Herbert Spencer and the Spectre of Comte

1. Sarton, George, “Herbert Spencer, 1820-1920,” Scribner's Magazine, LXVII (1920), 699.

2. Simon, W. M., European Positivism in the Nineteenth Century: An Essay in Intellectual History (Ithaca, 1963), pp. 217–19.

3. Sarton, , “Herbert Spencer,” Scribner's Magazine, LXVII, 699.

4. For a bibliography on Spencer and Comte, see Simon, , European Positivism, p. 219, n. 53. To Simon's bibliography may be added: Bliss, Henry Evelyn, The Organization of Knowledge and the System of the Sciences (New York, 1929), pp. 349–50; Clergué, Georges, Etude sur le problème de la classification des sciences (Paris, 1930), p. 32; Flint, Robert, Philosophy as Scientia Scientiarum and A History of Classifications of the Sciences (Edinburgh, 1904), pp. 182-83, 227-41, 275; Stanley, H. M., “On the Classification of the Sciences,” Mind, IX (1884), 265–74.

5. “Ethics,” the abstract science of the individual, was not part of the hierarchy as developed in Comte, Auguste, Cours de philosophie positive (1830–1842). It was added in 1852 when Comte was writing the Système de politique positive (1851-54).

To distinguish between “abstract” and “concrete” in Comte's system, J. K. Ingram, an Irish Positivist, wrote: “A Science is abstract, if it discovers independently the laws of a distinct general order of phenomena; while if it derives its truths altogether from a combination of the results of other sciences, and does not rest on special inductions of its own, it is concrete…. A complete systematisation of concrete sciences is impossible, as beyond our feeble powers of Combination. It is only Abstract Science that we can truly systematise, and this not in an absolute sense, but sufficiently for our real needs.” Ingram, J. K., Human Nature and Morals, p. 82, as quoted in Beesly, Edward Spencer, “Explanation of Philosophical Terms,” in Comte, Auguste, A Discourse on the Positive Spirit, tr. Beesly, E. S. (London, 1903 [original French edition, 1844]), p. x.

6. Reviews of the Cours or parts of it appeared in the Edinburgh Review, LXVII (1838), 271–308, and in Blackwood's Magazine, LIII (1843), 397–414. Comte was praised highly in Mill, J. S., A System of Logic (London, 1843), and in Lewes, G. H., A Biographical History of Philosophy (London, 1845–1846). He had corresponded with Mill, Alexander Bain, and Lewes, among others, in the British Isles. He had a number of admirers at Oxford who formed the nucleus of organized Positivism in England.

7. Spencer, Herbert, The Classification of the Sciences to which are added Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte (New York, 1864), p. 43n. The reliability of the explanation depends on Spencer's memory, after fourteen years, as well as his motives. I am not suggesting that Spencer appropriated Comte's heading consciously, but the term is one that he might easily have picked up in conversation.

8. Spencer, Herbert, An Autobiography (New York, 1904), I, 399, 422, 435, 461.

9. Ibid., I, 461; Spencer, Herbert, “The Filiation of Ideas,” in Duncan, David, Life and Letters of Herbert Spencer (New York, 1908), II, 321.

10. Ibid., II, 317, 320-21; letter from Spencer to Lewes, Mar. 21, 1864, in Spencer, , Autobiography, II, 568.

11. On Feb. 6, 1854, George Eliot wrote to Charles Bray: “Herbert Spencer, who never praises but upon compulsion and who has no knowledge of the original to help him, says that it [Harriet Martineau's translation] appears to him perfectly lucid and that the difficulty lies in the matter not in the form.” Haight, Gordon S. (ed.), The George Eliot Letters (New Haven, 1954–1955), II, 139–40. In a footnote Haight adds that this letter establishes Spencer's claim that he knew nothing of Comte When he wrote Social Statics. Eliot's statement, as the preceding paragraphs in the text demonstrate, cannot be taken literally.

12. Duncan, , Spencer, I, 93.

13. Letters to his father, Jan. 20 and Feb. 27, 1854, in Spencer, , Autobiography, I, 515, 517 (in the second letter he acknowledged borrowing “altruism” and “sociology” from Comte). It is surprising, in view of his association with Lewes, that he did not read Lewes's articles on Comte when they were first published in the Leader in 1852.

14. Spencer, , Classification … Reasons, p. 42n. Spencer's recollections are not altogether consistent. In the Autobiography, I, 518, he says that he did not read the divisions on “biology” or “sociology” and probably not the one on “chemistry” either.

15. Letters to A. Campbell Fraser, Jan. 26 and 28, 1854, in Duncan, , Spencer, I, 96–97; letters to his father and mother, Feb. 17 and 27, 1854, in Spencer, , Autobiography, I, 516–17; Spencer, , “Filiation of Ideas,” in Duncan, , Spencer, II, 340.

16. Spencer, Herbert, “The Genesis of Science,” Recent Discussions in Science, Philosophy, and Morals (New York, 1871), p. 165.

17. Ibid., pp. 190-201.

18. Spencer, , “Filiation of Ideas,” in Duncan, , Spencer, II, 321–22.

19. Some of Spencer's sharpest thrusts, e.g., that the idea of sequence was not inherent in the facts but was a product of the mind, and that there was constant interaction among all the sciences in their development, were misdirected, since Comte had said very much the same thing. Spencer, , “Genesis of Science,” Recent Discussions, pp. 171–85. On one point Spencer fully agreed with Comte, namely, that the formulation of a correct classification was essential, and that such a theory would have important consequences for the education of the individual which “rightly conducted must have a certain correspondence with the evolution of the race.” Ibid., p. 234.

20. From the British Quarterly Review, XXII (Oct. 1855), 597, as quoted in Haight, , George Eliot Letters, II, 219n.

21. Spencer was about to take off for Paris on holiday after suffering some nervous disorders following unfavorable comments on his Principles of Psychology, when John Chapman asked him to deliver £23 to Comte from the sales of Martineau's translation. Elliot, Hugh, Herbert Spencer (New York, 1917), pp. 32–35.

22. Letter from Comte to H. D. Hutton, Dec. 17, 1856, in Lettres d'Auguste Comte à divers (Paris, 1902–1905), I, Première Partie, 624; letter from Spencer to his mother, Oct. 20, 1856, in Duncan, , Spencer, I, 107;Spencer, , Autobiography, I, 577–78.

23. Letters from Spencer to E. L. Youmans, Oct. 28, 1863, and Youmans to Spencer, Dec. 14, 1863, in Fiske, John, Edward Livingston Youmans (New York, 1894), pp. 152-53, 169. Spencer's statement, which followed the letter to the New Englander in the Illustrations, had been offered to Youmans by Spencer for purposes of publication. Spencer, Herbert, Illustrations of Universal Progress (New York, 1864), pp. xiv–xvi; Fiske, , Youmans, pp. 173–74. But Youmans preferred to give a somewhat different impression by introducing it with: “We take the liberty of making an extract from a private letter.” One sentence referring to Huxley — “Professor Huxley pointed out to me passages in his own writings in which he spoke of Comte in language almost contemptuous” — was left out of the printed statement in the Illustrations.

24. Laugel, Auguste, “Les études philosophiques en Angleterre,” Revue des deux mondes, XLIX (1864), 930, 953, 956, 957.

25. Spencer, , Autobiography, II, 127–28; letter from Spencer to Youmans, Mar. 26, 1864, in Duncan, , Spencer, I, 148. Spencer sent the statement of the British scientists to Youmans, requesting that, if he found it of any use, he should not mention his (Spencer's) name. Spencer had originally gathered these testimonies for his letter to the New Englander. See letter from Spencer to Youmans, Jan. 3, 1864, in Fiske, , Youmans, p. 173.

26. Spencer, , Classification … Reasons, pp. 4-9, 11.

27. Spencer, , Autobiography, II, 128–29.

28. Spencer, , Classification … Reasons, p. 30.

29. Comte had argued that the physical aspects of the mind should be studied as part of biology and the cognitive aspects as part of sociology. He rejected the subjective introspective study of the mind which was pursued in his day. His partial adherence to the phrenology of Franz Joseph Gall made him an easy subject of ridicule. The science of ethics which he added to the original hierarchy was, in effect, individual psychology.

30. Spencer, , Classification … Reasons, pp. 37–41.

31. Ibid., pp. 42-45. At the end of Reasons he says: “I believe that there are scattered through his pages many large ideas that are valuable not only as stimuli but for their actual truth.” Ibid., p. 48.

32. Ibid., p. 47.

33. Mar. 26 and May 18, 1864, in Fiske, , Youmans, pp. 175, 181.

34. Duncan, , Spencer, II, 321–22.

35. Spencer, Herbert, First Principles (London, 1862), pp. 216, 490, 446–47.

36. Spencer, , Classification … Reasons, pp. 22–23.

37. Duncan, , Spencer, II, 321-22, 340. Spencer was already revising First Principles in June 1864. Letter from Spencer to Youmans, June 8, 1864, in Fiske, , Youmans, p. 182. For the revisions see Spencer, , First Principles (2nd ed.; London, 1867), pp. 285 (where he uses almost the exact words of the Classification), 337n, 540-51. For the extent of the revision see the Preface to the second edition, in which Spencer juxtaposes the new table of contents with the one of the first edition.

38. Letter from Spencer to Youmans, June 8, 1864, in Fiske, , Youmans, p. 182.

39. Mar. 21, 1864, in Spencer, , Autobiography, II, 565–72. I do not have Lewes's letter to Spencer.

40. After the exchange Spencer called on Lewes and Eliot for the first time in Apr. 1865. By Sep. friendly relations seem to have been restored, at least with Eliot. Haight, , George Eliot Letters, II, 140n; IV, 145n, 209.

41. Littré, Emile, Auguste Comte et la philosophie positive (2nd ed.; Paris, 1864), pp. 286–306; Simon, , European Positivism, p. 248; the Preface to the second edition of the Classification may be found in Spencer, , Recent Discussions, pp. 59–60.

42. Letter from Mill to Spencer, Apr. 3, 1864, and Spencer's reply, Apr. 8, in Duncan, , Spencer, I, 149–50. Also see the interesting comparison of the first and eighth editions (1843 and 1872) of Mill's Logic for references to Comte, , in Simon, , European Positivism, pp. 275–79.

43. Letter from Mill to Spencer, Mar. 11, 1865, in Duncan, , Spencer, I, 155;Mill, John Stuart, Auguste Comte and Positivism (London, 1907 [originally published in the Westminster Review, 1865]), pp. 5, 33-35, 43, 45-46; for further elaboration of Mill's view see also pp. 7-8, 33-46, 102-04. Mill's criticism of Spencer for considering H. T. Buckle a member of Comte's school probably was responsible for the omission of the reference to Buckle in the third edition of the Classification. Mill also pointed out that Spencer's assertions that feelings rather than ideas govern the world, and that society rests on character and not intellect, were very much part of Comte's philosophy and not antagonistic to it. Ibid., pp. 102-03.

44. Spencer refrained from adopting the new title in 1867 because Thomas Huxley and John Tyndall had objected to it. Letters from Spencer to Youmans, Jan. 22, 1868, and Youmans to Spencer, Mar. 4, 1868, in Fiske, , Youmans, pp. 249–50. He finally settled on it as a result of another comparison with Comte. In 1869-70 John Fiske delivered a series of lectures at Harvard (published with the help of Youmans in the New York World) in which he grouped Comte and Spencer as “positive” philosophers. Spencer complained bitterly to Youmans and tried to impress upon Fiske the vast differences between his own system and Comte's. He made his point. Fiske was thereafter less favorably disposed towards Comte and used the term “Cosmic Philosophy” to describe Spencer's system. Spencer did not like Fiske's new designation either and in the fall of 1871 adopted “Synthetic Philosophy.” Spencer had rejected Fiske's suggestion that he use “Evolution Philosophy.” See Berman, Milton, John Fiske: The Evolution of a Popularizer (Cambridge, Mass., 1961), pp. 18, 35, 75–77; letter from Spencer to Youmans, Dec. 4, 1869, in Duncan, , Spencer, I, 206; letter from Spencer to Fiske, Feb. 2, 1870, in ibid., I, 207-08, and in Clark, John Spencer, The Life and Letters of John Fiske (Boston, 1917), I, 366–70; Fiske, , Youmans, pp. 219–20n; letter from Youmans to his sister, Dec. 2, 1871, ibid., p. 290.

45. July 30 and Sep. 1, 1867, in ibid., pp. 235-36, 238. Youmans's reaction may have been prompted by Spencer's unhappy reference to a statement in Lewes's new edition of the biographical history — The History of Philosophy from Thales to Comte (London, 1867), p. 654: “Mr. Spencer is unequivocally a positive philosopher, however he may repudiate being considered a disciple of Comte.” Letter from Spencer, June 7, 1867, in Fiske, , Youmans, p. 233; Duncan, , Spencer, I, 172.

46. The two copies of the second edition of the Classification (New York, 1870) that I have seen do not differ from the first (except for an appendix) and did not contain the new Preface. I have not been able to locate a copy of the second British edition. The Preface, however, appears wherever Spencer republished the Comte material in collections of his essays. In the third edition (1871), both British and American, minor changes were made in the text. The only French translation I have been able to locate was made from the third edition by F. Réthoré.

47. The whole history of the classification of the sciences is dealt with in Bain, Alexander, Logic (London, 1870), Pt. 1, pp. 229 ff. Bain, like Mill, had broken with Comte but continued to defend his classification against Spencer. Ibid., pp. 234, 241.

48. Spencer's troubles were not over by any means, for Comte's classification found a staunch defender in Lester F. Ward, the American sociologist. Ward, who was not a Positivist, not only preferred Comte's arrangement of the sciences to Spencer's, but insisted that there was very little difference between them, thus implying that Spencer had borrowed from Comte. Convinced that Spencer was carrying forward Comte's great work in philosophy, he reminded him that it would in no way harm his reputation to give credit where it was due. For Ward's exchange with Spencer and for his fluctuating views regarding the relationship between the two classifications, see Ward, Lester F., Dynamic Sociology (New York, 1883), I, 97, 98, 104-05, 119, 134, 135, 142–49; Ward, Lester F., Pure Sociology (2nd ed.; New York, 1911 [1st ed., 1903]), pp. 66–69; the abstract of a paper on the classifications in Science, new series, III (1896), 292-94; Brown University Library, letters to Ward from Spencer, E. S. Beesly, Richard Congreve, Frederic Harrison, 1883-96, Ward Papers. I wish to thank Mrs. Christine D. Hathaway, special collections librarian, for her assistance in making the material in the Ward Papers available to me.

49. Attempts to classify the sciences go back at least as far as Bacon. In the nineteenth century there were many classifications. Simon speaks of “the popular pastime of classifying the sciences.” Simon, , European Positivism, p. 106.

50. Toward the end of his life Spencer came closer to the Positivist viewpoint on some of these issues.

51. There is a shred of evidence, which I have not been able to pursue, that Spencer came into contact with Comte's ideas before 1850. Some of Spencer's earliest articles (1843-44) were published in Zoist, a mesmeric journal, with a Comtean flavor. See Webb, R. K., Harriet Martineau: A Radical Victorian (New York, 1960), pp. 245–53.