¹ Edict of May 1774, quoted in Bailly, M. A., Histoire financière de la France (Paris, 1830), p. i.Google Scholar

² Guéry, Alain, “Les finances de la monarchie française sous l'ancien régime,” Annales ESC, 33 (03–04 1978), pp. 216–38.Google Scholar

³ Morineau, Michel, “Budgets de l' Etat et gestion des finances royales en France au dix-huitième siècle,” Revue historique, 254 (10–12 1980), pp. 289–336.Google Scholar One exception is Riley, James C., “French Finances, 1727–1768,” Journal of Modern History, 59 (06 1987), pp. 224–26. He finds surpluses for a number of years between 1727 and 1750.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁴ Taylor, George V., “The Paris Bourse on the Eve of the Revolution, 1781–1789,” American Historical Review, 67 (06 1962), p. 965.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁵ Sargent, Thomas J. and Wallace, Neil, “Some Unpleasant Monetarist Arithmetic,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review (Fall 1981), pp. 1–17Google Scholar and Miller, Preston J., “Budget Deficit Mythology,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review (Fall 1983), pp. 12–13.Google Scholar

⁶ Darby, Michael R., “Some Pleasant Monetarist Arithmetic,” and Preston J. Miller and Thomas J. Sargent, “A Reply to Darby,” Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review (Spring 1984), pp. 15–26.Google Scholar

⁷ O'Brien, Patrick and Keyder, Caglar, Economic Growth in Britain and France, 1780–1914 (London, 1978). They give the most optimistic estimate of 1 percent for 1701–1710 to 1781–1790. For one summary of the evidence,Google Scholar see Riley, James C., The Seven Years War and the Old Regime in France (Princeton, 1986), pp. 13–23.Google Scholar

⁸ Bigo, Robert, La Caisse d' Escompte (Paris, 1927), p. 43.Google ScholarNecker, Jacques, Oeuvres complètes (Paris, 1820), vol. 3, pp. 1–5.Google Scholar Also see Weir, David R., “Tontines, Public Finance, and Revolution in France and England, 1688–1789,” this Journal, 49 (03 1989), pp. 121–22.Google Scholar

⁹ Labrousse, Ernest et al. , Histoire économique et sociale de la France (Paris, 1970), vol. 2, pp. 386–87.Google Scholar

¹⁰ Mémoire presenté au Roi in de la Cour, Charles Joseph Mathon, Collection de Comptes Rendus (Lausanne, 1788).Google Scholar

¹¹ Marion, Marcel, Histoire financière de la France depuis 1715 (Paris, 1914), vol. 1, pp. 251–54.Google Scholar

¹² Bosher, J. F., French Finances, 1770–1795 (Cambridge, 1970), pp. 148–53.Google Scholar

¹³ There were no items for borrowing in most prospective budgets, thus only adjustments for reimbursements were made. The result is plausible here given the extremely limited borrowing in these years.Google Scholar

¹⁴ Mathon, Collection, p. 118.Google Scholar

¹⁵ Shakespeare, Howard J., France: The Royal Loans—Les Emprunts Royaux, 1689–1789 (Shrewsberry, 1986), pp. 130–34.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Mathon, Collection, p. 71, and Clamageran, Jean-Jules, Histoire de l'impôt en France (Paris,1876), pp. 430, 436.Google Scholar

¹⁷ Harris, Robert D., Necker: Reform Statesman of the Ancien Régime (Berkeley, 1979), pp. 35–36.Google ScholarWeber, Henry, La Compagnie Française des Indes (1604–1875) (Paris, 1904), pp. 614–15. The prices used in calculating the yield were found in the Gazette de France. The government takeover raised the dividend and required shareholders to raise their nominal capital. An adjustment is made for this change in the calculation of the yields.Google Scholar

¹⁸ “It was utterly typical of the ways of the Old Regime monarchy that the Controller-General, Terray, did nothing to profit from these circumstances and reform the government's finances.” Sutherland, D. M. G., France 1789–1815: Revolution and Counterrevolution, (London, 1985), p.249.Google Scholar

¹⁹ Marion, Hisroire financière, vol. 1, p. 255.Google Scholar

²⁰ Quoted in Marion, Histoire financière, vol. 1, p. 280.Google Scholar

²¹ Marion, Histoire financière, vol. 1, p. 287,Google Scholar and Faure, Edgar, La Disgrāce de Turgot (Paris,1961), pp. 151–52.Google Scholar

²² This was still well above the British consol yield, which averaged 3.59 percent for the 1760s, 3.75 percent for the 1770s, and 4.64 percent for the 1780s. Homer, Sidney, A History of Interest Rates (New Brunswick, 1977), pp. 161–62.Google Scholar

²³ Bosher, French Finances, p. 98.Google Scholar

²⁴ The prices are for the day nearest to the end of the month as recorded in the Gazette de France. A price of 84 represents a 16 percent discount on the face value of the rescription.Google Scholar

²⁵ Weir, “Tontines,” pp. 118–21.Google Scholar

²⁶ The series ends in 1785, when the outstanding rescriptions were retired by the Receveurs Généraux.Google Scholar

²⁷ Marion, Histoire financière, vol. 1, p. 295.Google Scholar

²⁸ Harris, Necker, pp. 118, 134–36,Google Scholar and Harris, Robert D., “French Finances and the American War, 1777–1783,” The Journal of Modern History, 48 (06 1976), p. 236.CrossRefGoogle ScholarSee Necker, Oeuvres, vol. 3, pp. 1–5.Google Scholar

²⁹ The details of these economies are found in Harris, Necker, pp. 155–59.Google Scholar

³⁰ Ibid., pp. 122–24, 154–55.

³¹ Marion, Histoire financière, vol. 1, appendix 2. It is important to note that Calonne followed financial norms of the ancien régime and attacked Necker for errors in the ordinary budget, not for ignoring the extraordinary budget—that is a later criticism that began with Bailly, Histoire financière, pp. 234–38.Google Scholar See Harris, Robert D., “Necker's Compte Rendu of 1781: A Reconsideration,” Journal of Modern History, 42 (06 1970), pp. 170–76.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³² The strong demand for rentes was also partly attributable to financial innovations in Geneva. See, Taylor, “The Paris Bourse,” pp. 961–62.Google Scholar

³³ One prominent modern critic is Riley, James C., International Government Finance and the Amsterdam Capital Market, 1740–1815 (Cambridge, 1980), pp. 175–78.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

³⁴ Bosher, French Finances, pp. 166–77.Google Scholar

³⁵ Harris, “French Finances,” pp. 240–42.Google Scholar

³⁶ Stone, Bailey, The Parlement de Paris (Chapel Hill, 1981), pp. 83–86.Google Scholar

³⁷ Marion, Histoire financière, vol. 1, pp. 340–1.Google Scholar

³⁸ It is unclear whether this is a true prospective budget.Google Scholar

³⁹ Bosher, French Finances, p. 177–78.Google Scholar

⁴⁰ Marion, Histoire financière, vol. 1, pp. 345–46.Google Scholar

⁴¹ Stone, The Parlement of Paris, pp. 80–85.Google Scholar

⁴² Shakespeare, France, The Royal Loans, p. 142. These rentes could be purchased half in cash and half in other rentes with coupons under 5 percent, at 25 times the annual coupon.Google ScholarVührer, Alphonse, Histoire de la dette publique (Paris, 1886), vol. 1, pp. 280–81. This was a minor concession and failed to boost the implicit yield up to the market rate.Google Scholar

⁴³ Bigo, La Caisse, p. 75.Google Scholar

⁴⁴ Bosher, French Finances, pp. 178–82.Google Scholar

⁴⁵ Riley, James C., “Dutch Investment in France, 1781–1787,” this Journal, 33 (12 1973), pp.733–57.Google Scholar

⁴⁶ James C. Riley, International Government Finance, p. 185.Google Scholar

⁴⁷ Harris, “French Finances,” p. 238. This is, of course, gross borrowings.Google Scholar

⁴⁸ Stone, The Parlement of Paris, pp. 85–91.Google Scholar

⁴⁹ Vührer, Dette publique, vol. 1, pp. 286–90.Google Scholar

⁵⁰ Ibid., pp. 284–85.

⁵¹ Prices were obtained from the Gazette Nationale for the day nearest the end of the month. A price of 92 represents an 8 percent discount on the face value of a note.Google Scholar

⁵² As large landowners, the members of the Parlement vigorously opposed taxes that would increase their share of the tax burden. Stone, The Parlement of Paris, pp. 77–78.Google Scholar

⁵³ Mathon, Collection, pp. 222–23.Google Scholar

⁵⁴ Harris, “French Finances,” pp. 124–40.Google Scholar

⁵⁵ Vührer, Dette publique, pp. 312–15.Google Scholar

⁵⁶ This deficit is net borrowing. An alternative measure, revenues plus reimbursements less receipts, yields 85,441,136 livres.Google Scholar

⁵⁷ de Warville, Jacques-Pierre Brissot, Pointe de Banqueroute ou Lettre à un Créancier de l' Etat (London, 1787).Google Scholar

⁵⁸ The power and size of the creditor class had grown since Terray's suspension of payments on the debt. While not narrowly restricted in 1770, ownership of the rentes had expanded with the growth of the debt and financial innovation. The proportion of rentes in the fortunes and legacies of Parisians rose over the course of the eighteenth century. Roche, Daniel, The People of Paris, An Essay in Popular Culture in the 18th century (Leamington Spa. 1987), pp. 79–82.Google Scholar

⁵⁹ The interest rate on the anticipations is unknown, but with the yields on long-term debt above 9 percent and the quantity of anticipations rapidly growing, it is not surprising that the government reached its borrowing limit.Google Scholar

⁶⁰ Doyle, William, The Origins of the French Revolution (Oxford, 1980), pp. 113–14.Google Scholar

⁶¹ Bigo, La Caisse, pp. 113–20.Google Scholar

⁶² Linguet, Simon-Nicholas-Henri, “Reflexions sur la dette Nationale en France,” Annales Politiques, Civiles et Littéraires du Dix-Huitiéme Siècle, 16 (09 1788).Google Scholar

⁶³ Bigo, La Caisse, pp. 126–34.Google Scholar

⁶⁴ This is adjusted for reimbursements; the actual deficit was 116 million.Google Scholar

⁶⁵ The default finally came in 1797, when all remedies had been exhausted.Google Scholar