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The Philadelphian system: sovereignty, arms control, and balance of power in the American states-union, circa 1787–1861

  • Daniel H. Deudney (a1)
Abstract

A rediscovery of the long-forgotten republican version of liberal political theory has arresting implications for the theory and practice of international relations. Republican liberalism has a theory of security that is superior to realism, because it addresses not only threats of war from other states but also the threat of despotism at home. In this view, a Hobson's choice between anarchy and hierarchy is not necessary because an intermediary structure, here dubbed “negarchy,” is also available. The American Union from 1787 until 1861 is a historical example. This Philadelphian system was not a real state since, for example, the union did not enjoy a monopoly of legitimate violence. Yet neither was it a state system, since the American states lacked sufficient autonomy. While it shared some features with the Westphalian system such as balance of power, it differed fundamentally. Its origins owed something to particular conditions of time and place, and the American Civil War ended this system. Yet close analysis indicates that it may have surprising relevance for the future of contemporary issues such as the European Union and nuclear governance.

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1. The term “realism” is not capitalized here, although I agree with Keohane that a distinction is necessary between the school of thought termed realism by international relations scholars and the term as generally used: “Capitalization is used to indicate that Realism is a specific school, and that it would be possible to be a realist—-in the sense of examining reality as it really is-without subscribing to Realist assumptions.” See Keohane Robert O., International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), p. 68 n. 17.

2. This composite picture glosses over many secondary differences. Key texts include: Waltz Kenneth, Theory of International Politics (Lexington, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and Jervis Robert, “Security Regimes,” in Krasner Stephen, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 173–94.

3. For overviews of many of the different liberal international theory arguments, see Baldwin David, ed., Neoliberalism and Neorealism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); and Moravcsik Andrew, “Liberalism and International Relations Theory,” working paper, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., 1993.

4. This argument is now backed by extensive empirical evidence. See Doyle Michael W., “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” part 1, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Summer 1983), pp. 205–35, and part 2, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12 (Fall 1983), pp. 323353; and Russett Bruce, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993).

5. On the definition of state, see Hexter J. H., The Vision of Politics on the Eve of the Reformation (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 192: “Lo stato is not a matrix of values, a body politic: it is an instrument of exploitation, the instrument the prince uses to get what he wants.” For extended analysis, see Viroli Maurizio, From Politics to Reason of State: The Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics 1250–1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

6. Works describing the European political order in this manner include Hinsley F. H., Power and the Pursuit of Peace (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1963), pp. 107119; and Gulick Edward, Europe's Classical Balance of Power (New York: Norton, 1967), pp. 120135.

7. Everdell comes close to my definition: “Republicanism is a kaleidoscope of institutions, all with the one purpose of preventing rule by one person. This seemingly simple objective has continually demanded the most bewilderingly complex of means.” See Everdell William, The End of Kings: A History of Republics and Republicans (New York: Free Press, 1983), p. 12.

8. For an account of this process, see Downing Brian M., The Military Revolution and Political Change: Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1992).

9. For a classic synthesis, see Herz John, International Politics in the Atomic Age (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 39110.

10. Much confusion arises because both state and republic are used in a generic and synonymous sense and in more specific and opposing senses. For a useful sorting, see Onuf Nicholas, “Civitas Maxima: Wolff, Vattel, and the Fate of Republicanism, American Journal of International Law 88 (04 1994), pp. 288289.

11. See Forsyth Murray, Unions of States (Leicester, England: Leicester University Press, 1981); and Elazar Daniel, ed., Federalism as Grand Design (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1987).

12. On the American Civil War as a second founding, James McPherson notes: “Before 1861 the two words ‘United States’ were generally used as a plural noun: ‘the United States’ are a republic. After 1865 the United States became a singular noun. The loose union of states became a nation,” emphasis original. “The Second American Revolution,” in Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. viii.

13. Turner Frederick Jackson, The Significance of Sections in American History (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1932), p. 316. See also Scott James Brown, The United States of America: A Study in International Organization (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 1920).

14. De Tocqueville saw “two governments, completely separate and almost independent… [and] twenty-four small sovereign nations, whose agglomeration constitutes the body of the Union.” See Tocqueville Alexis de, Democracy in America vol. 2 (New York: Knopf, 1945), p. 61.See also Kelley G. A., “Hegel's America,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 2 (Fall 1972), pp. 336.

15. See Stourzh Gerald, Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1970); and Hutson J. H., John Adams and the Diplomacy of the American Revolution (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1980).

16. Streit, for example, advanced “Atlantic Union” modeled on the U.S. founding, sought to dispel the “fog over sovereignty,” and attacked the “national sovereignty” of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. See Streit Clarence, Union Now (New York: Harper and Row, 1940); and Streit Clarence, Freedom's Frontier: Atlantic Union Now (New York: Harper and Row, 1961).

17. Morgenthau responded to this structural alternative with an argument about identity: the American founding was essentially an event in national history, exceptional in size but not in form. Subsequent idealist work, most notably by Karl Deutsch and associates, followed suit, focusing on identity and treating all American order after 1789 as “amalgamated” and thus otherwise undistinguished structurally from a federal state or, indeed, a totalitarian one. See Morgenthau Hans, Politics Among Nations, 4th ed. (New York: Knopf, 1967), pp. 496500; Calleo David and Rowland Benjamin, America and the World Political Economy: Atlantic Dreams and National Realities (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1973), pp. 1684; and Deutsch Karl et al. , Political Order in the North Atlantic Area (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 29 n. 7.

18. On states-union (Staatenbund) versus federal state (Bundestaat) and on the concept of a union composed of organs, see Emerson Rupert, State and Sovereignty in Modern Germany (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1928), pp. 92125; and Garner James Wilford, Political Science and Government (New York: American Book Co., 1928), pp. 265302, respectively. Madison's James quotation is from Federalist Paper no. 51, found in Rossiter Clinton, ed., The Federalist Papers (New York: New American Library, 1961). All Federalist documents are from this volume. Hereafter, they will be cited by document and page numbers only. See also Ostrum Vincent, The Political Theory of a Compound Republic (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1987).

19. For an overview of recent work on the founding period, see: Onuf Peter S., “Reflections on the Founding: Constitutional Historiography in Bicentennial Perspective,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd series, 46 (Summer 1989).

20. See Greene Jack P., Peripheries and Center: Constitutional Development in the Extended Polities of the British Empire and the United States, 1607–1788 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1986); and Onuf Peter S., The Origins of the Federal Republic: Jurisdictional Controversies in the United States: 1775–1787 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).

21. Meinig D. W., Atlantic America, 1492–1800 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986); and Continental America, 1800–1867 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1993).

22. In this article I treat Publius as one voice and as the authoritative understanding of the Constitution of 1787. For the emergence and components of the Constitution as “Grand Compromise,” see Anderson Thornton, Creating the Constitution: The Convention of 1787 and the First Congress (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993); and Rossiter Clinton, 1787: The Grand Convention (New York: Norton, 1987).

23. Dietze Gottfried, The Federalist: A Classic on Federalism and Free Government, part 2, “The Federalist as a Treatise on Peace and Security” (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1960), pp. 177254.

24. Montesquieu Baron, Spirit of the Laws, book 11, sec. 6, trans. Nugent Thomas (New York: Hafner, 1948), p. 151. For Montesquieu's authority, see Lutz Donald, “The Relative Influence of European Writers in Late Eighteenth Century Political Thought,” American Political Science Review 78 (03 1984), pp. 8997. For the place of security in liberalism more generally, see Sklar Judith, “The Liberalism of Fear,” in Rosenbaum Nancy, ed., Liberalism and the Moral Life (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 2138.

25. For a recent restatement on the state apparatus as protector and predator, see Tilly Charles, “War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Evans Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol Theda, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

26. Federalist, no. 51, p. 322.

27. Hobbes Thomas, Leviathan, ed. Oakeshot Michael (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960), p. 75.

28. As Locke observed, anyone is “in much worse condition, who is exposed to the arbitrary power of a man, who has the command of 100,000, than he that is exposed to the arbitrary power of 100,000 single men.” See Locke John, Second Treatise on Government, ed. Laslett Peter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), p. 405.

29. Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, p. 150.

30. Calhoun explains, “It is, indeed, the negative power which makes the constitution, and the positive which makes the government. The one is the power of acting, and the other the power of preventing or arresting action. The two, combined, make constitutional governments.” See Calhoun John C., A Disquisition on Government (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1953), p. 28.

31. Federalist, no. 46, p. 294. See also Monroe James, The People the Sovereigns (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1867).

32. For discussions of sovereignty, see Hinsley F. H., Sovereignty, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); James Alan, Sovereign Statehood (London: Allen and Unwin, 1986); Krasner Stephen, “Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective,” Comparative Political Studies 21 (04 1988), pp. 6694; Onuf Nicholas, “Sovereignty: Outline of a Conceptual History,” Alternatives, vol. 16, no. 4, 1991, pp. 425446; and Walker R. B. J. and Mendlovitz Saul, eds., Contending Sovereignties (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner, 1990).

33. Blackstone William, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 4 vols., 1st ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765–69), vol. 1, p. 156–57.

34. See, for example, Arendt Hannah, On Revolution (New York: Viking, 1965), p. 152: “The great and, in the long run, perhaps the greatest American innovation in politics as such was the consistent abolition of sovereignty within the body politic of the republic, the insight that in the realm of human affairs sovereignty and tyranny are the same.”

35. Hobbes makes this error when he argues, “There cannot be a mixed state.” See Hobbes Thomas, De Cive, ed. Gert Bernard (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1972), p. 191.

36. Leading theorists of the real-state, most notably Jean Bodin and Hobbes, insist that sovereignty should reside within the state apparatus or in the head of state. They view the location of sovereignty in a body made up of many individuals rather than one or a few as inimical to maintaining practical political order. The division of sovereignty is a conceptual impossibility; its location in the people is possible in principle but is undesirable in practice. See Bodin Jean, The Six Books of the Commonwealth, trans. Tooley M.J. (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1967).

37. Montesquieu and David Hume argue that such regimes differ from real-states and despotisms because they have been tamed by the incorporation of the most important power control devices borrowed from republics. See Hume David, “On the Rise and Progress of Arts and Sciences,” Political Essays, ed. Haakanssen Knud (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 68.

38. On the emergence of popular sovereignty, see Morgan Edmund S., Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America (New York: Norton, 1988); Bailyn Bernard, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 198229; and Kammen Michael, “Rethinking the ‘Fountain of Power’: Changing Perceptions of Popular Sovereignty, 1764–1788,” Sovereignty and Liberty (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), pp. 1132.

39. A compound republic serving an extended recessed public is distinct from a majoritarian democracy because its architecture of vetoes protects minorities by requiring a concurrent majority. For discussions, see Ostrum, The Political Theory of a Compound Republic, pp. 12 and 23; Eidelberg Paul, The Philosophy of the American Constitution (New York: Free Press, 1968), p. 21; and II William F. Harris, The Interpretable Constitution (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993). In the years leading up to the Civil War the Publius synthesis was challenged by Calhoun, who held that the peoples of the states retained sovereignty, and by Daniel Webster and other nationalists, who held that the sovereign of the union was a national democratic majority. For concise overviews, see Forsyth, Unions of States, pp. 112–32; and Stamp Kenneth M., “The Concept of a Perpetual Union,” Journal of American History 65 (06 1978), pp. 553.

40. The rebellion of debtors in western Massachusetts led by retired officer Daniel Shays, which the Massachusetts militia refused to suppress, galvanized support for a stronger Union government. For pervasive fears of anarchy, see Onuf Peter, “Anarchy and the Crisis of the Union,” in Beltz Herman, Hoffman Ronald, and Albert Peter J., eds., To Form a More Perfect Union (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1987).

41. Federalist, no. 9, pp. 73 and 71, respectively.

42. Slaughter Thomas P., The Whiskey Rebellion: Frontier Epilogue to the American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

43. Federalist, no. 6, p. 54. For fears of interstate American wars, see Onuf, The Origins of the Federal Republic.

44. See Main Jackson Turner, “The American States in the Revolutionary Era,” in Hoffman Ronald and Albert Peter J., eds., Arms and Independence: The Military Character of the American Revolution (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1981), pp. 130; and Jensen Merrill, The Articles of Confederation (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1940).

45. Federalist, no. 8, p. 67.

46. See Cress Lawrence Delbert, Citizens in Arms: The Army and Militia in American Society to the War of 1812 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982), pp. 94110; Kohn Richard H., Eagle and Sword: The Federalists and the Creation of the Military Establishment in America, 1783–1802 (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 4090; and Riker William, Soldiers of the States: The Role of the National Guard in American Democracy (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Institute, 1957).

47. On fear of foreign incursion as motive for the Union, see III Frederick W. Marks, Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983).

48. Thought was given at the Constitutional Convention to emulating the Roman model of a dual executive, the two simultaneously serving consuls, but the necessity of unitary command of the military forces in the field, demonstrated so memorably at Cannae, convinced them to construct a unitary commander-in-chief of the armed forces. See Federalist, no. 70, pp. 423–31.

49. On American attitudes toward and uses of Vattelian international law, see Lang Daniel, Foreign Policy in the Early Republic: The Law of Nations and the Balance of Power (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985); and Onuf Peter and Onuf Nicholas, Federal Union, Modern World: The Law of Nations in an Age of Revolutions, 1776–1814 (Madison, Wis.: Madison House, 1993).

50. Federalist, no. 8, pp. 67–69.

51. Storing Herbert, What the Antifederalists Were For (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).

52. As Henken observed: “Every grant to the President … relating to foreign affairs, was in effect a derogation from Congressional power, eked out slowly, reluctantly, and not without limitations and safeguards.” See Henken Louis, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution (New York: Norton, 1975), p. 33.

53. Wormuth Francis D. and Firmage Edwin B., To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congress in History and Law (Dallas, Tex.: Southern Methodist University Press, 1986).

54. See Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1, pp. 136–40: “To protect and maintain inviolate the three great and primary rights of personal security, personal liberty, and private property … when actually violated or attacked” required courts, the right of petition and “the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and defense.”

55. See Schwoerer Lois G., “No Standing Armies!” The Antiarmy Ideology in Seventeenth Century England (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); Malcolm Joyce Lee, To Keep and Bear Arms: The Origins of an Anglo-American Right (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994); and Halbrook Stephen P., That Every Man Be Armed: the Evolution of a Constitutional Right (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984).

56. See Meinig, Atlantic America, 1492–1800, p. 407–9; and Meinig, Continental America, 1800–1867, pp. 170196. Given that the Amerindian tribes had extensive participatory democracy, the numerous aggressions of the United States against them calls into question the strength of the “democratic peace” hypothesis.

57. See Scroggs William O., Filibusters and Financiers (New York: Russell and Russell, 1969); Rauch Basil, American Interest in Cuba, 1848–1855 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948); and Warner Donald F., The Idea of Continental Union: Agitation for the Annexation of Canada to the United States, 1849–1893 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1960).

58. See Potter David M. and Manning Thomas G., eds., Nationalism and Sectionalism in America, 1775–1877 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1949); Mood Fulmer, “The Origin, Evolution, and Application of the Sectional Concept, 1759–1900,” in Jensen Merrill, ed., Regionalism in America (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1952), pp. 598; and Matson Cathy D. and Onuf Peter S., A Union of Interests (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1990).

59. Turner, The Significance of Sections in American History, p. 50.

60. On the continuing sectional influence, see Garreau Joel, The Nine Nations of North America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1981); and Trubowitz Peter, “Sectionalism and American Foreign Policy: The Political Geography of Consensus and Conflict,” International Studies Quarterly 36 (06 1992), pp. 173–90.

61. Federalist, no. 10, pp. 77–84. Three of the most influential readings of the American Constitution in the twentieth century, by Charles Beard, Robert Dahl, and William Riker, attack Madison's strategy to check faction as an antidemocratic protection of economic interest, thus ignoring the intergroup security dynamic that is cumulatively addressed in Federalist nos. 1–14. See Beard Charles, An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution (New York: Macmillan, 1913); Dahl Robert, Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 433; and Riker William, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964).

62. This explains the “supreme paradox” of the years before the Civil War. Potter observes: “Northern unionists who believed in American nationalism resisted most proposals for further territorial growth of the nation, while states' rights southerners who denied that the Union was a nation sought to extend the national domain from pole to pole.” See Potter David M., The Impending Crisis, 1848–1861 (New York: Harper and Row, 1976), p. 197.

63. Federalist, no. 2, p. 41.

64. See Onuf Peter, Statehood and Union: A History of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1987); Williams Frederick D., ed., The Northwest Ordinance: Essays on Its Formulation, Provisions, and Legacy (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1989).

65. Concerning the Senate, Madison writes, “The equal vote allowed to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residual sovereignty.” See Federalist, no. 62, p. 378. This language implies that sovereignty is being divided, but is an attempt to express that the authorities divided by the Constitution are fundamental within it. See also Nagel Paul C., One Nation Indivisible: The Union in American Thought, 1776–1861 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961); and Alexander James, “State Sovereignty in the Federal System,” Publius 16 (Spring 1986), pp. 115.

66. The decisive events in the weakening of the Senate as an assembly of the representatives of the states were the rise of transstate political parties and the failure of the “doctrine of instruction,” according to which state legislatures could instruct Senators how to vote and recall them during their terms if they failed to obey. For discussion, see Riker William, “The Senate in American Federalism,” American Political Science Review 49 (06 1955), pp. 452469.

67. Greene, Peripheries and Center.

68. On the workings of the agency system, see Kammen Michael G., A Rope of Sand: The Colonial Agents, British Politics, and the American Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968); and Lowe James Tapier, Our Colonial Heritage: Diplomatic and Military (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1987).

69. Although unelected to Parliament, Franklin spoke directly to Parliament, and his intervention was widely credited with resolving the political crisis caused by the First Stamp Act. Since Franklin also served as organizer of the abortive Albany Plan of Union in 1754 and the Constitutional Convention of 1787, a careful examination of how he was able to say what to whom would provide a revealing picture of the nature of diplomatic, representational, and constitutional discourse and practice. A comparison between the multiple-access lobbying of the agency system and the Europeans and Japanese in Washington over the last generation would be revealing. See Morgam Edmund S. and Morgam Helen M., The Stamp Act Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1953).

70. Interstate rendition and extradition was made possible by interstate treaties and compacts, which are remarkably similar to those that sovereign nation-states have employed in recent years to fight criminal activity occurring across international borders. See Moore John Bassett, A Treatise on Interstate Extradition and Rendition (Boston: Boston Book Company, 1891); and Nadelmann Ethan, Cops Across Borders: The Internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993).

71. The signal contribution of structural analysis in system theory is that it allows us to see a system-level logic arising from how the parts are situated vis-à-vis one another. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 8182.

72. The recent liberal emphasis upon microfoundations has led to the neglect of structural liberalism: “In contrast to Marxism and realism Liberalism is not committed to ambitious and parsimonious structural theory.” See Keohane Robert O., “International Liberalism Reconsidered,” in Dunn John, ed., The Economic Limits to Modem Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 165–94 and pp. 172–73.

73. For other typologies, see Kaplan Morton A., System andProcess in International Politics (New York: John Wiley, 1957), pp. 2153; Rosecrance Richard N..Action and Reaction in World Politics (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963), pp. 219–75; Falk Richard, A Study of Future Worlds (New York: Free Press, 1975), pp. 150223; and Watson Adam, The Evolution of International Society (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 1318.

74. The distinction here is between Genossenschaft (association) and Herrschaft (lordship) derived from Gierke Otto von, Das deutsche Genossenshaftrecht 4 vols. (Berlin: Wiedmann, 1868, 1873,1881, and 1913); and Gasser Adolph, Geschichte der Volksfiieheit und der Demokratie (Aarau, Switzerland: Verlag H. R. Sauerlaender, 1939).

75. Federalist, no. 1, p. 33.

76. For overviews, see Nevins Allan, The American States During and After the Revolution, 1775–1789 (New York: Macmillan, 1924); and Morris Richard B., The Forging of the Union, 1781–1789 (New York: Harper and Row, 1987).

77. For the importance of geopolitical separation in the American founding, see Federalist, no. 9, pp. 70–71; Gilbert Felix, To the Farewell Address (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961); Wolfers Arnold and Martin Laurence, The Anglo-American Tradition in Foreign Policy (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1956), pp. i–xxvii; and Hintze Otto, “The Preconditions of Representative Government in World History," in Gilbert Felix, ed., The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 302–56.

78. Keohane Robert O., “Associative American Development, 1776–1860: Economic Growth and Political Disintegration,” in International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1989), pp. 183214; and Ticknor J. Ann, Self-Reliance Versus Power Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), pp. 71132; and Agnew John, The United States in the World-Economy: A Regional Geography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

79. At the same time, this vast frontier meant that pervasive land hunger could be met through migration and purchase rather than popular imperialism of the sort Thucydides described at work in democratic Athens. See Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, trans. Warner Rex (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1975).

80. See Meinig, Continental America, 1800–1867, p. 432447; and Onuf, The Origins of the Federal Republic.

81. Woods Gordon S., The Radicalism of the American Revolution (New York: Knopf, 1993).

82. See Ward Henry M., The United Colonies of New England, 1643–1690 (New York: Vantage Press, 1961); and Ward Henry M., “Unite or Die”: Intercolony Relations, 1690–1763 (Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1971).

83. The juridical inheritance of the British Empire in North America poses interesting similarities with the situation in postcolonial Africa and the post-Soviet successor states.

84. See Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, pp. 4556; Carr E. H., The Twenty Years' Crisis (New York: Macmillan, 1939); and Gilpin Robert, War and Change in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

85. See Greene, Peripheries and Center; and Koebner Richard, Empires (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1961) pp. 61193.

86. Kohn Hans, American Nationalism (New York: Collier Books, 1957); and Curti Merle, The Roots of American Loyalty (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946).

87. For compromise as a constitutive norm, see Knupfer Peter B., The Union As It Is: Constitutional Unionism and Sectional Compromise, 1787–1861 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

88. For republican symbols, see Zelinsky Wilbur, Nation into State: The Shifting Foundations of American Nationalism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988); and Wills Garry, Cincinnatus: George Washington and the Enlightenment (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1984).

89. Hofstader Richard, America at 1750: A Social Portrait (New York: Vintage, 1973).

90. Tocqueville De, Democracy in America, vol. 1, p. 178.

91. For discussion of the Wyoming Valley and other similar conflicts, see Onuf, The Origins of the Federal Republic, pp. 4973; Meinig, Atlantic America, 1492–1800, p. 290; and Morris, TheForging of the Union, 1781–1789, pp. 222–23.

92. For general analyses of nationalism in antebellum America, see Potter David M. and Manning Thomas G., eds., Nationalism and Sectionalism in America, 1775–1877 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1949); and Kohn, American Nationalism.

93. As Middlekauf writes, “There was … a standard culture throughout the colonies, not strictly American, but one heavily indebted to England. For the most part the institutions of politics and governments on all levels followed English models; the ‘official’ language, that is the language used by governing bodies and colonial leadership, was English; prevailing social values were also English.” See Middlekauf Robert, The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763–1789 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 28.

94. Meinig, Atlantic America, 1492–1800, p. 385. If ethnic identity had been the motive for independence, the French Canadians rather than colonial Englishmen would have rebelled against British rule.

95. See Faust Drew Gilpin, The Creation of Confederate Nationalism: Ideology and Identity in the Civil War South (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1980); Thomas Emory M., The Confederate Nation: 1861–1865 (New York: Harper and Row, 1979); McCardell John, The Idea of a Southern Nation: 1830–1860 (New York: Norton, 1979); and Craven Avery, The Growth of Southern Nationalism: 1848–1861 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1953).

96. Degler Carl N., “One Among Many: The United States and National Unification,” in Boritt Gabor S., ed., Lincoln: The War President (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 89119.

97. For an analysis of the role expectations of this expansion played in motivating the break with Britain, see Egnal Marc, A Mighty Empire: The Origins of the American Revolution (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988).

98. For such speculations, see Potter David M., The Impending Crisis, 1848–1861 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 10 n. 16.

99. See Taylor George Rogers, The Transportation Revolution, 1815–1860 (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1951), chap. 7; and Fishlow Albert, American Railroads and the Transformation of the Antebellum Economy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965).

100. Demographic, technical, and organizational factors hobbled Amerindian resistance. But had the American expansion not been so rapid, these groups might have been able to defensively modernize. On British attempts to employ Amerindians as a break to American expansion, see Wright Leitch J. Jr, Britain and the American Frontier, 1783–1815 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1975); and Rohrbaugh Malcolm J., The Trans-Appalachian Frontier (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

101. Before Vermont joined the Union in 1791, “Influential Vermonters began to discuss special relationships with Britain, some envisioning an imperial protectorate, others a Switzerland-like neutrality.” See Meinig, Continental America, 1492–1800, p. 349. Also see Onuf, The Origins of the Federal Republic, pp. 127145; and Williamson Chilton, Vermont in Quandary: 1763–1825 (Montpelier: Vermont Historical Society, 1949). On the incorporation of Texas, see Reichstein Andreas V., Rise of the Lone Star: The Making of Texas, Willson Jeanne R., trans. (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1989); Pletcher David, The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican War (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1973); and Meinig, Continental America, 1492–1800, pp. 128158.

102. An even earlier precedent, the union of Scotland with Britain in 1707, was facilitated by the ability of the Scots to send representatives to Parliament in proportion to their numbers and thus participate in the exercise of British power rather than being oppressed by it. For a discussion, see Pryde George S., The Treaty of Union of Scotland and England (London: Thomas Nelson, 1950).

103. For descriptions, see Potter, The Impending Crisis, 1848–1861, and Knupfer, The Union As It Is. For the similarities with European treaties, see Turner, The Significance of Sections in American History, p. 88.

104. On pairing of new entrants to the union, see Meinig, Continental America, 1492–1800, p. 449.

105. Two free-soil state admissions (Minnesota and Oregon) in a row made the Southern position seem irrecoverable without expansion into the Caribbean. See May Robert E., The Southern Dream of a Caribbean Empire, 1854–1862 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1973).

106. See Monaghan James, Civil War on the Western Border, 1854–1865 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1955); and Rawley James A., Race and Politics: “Bleeding Kansas” and the Coming of the Civil War (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1969).

107. For visions of constitutional modifications to avert secession, see Gunderson Robert G., Old Gentleman's Convention: The Washington Peace Conference of 1861 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1961); and Meinig, “Geopolitical Alternatives,” Continental America, 1492–1800, pp. 489502.

108. Schroeder Paul, “The Nineteenth Century International System: Changes in Structure,” World Politics 39 (10 1986), pp. 126.

109. Schroeder Paul, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972), pp. 392427.

110. As McPherson James puts it, “The United States went to war in 1861 to preserve the Union; it emerged from war in 1865 having created a nation.” Abraham Lincoln and the Second American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. viii, emphasis original. See also Hyman Harold M., A More Perfect Union: The Impact of the Civil War and Reconstruction on the Constitution (New York: Knopf, 1973).

111. See Curry Leonard P., Blueprint for Modern America: Non-military Legislation of the First Civil War Congress (Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968); Bensel Richard Franklin, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859–1877 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); and Neely Mark E. Jr, The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991).

112. Skrowronek Stephen, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

113. Bryce James, The American Commonwealth, 3d ed., vol. 1 (New York: Macmillan, 1888), p. 78.

114. For classic indictments, see Crowly Herbert, The Promise of American Life (New York: Macmillan, 1909); and Dewey John, The Public and Its Problems (New York: Henry Holt, 1927).

115. For this evolution, see Smith Louis, American Democracy and Military Power (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951); and Mahon John K., History of the Militia and the National Guard (New York: Macmillan, 1983).

116. For a succinct overview, see Koh Harold, The National Security Constitution (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 67100.

117. Corwin Edward, The Constitution and Total War (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1947).

118. concludes Koh, “Growing American hegemony and growing presidential power fed upon one another.” See The National Security Constitution, p. 97. It would be more accurate to say that increasingly intensive American competitive interaction with the rest of the world produced the effect Koh identifies. To the extent the United States' interactive relationship with the rest of the world has been hegemonic, the tendency for interaction to strengthen the President at the expense of Congress has probably been moderated.

119. As Edward S. Corwin observed, “The maintenance of constitutional government in the United States becomes linked with the broader cause of its restoration and preservation elsewhere.” See The Constitution and International Organization (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 5556.

120. For suggestions along these lines, see Pocock J. G. A., “States, Republics, and Empires: The American Founding in Early Modern Perspective,” in Ball Terence and Pocock J. G. A., eds., Conceptual Change and the Constitution (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1988), pp. 5577. The European treaties and settlements were foedera and the American union was foederal, derived from Latin foedus, for covenant or alliance. See Elazar Daniel, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1985), pp. 115 and 122.

121. On order building in the wake of war and revolution, see Holsti Kalevi J., Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order, 1648–1989 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); and G. John Ikenberry, “International Order Building and Peace Settlements,” manuscript.

122. Vile M. J. C., Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967).

123. On the problem internal balancing poses for the image of the state as hierarchically organized, see Milner Helen, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations: A Critique,” Review of International Studies 17 (01 1991), pp. 6785.

124. Kiernan V. G., The Duel in European History: Honour and the Reign of the Aristocracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).

125. Schumpeter Joseph, The Sociology of Imperialisms (1919; reprint New York: Meridian, 1972); and Mayer Arno J., The Persistence of the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War (New York: Pantheon, 1981).

126. Nye Joseph, “Neorealism and Neoliberalism,” World Politics 40 (01 1988), pp. 235–51 and p. 246 in particular.

127. But Wendt's characterization of anarchy as “what states make of it” is too permissive, for the negarchical structures of the Philadelphian system were carefully designed avoidances based on a knowledge and fear of anarchy's syndromes. See Wendt Alexander, “Anarchy is What States Make of It,” International Organization 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391–425.

128. On the world federation, see Doran Charles von, The Great Rehearsal (Boston: Little, Brown, 1948); Reeves Emery, The Anatomy of Peace (New York: Harper and Row, 1945); Meyer Cord Jr, Peace or Anarchy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1947); and Borgese G. A., Foundations of a World Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

129. For a concise tour, see, Rodgers Daniel T., “Republicanism: the Career of a Concept,” Journal of American History 79 (06 1992), pp. 1138.

130. On the European Union as anomaly, see Sbragia Alberta M., “Thinking about the European Future: The Uses of Comparison,” in Sbragia Alberta M., ed., Euro-politics (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1992), pp. 257–91; and Burley Anne-Marie, “Law Among Liberal States: Liberalism and the Act of State Doctrine,” Columbia Law Review 92 (12 1992), pp. 1907–96.

131. For further thoughts along these lines, see Deudney Daniel, “Dividing Realism: Security Materialism vs Structural Realism on Nuclear Security and Proliferation,” Security Studies 2 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 736; and Deudney Daniel, “Nuclear Weapons and the Waning of the Real-State,” Daedalus (Spring 1995), forthcoming.

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International Organization
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