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Emergence of Endogenous Legal Institutions: Property Rights and Community Governance in the Italian Alps

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 March 2007

Marco Casari
Marco Casari
Affiliation:
Assistant Professor of Economics, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, 403 West State Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907. E-mail: casari@purdue.edu..
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Abstract

This article examines changes in institutions that protected property rights in the Alps between the thirteenth and the nineteenth century and, in particular, alternative management systems adopted for the common pastures and forests in about 200 communities. Over time, private-order institutions in the form of charters replaced informal arrangements sustained by the long-run interaction among villagers. Although costly to run, the charters accomplished several tasks that increased resource use efficiency.

Type
ARTICLES
Information
The Journal of Economic History , Volume 67 , Issue 1 , March 2007 , pp. 191 - 226
Copyright
© 2007 The Economic History Association

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