¹ Quotation is from the U. S. initial post-surrender directive (text in Occupation of Japan, State Department Publication 2671, Far Eastern Series 17, p. 79). The occupation had two later directives from the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (the detailed basic working directive) and from the Far Eastern Commission. SCAP is usefully referred to as a person, i.e., General MacArthur, or as denominating the occupation administration as a whole.

² Each successive SCAP directive was numbered, and thus known by its number on the SCAP Index (SCAPIN).

³ Government Section, SCAP, Political Reorientation of Japan: September 1945 to. September 1948 (Washington, Government Printing Office, n.d.), hereafter referred to as PRO.

As used in this article, the term “economic purge” has two meanings. It refers generally to the entire purge operation in the economic field, of which actions taken under SCAPIN 550 and the Zaibatsu Appointees Law form two separate and distinct parts. It also refers specifically to the SCAPIN 550 action on the economic side, by long usage termed the economic purge. The context makes clear whether the term is used in its generalized or specific meaning.

⁴ For text of the working directive, prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Documents & State Papers (Dept. of State), Vol. 1, No. 1, April 1948Google Scholar.

⁵ The reasons for the prevailing view are thus stated in PRO, p. 47. It was also argued, then and later, that the action would hit the best friends of the United States in Japan.

⁶ Information supplied the writer in personal conversations.

⁷ PRO, p. 47. The wording here is ambiguous as to time of the removals, and it may be doubted that the whole 217 were purged in 1946.

⁸ The brief summary here presented is based on the writer's personal knowledge. The full history of the summer's debate on this issue, a long and interesting one, lies buried in GHQ memoranda and reports.

⁹ For the MacArthur-Yoshida letters, see PRO, pp. 496–500, and for a general treatment of the economic purge, ibid., pp. 46–57.

¹⁰ Text of ordinances in PRO, pp. 501–547; for the listings, see pp. 529–531 (pars. 6–8) and pp. 538–543 (pars. 11–12).

¹¹ These positions were specially defined in Appendix I, Article VII, 6 (PRO, p. 526). Principal stockholder was discarded when it was found that such person invariably held one of the officerships. (PRO, p. 52).

¹² For “principal public office,” the defined positions were chairman, vice-chairman, president, vice-president, director, standing auditor, or other position of equal authority or influence. The defined positions in the two classifications (principal and ordinary) constituted “public office” for business companies and the agencies listed in paragraphs 6–8.

¹³ The exception is stated in Article III, Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947 (PRO, p. 501).

¹⁴ Some of the 19 companies had two or more “successor” companies, but they still represented an area of business activity equal to that of the original company. Among them were included such giants of Japanese industry as Fuji Industrial (Nakajima), Fuso Metals (Sumitomo), Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, and Oji Paper (Mitsui). Many of their “successor” companies did not emerge until 1948 or later, and none were listed in Appendix II. Purgees could assume their old posts in these companies; if challenged, they could argue that the companies were not listed. Were they challenged? Surveillance of the “successor” companies may well have lapsed in 1948 and 1949.

The 28 listed companies of par. ll(a) subjected to dissolution were the following numbered companies of the PRO list (pp. 538–541): 6, 10, 13, 16, 18, 41, 47, 48, 49, 50, 56, 58, 61, 62, 73, 77, 81, 88, 93, 106, 110, 111, 114, 119, 122, 130, 131, and 158.

¹⁵ The six deconcentrated companies not listed were Hokkaido Dairy, Japan Brewery, Japan Explosives, Oriental Can (Mitsui), Shochiku Cinema, and Toho Cinema. The evidential purge applied to Japan Express and Imperial Petroleum, which were listed under par. 6 (PRO, p. 529).

¹⁶ PRO, p. 54.

¹⁷ PRO, p. 57.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ List of criteria in Article VII, 6 of Appendix I to the Cabinet ordinance (PRO, p. 526)

²⁰ See Nippon Times, November 8, 1945, for texts of the Japanese government proposals incorporating the Yasuda Plan and of SCAPIN 244.

²¹ For assignment to Finance Ministry, see HCLC, Final Report on Zaibatsu Dissolution (Tokyo, July 10, 1951), p. 65.Google Scholar Finance Minister at the time was Viscount Shibusawa Keizo, head of one of the Zaibatsu families.

²² Separate copy of memorandum.

²³ Separate copy of memorandum.

²⁴ Revisions in Official Gazette, No. 205, December 4, 1946, pp. 2–3; for the original ordinance, ibid., No. 14, April 20, 1946, pp. 1–6. English edition, and so hereafter. The Commission reports that approvals under Article 19–3 were granted in but two cases. (See HCLC, Final Report, p. 66).

²⁵ For action and list, see HCLC, Final Report, pp. 65–66. The 56 “designated persons,” strictly speaking, came from ten Zaibatsu “houses” rather than “families.” Thus, the eleven “designated persons” of the Mitsui house were the heads of eleven Mitsui families.

²⁶ HCLC, Final Report, p. 65.

²⁷ This bank had seen to the printing of the Japanese occupation currency for the Philippines, before December 7, 1941.

²⁸ Defiers of occupation mandates could be prosecuted in the occupation courts, but instances of such action did not occur in respect to Japanese businessmen.

²⁹ Text of law, enforcement regulations, and five appendices to the latter in Official Gazette, Extra, January 7, 1948, pp. 1–17.

³⁰ For the figure of 335 Mitsui subsidiaries, see Hadley, Eleanor M., “Concentrated Business Power in Japan” (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1949)Google Scholar, Tables III, IV, V, VI, IX, and XIV. Total derived as follows: 22 designated subsidiaries of the honsha, 48 ordinary subsidiaries of the honsha, 27 subsidiaries of honsha's ordinary subsidiaries, 81 subsidiaries of the designated subsidiaries (except Trading and Mining), 126 subsidiaries of Mitsui Trading, and 31 subsidiaries of Mitsui Mining.

³¹ This provision served to exclude designation of old-line officials of the restricted companies, but most of these latter were small and of minor importance.

³² Text of Ordinance 567 in Official Gazette, No. 197, November 25, 1946, pp. 1–6.

³³ Text of amendment in HCLC, Laws, Rules and Regulations concerning the Reconstruction and Democratization of Japanese Economy (Tokyo, 1949), PP. 424–425. The Liberal Party, under Prime Minister Yoshida, had assumed office in mid-October 1948.

³⁴ Information obtained for author by Joseph Fromm, the Far Eastern Regional Editor of U. S. News & World Report.

³⁵ Nippon Times, October 14, 1950.

³⁶ For text of General Ridgway's statement, see ibid., May 2, 1951.

³⁷ Ibid., June 21, 1951. About three-fourths of the total 200,000 purgees were military or ex-service personnel. See PRO, p. 553.

³⁸ From tabulated data supplied by occupation headquarters. Sixty of the remaining 80 were under Category G, with 20 under Category E.

³⁹ HCLC, Final Report on Zaibatsu Dissolution, cited, p. 11. The Commission itself dissolved on the same day, July 11, 1951.

⁴⁰ PRO, p. 51.

⁴¹ Hatoyama was, in this respect, a thorn in the flesh of the occupation authorities. In the final analysis, they could not make a case that would stand up in court unless a witness would testify that he had heard political affairs discussed with Hatoyama instead of ordinary personal affairs. So it was too for the business leaders.

⁴² See Article XIII, Imperial Ordinance No. 1 of 1947, PRO, p. 502.

⁴³ The New York Times, June 13, 1947.