” in Lombra, Raymond E. and Witte, William E., eds., Political Economy of International and Domestic Monetary Relations (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1982); and Russett, Bruce, “The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony: Or Is Mark Twain Really Dead?” International Organization 39 (Spring 1985).
46. Clausen, , “US Nuclear Exports,” in Snyder and Wells, Limiting Nuclear Proliferation, p. 201.
47. There is, of course, considerable circumstantial evidence that South Africa (possibly in conjunction with Israel) exploded a nuclear device in 1979. For a review of this evidence, see Washington Office on Africa Educational Fund, “The September 27, 1979 Mystery Flash: Did South Africa Detonate a Nuclear Bomb?” (21 May 1985). What makes this report so interesting is that it relies heavily on U.S. Naval Research Laboratory documents. For a more general review of South Africa's status as a nuclear threshold state, see Jastrow, Robert, ‘South Africa,” in Snyder, and Wells, , Limiting Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 146–180. The widely held belief that Jerusalem secretly possessed nuclear weapons was recently given additional credence; based on the testimony of Mordechai Vanunu, a former employee of the Dimona nuclear plant, London's Sunday Times reported on 5 October 1986 that Israel had stockpiled about 100 atomic weapons over the last twenty years, making Israel the sixth-ranked nuclear power in the world.
48. Nye, , “Maintaining the Non-Proliferation Regime,” p. 15.
49. Dunn, , “Building on Success,” pp. 230–231.
50. On the Carter administration's emphasis on utilizing “supplier leverage,” see Beckman, Nuclear Non-Proliferation; Nye, Joseph S., “Non-Proliferation: A Long Term Strategy,” Foreign Affairs 56 (Spring 1978); Quester, George, ed., Nuclear Proliferation: Breaking the Chain (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981); and Brenner, Michael, Nuclear Power and Non-Proliferation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
51. On the Reagan approach to non-proliferation, which stresses “reliable supply,” see Clausen, Peter, “The Reagan Non-Proliferation Policy,” Arms Control Today 14 (12 1982); Spector, “Unfinished Business”; and Dunn, “Standing up for the NPT.”
52. Walker, William and Lonnroth, Mans, Nuclear Power Struggles: Industrial Competition and Proliferation Control (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 1.
53. Pilat, Joseph F., “The Future of the Nuclear Supply Regime,” in Jones, , Institutional Policy Choices, pp. 90–91.
54. For example, see Keohane, After Hegemony, passim; Krasner, International Regimes, passim; and the special issue of World Politics 38 (10 1985), entitled “Cooperation under Anarchy.”
55. Axelrod, and Keohane, , “Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy,” p. 226.
56. The principal author of the functional theory is Robert Keohane; see his “Demand for International Regimes,” passim; and After Hegemony, pp. 85–109. For a related argument, see Stein, Arthur A., “Coordination and Collaboration; Regimes in an Anarchic World,” in Krasner, , International Regimes, pp. 115–140.
57. Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 88.
61. See Waltz, Kenneth N., Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 38–59.
62. Krasner, , “Structural Causes,” p. 1.
63. Keohane acknowledges that “cooperation need not involve any negotiation at all,” but focuses his attention exclusively on “coordination achieved through bargaining,” After Hegemony, p. 76.
64. See Young, Oran R., “Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes,” in Krasner, , International Regimes, pp. 93–113.
65. Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 46.
68. Haas, , “Why Collaborate?” pp. 367–68.
69. Haas, Ernst B., “Words Can Hurt You; or Who Said What to Whom about Regimes,” in Krasner, , International Regimes, pp. 23–59.
70. Rosenau, , “Before Cooperation,” p. 864.
72. See Young, , “Regime Dynamics”; and Puchala, Donald J. and Hopkins, Raymond F., “International Regimes: Lessons from Inductive Analysis,” in Krasner, , International Regimes, pp.61–92.
73. Haas, , “Issue Linkage,” p. 372; the “tactical linkage” of issues is used only to obtain additional bargaining leverage, usually after a regime is formed.
74. Keohane, “Reciprocity,” passim.
75. The attempt to construct a complex interdependence model is the subject of a special issue of International Organization (Summer 1971), entitled “Transnational Relations and World Politics” and edited by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye; and Keohane and Nye, Power and Interdependence.
76. See Waltz, , Theory of International Politics, and Keohane, Robert O., ed., Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
77. See Holsti, K. J., The Dividing Discipline: Hegemony and Diversity in International Theory (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985).
78. Keohane, and Nye, , Power and Interdependence, p. 35.
79. Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 83.
80. Keohane, and Nye, , Power and Interdependence, pp. 33–34.
81. Keohane, , “Demand for International Regimes,” p. 144.
82. Rosenau, , “Before Cooperation,” p. 877.
83. Snidal, Duncan, “The Game Theory of International Politics,” World Politics 38 (10 1985), p. 56.
84. Richard L. O'Meara, “Regimes and Their Implications for International Theory,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Winter 1984), p. 256.
85. Krasner, Stephen D., “Regimes and the Limits of Realism,” in Krasner, , International Regimes, p. 368. While Keohane devotes little attention to exploring the role of knowledge and learning in regimes, he is well aware of its potential importance, Keohane, , After Hegemony, p. 132.
86. Young, Oran R., “International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation,” World Politics 33 (04 1980), p. 31.
87. Puchala, and Hopkins, , in Krasner, , International Regimes, p. 63.
88. Young, , “Problems of Concept Formation,” p. 349.
89. See Puchala, and Hopkins's, discussion of “evolutionary change” in regimes, which occurs without major changes in the distribution of power, in “Lessons from Inductive Analysis,” pp. 65–66.
90. Young, , “Regime Dynamics,” p. 93.
91. Puchala, and Hopkins, , “Lessons from Inductive Analysis,” p. 63.
92. See Kitschelt, Herbert, “Four Theories of Public Policy Making and Fast Breeder Reactor Development,” International Organization 40 (Winter 1986), pp. 65–105.
93. Steinbruner, John D., The Cybernetric Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
