Avey, Paul C Markowitz, Jonathan N and Reardon, Robert J 2018. Do US Troop Withdrawals Cause Instability? Evidence from Two Exogenous Shocks on the Korean Peninsula. Journal of Global Security Studies, Vol. 3, Issue. 1, p. 72.
Sechser, Todd S. 2018. Reputations and Signaling in Coercive Bargaining. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 62, Issue. 2, p. 318.
Renshon, Jonathan Dafoe, Allan and Huth, Paul 2018. Leader Influence and Reputation Formation in World Politics. American Journal of Political Science,
Zachary, Paul Deloughery, Kathleen and Downes, Alexander B. 2017. No Business Like FIRC Business: Foreign-Imposed Regime Change and Bilateral Trade. British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 47, Issue. 04, p. 749.
Chiozza, Giacomo 2017. Presidents on the cycle: Elections, audience costs, and coercive diplomacy. Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 34, Issue. 1, p. 3.
Heffington, Colton Park, Brandon Beomseob and Williams, Laron K 2017. The “Most Important Problem” Dataset (MIPD): a new dataset on American issue importance. Conflict Management and Peace Science, p. 073889421769146.
Mendeloff, David 2017. Punish or Persuade? The Compellence Logic of International Criminal Court Intervention in Cases of Ongoing Civilian Violence. International Studies Review,
Gelpi, Christopher 2017. Democracies in Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 61, Issue. 9, p. 1925.
Sharp, Travis 2017. Theorizing cyber coercion: The 2014 North Korean operation against Sony. Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 40, Issue. 7, p. 898.
Kim, Nam Kyu 2017. Are Military Regimes Really Belligerent?. Journal of Conflict Resolution, p. 002200271668462.
Mazumder, Soumyajit 2017. Autocracies and the international sources of cooperation. Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 54, Issue. 3, p. 412.
McManus, Roseanne W. 2017. The Impact of Context on the Ability of Leaders to Signal Resolve. International Interactions, Vol. 43, Issue. 3, p. 453.
Tarar, Ahmer 2016. A Strategic Logic of the MilitaryFait Accompli. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 60, Issue. 4, p. 742.
Downes, Alexander B. and O'Rourke, Lindsey A. 2016. You Can't Always Get What You Want: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate Relations. International Security, Vol. 41, Issue. 2, p. 43.
Moon, Chungshik and Souva, Mark 2016. Audience Costs, Information, and Credible Commitment Problems. Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 60, Issue. 3, p. 434.
Weisiger, Alex and Gartzke, Erik 2016. Debating the Democratic Peace in the International System. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 60, Issue. 3, p. 578.
Kertzer, Joshua D. and Brutger, Ryan 2016. Decomposing Audience Costs: Bringing the Audience Back into Audience Cost Theory. American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 60, Issue. 1, p. 234.
Miller, Ross A and Bokemper, Scott E 2016. Media coverage and the escalation of militarized interstate disputes, 1992–2001. Media, War & Conflict, Vol. 9, Issue. 2, p. 162.
Stoycheff, Elizabeth and Nisbet, Erik C. 2016. Priming the Costs of Conflict? Russian Public Opinion About the 2014 Crimean Conflict. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, p. edw020.
Gottfried, Matthew S. and Trager, Robert F. 2016. A Preference for War: How Fairness and Rhetoric Influence Leadership Incentives in Crises. International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 60, Issue. 2, p. 243.
Do democracies make more effective coercive threats? An influential literature in international relations argues that democratic institutions allow leaders to credibly signal their resolve in crises, thereby making their threats more likely to work than threats by nondemocracies. This article revisits the quantitative evidence for this proposition, which we call the “democratic credibility hypothesis,” and finds that it is surprisingly weak. Close examination of the data sets most commonly used to test this hypothesis reveals that they contain few successful democratic threats, or indeed threats of any kind. Moreover, these data sets' outcome variables do not properly measure the effectiveness of threats, and therefore yield misleading results. The article then reassesses the democratic credibility hypothesis using the Militarized Compellent Threats data set, a new data set designed specifically to test hypotheses about the effectiveness of coercive threats. The analysis indicates that threats from democracies are no more successful than threats from other states.
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.
Full text views reflects the number of PDF downloads, PDFs sent to Google Drive, Dropbox and Kindle and HTML full text views.
* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 22nd February 2018. This data will be updated every 24 hours.