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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2011
The meiji period (1868–1912) in Japanese history is known traditionally as an era of bustling reform during which the leaders of the restored imperial government sought to discard a feudal and backward civilization and to replace it with the modernity of the West. No people, however, notwithstanding all their persistence, talents, and hopes can have worked as great a transformation in their national life as has been claimed for the Japanese during this period. There is no doubt that great and far-reaching reforms were inaugurated, but it is especially necessary, in assessing them, to distinguish between the initial plans and hopes of the Japanese, on the one hand, and the actual achievements, on the other. The fundamental institutional changes which were projected required in most instances the passage of at least a generation before a reasonable stage of progress was attained. Failure to bear in mind the gradual nature of these changes has often resulted in the presentation of distorted and anachronistic treatments of modern Japanese history.
1 See inter alia, Capt. Grierson, J. M., Armed strength of Japan: compiled in the Intelligence Branch of the War Office (London, 1886), 6;Google ScholarLane-Poole, S., The life of Sir Harry Parkes (London, 1901), 2:190 ff.Google Scholar
2 A typical example of the foreign “military expert” and his problems in assessing Japanese military forces will be found in Lory, Hillis, Japan's military masters (New York, 1943), 219–20.Google ScholarThe inadequacies of many foreign experts on Japan in general are strikingly commented upon in Owen Lattimore, Solution in Asia (New York, 1945), 27 ff.Google Scholar
3 Kimio, Izu and Yoshio, Matsushita, Nihon gunji hattatsu-shi (Tokyo, 1948), 137.Google Scholar
4 Even the most casual survey of Japanese foreign relations with the Western powers up to the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 at least will reveal that the diplomacy of the Japanese government was “defensive.” Every effort was made to avoid antagonisms with Western powers, but not with Asiatic nations, which could serve as pretexts for aggression. What was true of this era as a whole was of course even more characteristic of the earlier years of the Meiji period.
5 It is most interesting to note that on November 6, 1868, at a time when the Restoration government had not as yet successfully established itself, and when it had no independent military force upon which it could rely, Kido Takayoshi proposed to Ōmura Masujirō that three fifths of the government revenues be devoted to military projects; see Toshio, Ōito, Bakumatsu heisei kaikaku-shi (Tokyo, 1939), 214.Google Scholar Ōmura, who was in charge of the government's military planning, upheld the point of view that the greatest threat to the continued existence of the new regime would ultimately come from the southwestern clans. His military policies were accordingly especially designed to cope with this contingency (Izu and Matsushita, 137).
6 Itō Hirobumi, Governor of Hyōgo during the Restoration, was, among many others, acutely aware of the reasons for the traditional weakness of the throne. Thus as early as October 27, 1868, he recommended to the imperial government that the clan troops returning from the campaigns in the north be constituted a national army and placed under the direct authority of the emperor. See tsuijō-kai, Shumpō-kō, Itō Hirobumi-den (Tokyo, 1940), 1:410–13.Google Scholar
7 Reischauer, R. K., Early Japanese history (Princeton, 1937), part A, 25–26, 55.Google Scholar
8 Ōito, 167 ff.;Norman, E. H., Soldier and peasant in Japan (New York, 1943), 12–13.Google Scholar
9 Brown, Delmer M., “The impact of firearms on Japanese warfare, 1543–98,” Far Eastern quarterly, 7 (May 1948), 236–53;CrossRefGoogle ScholarBoxer, C. R., “Notes on European military influence in Japan,” Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 2nd ser., 8 (1931), 68–93.Google Scholar
10 It was of course not firearms per se which aroused the awe of the Japanese; it was rather the advanced modern types. The Colt revolver, breech-loading rifle, and rifled cannon of heavy caliber provided an impressive contrast to the antiquated matchlocks and smooth-bore cannon of the feudal armies.
11 The attempts made by the shogunate and many of the feudal clans to introduce Western technology in order to increase their respective military strength have been studied extensively by both Japanese and Western scholars. For excellent recent studies see Thomas Smith, “The introduction of Western industry to Japan during the last years of the Tokugawa period,” Harvard journal of Asiatic studies, 11 (June 1948), 130–52;CrossRefGoogle ScholarYasuzō, Horie, “Bakumatsu no gunji kōgyō,” Keizai-shi kenkyū, 19 (May 1938), 489–507.Google Scholar
12 Eijirō, Honjō, Bakumatsu no shinseisaku (Tokyo, 1935), 178–79.Google Scholar
13 ibid., 179–80.
14 ibid., 182.
15 The Chanoine military mission to Japan is discussed at length in Lapeyrère, P. de, Le Japon militaire (Paris, 1883), 24–29.Google Scholar Charles Chanoine was no stranger to the Far East, having participated in the Anglo-French expedition against China in 1860. Shortly before the outbreak of the wars of the Restoration the military mission was dismissed by the shogunate. Chanoine and most of the men returned immediately to France, but a few of the officers remained in Japan and joined Admiral Enomoto Kamajirō in his famed retreat to Hokkaidō. In later years Chanoine rose to be minister of war of France and also became involved in the unsavory Dreyfus Affair.
16 SeeYashi, Shozan, Kinsé Shiriaku, tr. by Satow, E. M. (Yokohama, 1873), 103.Google Scholar
17 Izu and Matsushita, 131; see also Seitoku, ItōKokubō-shi, , in Gendai Nihon bummei-shi (Tokyo, 1941), 4:36, 39.Google Scholar
18 Kunio, Maruyamajidai-shi, Meiji, in Shinkō Dainihon-shi (Tokyo, 1939), 8:45.Google Scholar
19 See Yamagata as quoted in Ōito, 224–225; Itō Hirobumi-den, 1:410. The argument usually presented was to the effect that in ancient times both military and civil power had been vested in the throne, but during the Middle Ages the military power had been gradually assumed by the buke. With the restoration of the emperor it was accordingly desirable to return this power to him. It is interesting to observe too that this argument appears at length in the conscription law issued in 1872.
20 Ōmura Masujirō (1824–69) is well known in the history of the closing years of the Tokugawa shogunate as one of the foremost military leaders of Japan as well as a student of the Dutch learning. Through the medium of the Dutch language he was able to study the military science of the West, which he blended well with traditional native practice. In the distribution of important positions in the new Restoration government Ōmura was singled out among the many great Chōshū generals for the post of vice-minister of military affairs (hyōbu-taiyū), while the equally illustrious Saigō Takamori of Satsuma was rewarded with the command of the imperial army. It should be noted that the direction of the Bureau of Naval and Military Affairs was nominally entrusted to an imperial prince; actually it was Ōmura as vice-minister who was in charge. For a short sketch of this leading figure of the Meiji Restoration see “Masujirō, Ōmura,” Jimbutsu-hen, in Tatsujirō, Honda and Sakumi, Hanami (eds.), Isetsu Nihon-shi (Tokyo, 1931–33), 8:58–66.Google Scholar See also Mombu-shō, , Ishin-shi (Tokyo, 1941), 5:611–16.Google Scholar
21 Iichirō, Tokutomi, Kōshaku Yamagata Aritomo-den (Tokyo, 1933), 2:148–49.Google Scholar
22 The great esteem with which this Chōshū general was held by posterity is succinctly attested to by the fact that the first bronze statue raised in Japan to the memory of a Restoration leader was that of Ōmura. See Papinot, E., Historical and geographical dictionary of Japan (Tokyo, 1908), 488.Google Scholar
23 For the growth of the early Japanese military schools see Izu and Matsushita, 185–86.
24 Takeo, Kono, Nihon heinō shiron (Tokyo, 1938), 199; hereafter cited as NHS.Google Scholar
25 Yamagata's first official act upon assuming office was designed to instill some efficiency in the bureau. In order to get the department personnel off the floor, where a cramped sitting position made difficult sustained attention to work, Western-style chairs and tables were introduced (Tokutomi, 2:57–58).
26 General Saigō Tsugumichi, younger brother of the eminent Takamori, transferred his army loyalties in later years, became an admiral in the rising Japanese navy, and closed a distinguished life as minister of the navy!
27 Tokutomi, 2:42.
28 Nobuyuki, Abe, “Meiji Taishō rikugun-shi,” in Eiichi, Shibusawa, et al. (eds.), Meiji Taishō-shi (Tokyo, 1929), 3:5.Google Scholar
29 Tokutomi, 2:157–58; Lapeyrère, 51.
30 Tokutomi, 2:153.
31 Izu and Matsushita, 140–41; Bunjirō, Horiuchi and Masashi, Hirayamaenkakushi, RikugunGunji-hen, in Sakuzō, Yoshino, et al, (eds.). Meiji bunka zenshū (Tokyo, 1927–1930), 23: 125–26; cited hereafter as MBZ.Google Scholar
32 Aritomo, Yamagata, “The Japanese army,” in Stead, A. (comp.), Japan by the Japanese (London, 1904), 105.Google Scholar
33 In 1873 the original four garrison areas were increased to six: Tokyo, Sendai, Osaka, Hiroshima, Nagoya, and Kumamoto (MBZ, 129–30).
34 Obata, Kyugoro, An interpretation of the life of Viscount Shibusawa (Tokyo, 1938), 76–77.Google Scholar
35 NHS, 198.
36 Yamagata, who ordinarily was a most realistic individual, actually had visions of an army of 400,000 menl (Yamagata, 105–06.) Though it might perhaps have been possible to raise so huge a military force, it would have been utterly impossible, considering the wealth of the nation at the time, for the Japanese people to maintain it. Not until after the Sino-Japanese War did the Japanese army start to approximate this strength.
37 NHS, 199.
38 Ogawa, Gotaro, Conscription system in Japan (New York, 1921), 14.Google Scholar
39 Norman, 49.
40 NHS, 206–07; Tokutomi, 2:223–24.
41 Major General Kono, T., “The Japanese Army,” in Nitobe, Inazo, et al., Western influence in modern Japan (Chicago, 1931), 385;Google Scholar Tokutomi, 2:224–26.
42 This second French military mission, commanded by Colonel Marguerie, remained in Japan until 1880, though during the last six years it was headed by Lieutenant Colonel Munier (Grierson, 5–6; Lapeyrère, 54). French influence waned very rapidly especially after the conclusion of the Satsuma rebellion in 1877. At this time Katsura who had for several years been military attaché in Berlin and was, like Yamagata, a great admirer of the German military system, was very active in pressing for a change to German procedure and organization. German influence too was greatly advanced after 1885 when Generals Kawakami and Ō yama returned from a trip to Europe, bringing with them Colonel Meckel.
43 Ike, Nobutake, “Triumph of the peace party in Japan in 1873,” Far Eastern quarterly, 2 (May 1943), 286–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
44 Norman, 76.
45 Tokutomi, 2:327.
46 The conscription law had not as yet been in operation long enough to permit dilution of the samurai with heimin, or commoners.
47 House, Edward, The Japanese expedition to Formosa (Tokyo, 1875).Google Scholar
48 ibid., 47. This observation should be compared with the description of a Japanese landing in Korea witnessed by Horace Allen, the American minister, at the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in February 1904. Speaking of a debarkation of Japanese troops Allen noted with awe a “steady stream of quiet determined men . . .like molasses running out of a barrel in summer. No noise or friction” (Quoted in Harrington, F., God, mammon and the Japanese [Madison; University of Wisconsin, 1944], 324–25).Google Scholar
49 The Formosan expedition, it should be noted, represented at the time the furthest penetration overseas of a Japanese army in history. From a military point of view the actual achievements on the field of battle were no better than a farce. Even that rabid encomiast of. the Japanese, Frank Brinkley, could say no more than that it “amounted to the shooting-down of a few semi-savages” (Brinkley, F., A history of the Japanese people [New York, 1914], 685).Google Scholar Nevertheless the lessons learned in this adventure were invaluable.
50 Saigō so wholeheartedly supported war with Korea that he even offered to proceed to the Hermit Kingdom with the hope of being assassinated. Such an eventuality, he felt, would provide an adequate casus belli and force the hand of his own government. See Idditti, S., The life of Marquis Shigenobu Okuma (Tokyo, 1940), 155.Google Scholar
51 The account of the Satsuma Rebellion which follows has been drawn principally from the following studies: Jintarō, Fujii, “Nansei Seneki,” in Kōju, Takayanagi (comp.), Dainihon senshi (Tokyo, 1938), 4:221–281;Google ScholarMounsey, A., The Satsuma rebellion (London, 1879)Google Scholar, the background of which has been strongly criticized by Japanese historians; and Clement, E. W., “The Saga and Satsuma Rebellions,” Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 50 (1923), 13–58Google Scholar, which is largely a regurgitation of Mounsey.
52 Although it is true that the samurai of Satsuma especially continued to retain for long the conservative feudal outlook of pre-Restoration Japan, it is necessary to bear in mind that Satsuma had a proper respect for Western industrial and military technology. In the introduction of factories, arsenals, and foundries into Tokugawa Japan Satsuma had actually been a pioneer. During the early years of the Restoration an arsenal was located in Kagoshima and after the outbreak of the rebellion Saigō 's agents attempted to purchase modern Western weapons in France. They were, however, forestalled in this respect by the vigilance of the central government. For this last episode see Takekoshi, Yosaburo, Prince Saionji (Kyoto, 1933), 86.Google Scholar
53 Itagaki of Tosa and his followers, unremitting foes of the government leaders since the break with Okubo in 1873, took advantage of the government's difficulties during the Satsuma Rebellion to criticize its military policy. “Yet we see [they said], on the occasion of a rebellion breaking out in Kiushiu, the Imperial army finds itself very hard pressed in the en gagements in Higo. Not only the whole of the regular army and reserves have to be sent down, but finding they cannot suppress the insurrection, police forces are armed and despatched to the seat of war . . . . Now, police were not intended to be used as soldiers in the field” (Mc Laren, W. (ed.), Japanese government documents, Transactions of the Asiatic Society of Japan, 42, no. 1 (1914), 468.Google Scholar Although this summarizes well the difficulties of the central government in coping with the rebels, the observation on the function of the Japanese police force was in correct. In many respects the police of the early Meiji period were an adjunct of the army. Organized as a semimilitary group and drawing much of the force from the samurai class, they were similar in many respects to the French gendarmerie and the Italian carabinieri.
54 NHS, 209.
55 It has been reported that the astute Saigō ordered his swordmen to slash the enemy about the legs rather than kill them. By this strategem the enemy would be deprived temporarily not only of the offensive strength of the wounded but also of the soldiers needed to carry them off the field (Maclay, A. C., A budget of letters from Japan [New York, 1889], 296).Google Scholar On the recruitment of samurai by the central government see Gakkai, Nihon Chiri, Nihon Heisei-shi (Tokyo, 1939), 280.Google Scholar
