Few countries in the world can claim to be free from corruption and none of these is to be found in Commonwealth Africa. Even though administrative incorruptibility was one of the boasts of the British colonial service, low-level corruption was common during the colonial period and indeed served to bolster the colonial system. Since African states obtained political independence, levels of corruption have markedly increased, regardless of official ideology or economic approach, and in many countries corruption is both pervasive and endemic. Changes of government are often accompanied and, in the case of military coups, justified by commitments to eradicate the corrupt practices that allegedly characterized the previous regime. Corruption is an obstacle to economic development and to political integration, and most African governments (cynically or not) avow the need to combat it. Pressure on governments to act has increased in recent years and comes from two sources. The emergence of pro-democracy forces has drawn large numbers of people into the arena of political debate and organization and this in turn has led to demands for openness and accountability on the part of government. Moreover, foreign donors and international financial institutions are today less willing to condone corrupt practices on the part of African governments. They stress the importance of good governance and accountability and the need to link economic reconstruction with institutional reform.

The attitude of courts to previous inconsistent statements of witnesses is primarily informed by the premium placed on the most credible evidence. A vintage rationale for this attitude states that:

“The character of a witness for habitual veracity is an essential ingredient in his credibility: for a man who is capable of uttering a deliberate falsehood is in most cases capable of doing so under the solemn sanction of an oath. If therefore it appears that he has formerly said or written the contrary of that which he has now sworn (unless the reason of his having done so is satisfactorily accounted for), his evidence should not have much weight….”

Development in all its forms is a pervasive theme in the study of modern Africa. The meaning, objectives and methods of development are issues which have entered into every discipline concerned with the study of that continent. The study of law is no exception. Broadly speaking there are three “paradigms of law” which have special relevance to debates on African development. These can be characterized as the instrumental model, the pluralist model and the customary law model.

“First of all, the idea of multi-parties is not a new one in Africa. Here in Uganda, we had multi-parties between 1962 and 1966. The generals took over power all over Africa because the multi-parties had failed: this is a historical fact. Their failure was, however, not surprising because we are talking about systems from completely different societies. In Africa, we still have pre-industrial societies without any significant level of social stratification [and] therefore, we are still dealing mainly with tribal groups. Political pluralism will come to Africa, no doubt, but not at a forced pace.”

The extent to which customary law restricts the freedom of testamentary power (if at all) has given rise to a spate of cases right up to the Supreme Court, in which the courts have attempted to interpret and apply section 3(1) of the Wills Law (1958) of Western Nigeria, which currently applies to Lagos, Ogun, Osun, Ondo, Edo and Delta States. Section 3(1) of the Wills Law of all these States provides thus:

“Subject to any Customary Law relating thereto, it shall be lawful for every person to devise, bequeath or dispose of, by his will executed in a manner hereinafter required, all real and all personal estate which he shall be entided to, either in Law or in equity, at the time of his death and which if not so devised, bequeathed and disposed of would devolve upon the heir at law of him, or if he became entided by descent, of his ancestor, or upon his executor or administrator”.

The Ninth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (the Ninth Congress), was held in Cairo, Egypt from 29 April to 8 May, 1995. It followed the sequence of United Nations quinquennial congresses on the prevention of crime and die treatment of offenders which began in 1955 as a direct continuation of die international penitentiary congresses that had been organized by the International Penal and Penitentiary Commission (IPPC) since the 19tii century. The congresses are convened by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) on die basis of General Assembly Resolution 415(V) of 1950. The Nindi Congress was attended by delegates from 138 states, several United Nations offices and organs, including specialized agencies, various inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations and over 190 individual experts. This was die first time the Congress was held on the African continent.

The enactment of the Ombudsman Act, 1995, marks Botswana's belated, albeit welcome, membership of the world-wide movement to enhance governmental administration. The Act brings to fruition the deliberations of an international conference on the suitability of the Ombudsman institution in Botswana held in Gaborone in 1993. The need for such an institution to complement the country's democratic institutions was made clear at that conference by the then Minister for Presidential Affairs and Public Administration who was quoted as saying:

‘The wide acceptance of the Ombudsman institution and the fact that it has been incorporated in recent constitutional reforms in other countries requires that we in Botswana give serious consideration to it at this point in time.’

Many Commonwealth African constitutions provide for the making of rules imposing time limits on the enforcement of constitutional rights. A typical example is article 46(1) of the Constitution of the Seychelles which provides: “The Chief Justice may make rules for the purpose of this article with respect to the practice and procedure of the Constitutional Court … including rules with respect to the time within which an application or a reference may be made or brought”.

In June 1995, die Constitutional Review Commission issued its report. Its major recommendations for a new constitution for Zambia are noted below whilst a detailed analysis will appear in the Journal at a later date.

Article 91(3) of the Constitution of Zambia provides that: “The Judicature shall be autonomous and shall be administered in accordance with the provisions of an Act of Parliament”. The financial and administrative independence of the judiciary is now provided for in die Judicature Administration Act, 1994.

In July 1995 this long-awaited Act was signed into law. Its Preamble states that it is: “To provide for the investigation and establishment of as complete a picture as possible of the nature, causes and extent of gross violations of human rights committed during the period from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date contemplated in the Constitution, within or without the Republic, emanating from the conflicts of the past, and the fate or whereabouts of the victims of such violations; the granting of amnesty to persons who make full disclosure of acts associated with a political objective committed in the course of the conflicts of the past during the said period; affording victims an opportunity to relate the violations they suffered; the taking of measures aimed at the granting of reparation to, and the rehabilitation and the restoration of the human and civil dignity of, victims of violations of human rights; reporting to the Nation about such violations and victims; the making of recommendations aimed at the prevention of the commission of gross violations of human rights; and for the said purposes to provide for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, a Committee on Human Rights Violations, a Committee on Amnesty and a Committee on Reparation and Rehabilitation…”

In the case of In Re: Chikweche (Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, 1995, unreported), the applicant, a devout follower of the Rastafari movement, was refused registration as a legal practitioner by a High Court judge. The precise reasons for the refusal were not clear but seemingly the applicant was not considered a “fit and proper person” as required by section 5(1)(f) of the Legal Practitioners Act. Before the Supreme Court it was submitted that such refusal was by reason only of the applicant's dreadlocks hairstyle and therefore this infringed his constitutional right to freedom of conscience.

The first term of the Constitutional Court began in February 1995. The Court is made up of 11 judges, five of whom, namely Mr Arthur Chaskalson (President), Mr Justice Goldstone, Mr Justice Laurie Ackermann, Mr Justice Ishmail Mohamed, and Mr Justice Tholakele Madlain, were appointed by the President of the Republic in consultation with the Cabinet and the Chief Justice. The remaining six members were appointed by the President of the Republic after consultation with the President of the Court and the Cabinet and following the making of recommendations by the Judicial Service Commission (JSC). In so doing, the JSC was required to take into account “the need to constitute a court which is independent, competent and representative in respect of race and gender”. After a series of public hearings, the JSC submitted a list often names for consideration from the 24 candidates who were short-listed. The following six were appointed: Mr Justice John Didcott, Mr Justice Johann Kriegler, Mr Pius Langa, Prof. Yvonne Mokgoro, Prof. Catherine O'Regan and Prof. Albie Sachs. The Constitutional Court Complementary Act, 1995, provides that eight of the 11 judges must hear each case, so that only one case can be heard by the court at any one time.

In September 1994 representatives from national parliaments in 33 African states attended the 92nd Inter-Parliamentary Conference. The following resolution was adopted unanimously by the conference and is significant in that it sets out a series of strategies which, if implemented, will go a long way towards the strengthening of human rights in practice.