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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 March 2011
The outbreak of hostilities between Chinese and Japanese troops at Liutiaohu in the vicinity of Mukden on the night of September 18, 1931, unleashed a chain of events leading to a disasterous war for Japan and the collapse of the Kuomintang government in China. The causes and course of the Manchurian incident which began on that date are well known and have been abundantly published in recent years. Although the significance of the Nakamura incident as a prelude to the Manchurian affair has also been generally recognized, the details of the Nakamura case and the manner in which the conflicting organs of Japanese policy-making handled it have remained obscure. The attempt here is to supply these details and analyze the affair with particular reference to the role of the Japanese Foreign Office and the growing civil-military conflict over the control of foreign policy.
1 Among the recent accounts are Yoshihashi, Takehiko, Conspiracy at Mukden (New Haven, 1963)Google Scholar; Ogata, Sadako N., Defiance in Manchuria: the Making of Japanese Foreign Policy, 1931–1932 (Berkeley, 1964)Google Scholar; Shimbun-sha, Asahi, Taiheiyo Senso e no Michi [The Road to the Pacific War], I, II (Tokyo, 1962)Google Scholar; hereafter Taiheiyo Senso; Storry, Richard, The Double Patriots (Boston, 1957), pp. 54–95Google Scholar; Maxon, Yale C., Control of Japanese Foreign Policy. A Study of Civil-Military Rivalry, 1930–1945 (Berkeley, 1957). pp. 80–86Google Scholar; Ferrell, R. H., “The Manchurian Incident,” Journal of Modern History, XXVII (March 1955), 66–72.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
2 Kijūrō, Shidehara, Gaikō Gojūnen [Fifty Years of Diplomacy], (Tokyo, 1951), pp. 109–112.Google Scholar
3 Ogata, Defiance in Manchuria, pp. 53–54.
4 Taiheiyō Sensō, I, 366–377.
5 Liutiaohu was first mentioned by Ishihara in November, 1930, as the best place to begin action. (Taiheiyō Sensō, I, 379).
6 This affair involved a dispute over the right of Korean farmers, leasing land in the vicinity of Wanpaoshan, Kirin, to construct an irrigation ditch which passed over land owned and worked by Chinese. It resulted in an armed clash between Chinese and Japanese consular police and engendered much ill feeling on both sides.
7 Although nothing came of the Ch'en-Shidehara talks in July and August 1931, they help to reveal the character of the Japanese Foreign Minister whose thoughts were confined to formal diplomatic procedures and well established precedents. When Ch'en proposed a Sino-Japanese alliance through which friendship and amity could be restored, Shidehara countered with the suggestion of something akin to the Anglo-French entente cordiale of the early twentieth century which he thought might work to remove the sources of conflict and lead to mutual cooperation. (Shidehara, Gaikō Gojūnen, pp. 147–150).
8 Report of the General Staff Office of the Kwantung Army, Aug. I, 1931 (IMT 523, p. 130). Communication from Vice-Minister of War Sugiyama Gen to Nagai Ryūtarō, Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Oct. 7, 1931 (IMT 523, p. 550). The classification of Foreign Ministry archives is based on that of Cecil Uyehara, H., Checklist of Archives in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Washington, 1954)Google Scholar. The Japanese army admitted the following year that Nakamura was on a military mission. (League of Nations, Appeal by the Chinese Government: Report of the Commission of Enquiry [Geneva, 1932], p. 63. Hereafter cited as Lytton Report).
9 The most detailed description of Isugi is found in a dispatch from Consul-General Shimizu in Tsitsihar to Foreign Minister Shidehara, Aug. 15, 1931 (IMT 523, pp. 179–180). See also Report of the General Staff Office of the Kwantung Army, Aug. 1, 1931 (IMT 523, pp. 149–151).
10 For information on Nakamura's passports see Hayashi to Shidehara, July 31, 1931, No. 486 (IMT 523, p. 117) and Aug. 11, 1931, No. 504 (S484, pp. 8–9); Ōhashi, Consul-General in Harbin, to Shidehara, July 29, 1931, No. 148 (IMT 523, p. 102) and Aug. 4, 1931, No. 149 (IMT 523, p. 159). Nakamura's possession of the calling card is referred to in Hayashi to Shidehara, Aug. 19, 1931, No. 514 (S484, p. 17) and Sept. 18, 1931, No. 611–1 (IMT 523, p. 490). See also Report of the General Staff Office of the Kwantung Army, Aug. 1, 1931 (IMT 523, p. 145).
11 Hayashi to Shidehara, July 31, 1931, No. 486 (IMT 523, p. 117).
12 Although the Lytton Report indicated (p. 63) June 9 as the date of the party's departure from Ilikotu, available evidence suggests June 6. (Report of the General Staff Office of the Kwantung Army, Aug. 1, 1931 [IMT 523, p. 131]. Official Report to the Cabinet, Aug. 25, 1931 [IMT 523, p. 237].)
13 This surmise is based primarily on a report from Hayashi to Shidehara (IMT 523, p. 498) which was in turn drawn from a Chinese investigation and from the admission of the Chinese Commander of the Third Regiment. However, other reports listed the date of arrest variously from June 25 to June 30, while the contemporary press and the Lytton Report (p. 64) recorded June 27.
14 Announcement by the Commander of the Kwantung Army, Oct. 29, 1931 (IMT 523, pp. 553–554).
15 Hayashi to Shidehara, Sept. 3, 1931, No. 554–3 (S484, p. 47).
16 Announcement by the Commander of the Kwantung Army, Oct. 29, 1931 (IMT 523, pp. 555–557). This report describes, among other things, a half-hour whipping administered to Nakamura when his replies to queries were deemed unsatisfactory.
17 Ibid., p. 555; Hayashi to Shidehara, Sept. 3, 1931, No. 554–3 (S484, p. 49).
18 Hayashi to Shidehara, Sept. 18, 1931, No. 614 (IMT 523, p. 498). The official Kwantung Army version, prepared in October, describes in considerable detail the execution and cremation. Its accuracy, however, is questionable. (IMT 523, pp. 556–558).
19 Report of the General Staff Office of the Kwantung Army, Aug. I, 1931 (IMT 523, pp. 132–133).
20 Ibid., p. 134.
21 Ibid., p. 135. The woman who provided Satō with the information is consistently referred to in the Japanese reports by the name “Komiso” or “Komisa.”
22 The Chinese text and the Japanese translation are found in Shimizu to Shidehara, Aug. 1, 1931, No. 7 (IMT 523, pp. 125–126).
23 Shimizu to Shidehara, July 26, 1931, No. 30 (IMT 523, pp. 90–91).
24 The full “Takashima” report was communicated to the Foreign Office by Consul-General Shimizu on Aug. 1 (IMT 523, pp. 127–128).
25 Shidehara to Mukden, Tientsin, and Shanghai, July 25, 1931, No. 429 (IMT 523, p. 80).
26 Shidehara to Hayashi, July 27, 1931, No. 153 (IMT 523, p. 96).
27 Shimizu to Shidehara, July 27, 1931, No. 29–3 (IMT 523, pp. 86–87).
28 Shidehara to Hayashi, July 29, 1931, No. 156 (IMT 523, p. III).
29 Report of the General Staff Office of the Kwantung Army, Aug. 1, 1931 (IMT 523, pp. 136–137).
30 Shimizu to Shidehara, July 27, 1931, No. 31–1 (IMT 523, pp. 92–93).
31 Hayashi to Shidehara, Aug. II, 1931, No. 502 (8484, p. 7).
32 Major Hanaya was also deeply involved in staging the Mukden incident of September 18. See Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden, pp. 159–165.
33 Hayashi to Shidehara, Aug. 2, 1931, No. 490 (S484, p. 3). The demand for a forceful solution was expressed shortly thereafter, on August 6, in Tokyo by Vice-Minister of War Sugiyama. See Taiheiyō Sensō, I, 356–357.
34 Kumao, Harada, Saionji-kō to Seikyokfu [Prince Saionji and the Political Situation], II (Tokyo, 1950), 18–19.Google Scholar
35 This plan was independent of the one prepared by Ishihara who disapproved of sending Yen back to Shansi. (Taikeiyō Sensō, I, 423. See also Harada, Saionji-kō, II, 34).
36 Shidehara to Hayashi, Aug. 11, 1931, No. 161 (IMT 523, pp. 167–170).
37 Ibid.
38 Hayashi to Shidehara, Aug. 11, 1931, No. 504 (S484, pp. 8–9).
39 Shidehara to Hayashi, Aug. 11, 1931, No. 162 (IMT 523, pp. 171–172).
40 Shidehara to Hayashi, Aug. 14, 1931, No. 166 (IMT 523, p. 178).
41 Quoted in Taiheiyō Sensō, I, 406.
42 The full text of the letter is found in Taiheiyō Sensō, VIII, 110–113.
43 Yano (Peiping) to Shidehara, July 29, 1931, No. 678 (IMT 523, pp. 105–106) quotes the Manshū Nippō and The Manchuria Daily News for July 25, 1931.
44 Hayashi to Shidehara, Aug. 17, 1931, No. 511 (S484, pp. 12–15).
45 “Kōtō nite ikaku-gamashiki ippōteki tsūkoku o nashi.” (Hayashi to Shidehara, Aug. 19, 1931, No. 513 [S484, p. 16]).
46 Taiheiyō Sensō, I, 422.
47 Shidehara to Hayashi, Aug. 19, 1931, No. 167 (IMT 523, pp. 202–203).
48 Harada, Saionji-kō, II, 41.
49 Taiheiyō Sensō, I, 407, 430.
50 This included the information that no one, beyond the participants, had actually seen the Nakamura party taken away and shot. Huo did, however, claim to be an eyewitness to the arrest. (Hayashi to Shidehara, Sept. 4, 1931, No. 557 [S484, pp. 57–59]).
51 This information is contained in dispatches from Hayashi to Shidehara between Sept. 6 and Sept. 15, 1931. (IMT 523, pp. 331–455. passim).
52 Ōhashi to Shidehara, Sept. 28, 1931, No. 261 (IMT 523, pp. 548–549).
53 The Kwantung Army once reported to the Ministry of War that a soldier who had taken part in the shooting and had Nakamura's watch was available. After reporting this on September 2, however, it was never again mentioned. (IMT 523, pp. 263–264).
54 Hayashi to Shidehara, Aug. 21, 1931, No. 524 (S484, pp. 23–24).
55 Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army to Vice-Minister of War, Sept. 2, 1931, No. 308 (IMT 523, pp. 266–268). This report concluded that it was laughable to think that the matter could be settled within two weeks.
56 This was reported by Wang I-hsien, who provided one of the original reports of the killing. (Hayashi to Shidehara, Sept. 3, 1931, No. 554–2 [S484, pp. 45–46]).
57 Hayashi to Shidehara, Sept. 4, 1931, No. 561 (S484, pp. 63–68).
58 Shidehara to Hayashi, Sept. 4, 1931, No. 177 and No. 178 (IMT 523, pp. 302–305). The only substantial difference between these and the demands presented to the Foreign Office by the Kwantung Army on September 2 was the reduction of the requested compensation from 200,000 yen to 101,242 yen.
59 This attitude and Chang's resolute action in the Nakamura case seemed to indicate a modification of his earlier position in which he had concluded that the Japanese threat in Manchuria was not a consistent one. (Iriye, Akira, “Chang Hsüeh-liang and the Japanese,” The Journal of Asian Studies, XX [Nov. 1960], 43)Google Scholar. Chang's concern may be explained by two factors. First, his subordinates in Manchuria were by now convinced that the Japanese army planned some decisive action in the near future. Second, relations between Chang and Nanking were becoming strained and when the Kuomintang government began to express interest in the Nakamura affair it may have spurred Chang in his efforts to settle the matter quickly
60 Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden, p. 152 (footnote).
61 Taiheiyō Sensō, I, 432–433.
62 Ibid., 414.
63 Ibid., 415.
64 Hayashi to Shidehara, Sept. 6, 1931, No. 565–2 (IMT 523, pp. 335–336).
65 Hayashi to Shidehara, Sept. 10, 1931, No. 582 (IMT 523, pp. 395–398).
66 Hayashi to Shidehara, Sept. 12, 1931, No. 589 (IMT 523, pp. 429–430).
67 This information was communicated to the Foreign Office by the Consulate-General in Chientao on September 11. (IMT 523, pp. 424–425).
68 Yano to Shidehara, Sept. 16, 1931, No. 403 (IMT 523, pp. 474–475).
69 The notebooks and maps were apparently retained by Kuan as potential articles of evidence, a curious fact in view of his avowed fear of international repercussions. (Hayashi to Shidehara, Sept. 18, 1931, No. 611 [IMT 523, pp. 490–494]).
70 Hayashi to Shidehara, Sept. 18, 1931, No. 612 and No. 614 (IMT 523, pp. 496, 498).
71 “Gaikō tōkyoku ni arazaru mono musekinin naru gendō.” (Shigemitsu to Shidehara, Sept. 16, 1931, No. 95(?)o [IMT 523, p. 477]).
72 Taiheiyō Sensō, I, 354; Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Muk.den, pp. 123–124.
73 Mori, a top Seiyūkai politician, made an inspection trip of Manchuria in July and August 1931. He talked mainly with officials of the Kwantung Army and when he returned he launched a vigorous attack on the government. (Yoshihashi, Conspiracy at Mukden, pp. 147–149). The same author suggests conrincingly that Mori was deeply involved in the whole plot to seize Manchuria.
