We develop a compromise estimate of the German Net National Product for the years 1851–1913 based on four estimates from Hoffmann (1965) and Hoffmann and Müller (1959) by recalculating industrial production, investment, home and foreign capital income. Because differences remain during the early decades, we compute a weighted average compromise series. Economic activity is shown to be higher than the older estimates suggest. The average growth rate is lower. The average business cycle lasted five years, with high volatility in the early decades. The typical Gründerzeit pattern of boom then prolonged recession after 1873 can not be confirmed.

In 1904 the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine proclaimed that the United States would intervene in the affairs of unstable Central American and Caribbean countries that did not pay their debts. We find that the average sovereign debt price for countries under the U.S. “sphere of influence” rose by 74 percent in response to the pronouncement and actions to make it credible. We use this policy change to show that the United States subsequently acted as a regional hegemon and provided the global public goods of increased financial stability and peace. Reduced conflict spurred export growth and better fiscal management, but debt settlements were driven primarily by gunboat diplomacy.

This article uses an original dataset to test the effects of government monopoly service, competition, and regulation on the development of the telephone industry in Europe in the late 1800s and early 1900s. Like today, there were stateowned monopolies in some countries, vigorous competition in others, and others with private firms operating under restrictive concessions. The main determinant of government control of the telephone sector was the state's involvement in the telegraph. Countries with competition between telephone providers and whose governments did not threaten to expropriate firms' assets saw higher telephone penetration and lower prices, even in rural areas.

During the Progressive Era, advances in knowledge and specialization led to the emergence of modern-day professions. This growth in professions was accompanied by the adoption of occupational licensing regulation. In this article we explore the origins and effects of occupational licensing regulation during this period. Although most studies argue that occupational licensing regulation is adopted to restrict entry and reduce competition, the evidence from the Progressive Era suggests that regulation arose to improve markets as specialization and advances in knowledge made it increasingly difficult for consumers to judge the quality of professional services.

Not long ago, the Governor of a midwestern state was approached by representatives of a particular trade anxious to enlist the Governor's support in securing passage of legislation to license their trade.“Governor,” the men said, “passage of this licensing act will ensure that only qualified people will practice this occupation; it will eliminate charlatans, incompetents or frauds; and it will thereby protect the safety and welfare of the people of this state.”The governor, from long experience, was somewhat skeptical. “Gentlemen,” he asked, “are you concerned with advancing the health, safety and welfare of the people under the police powers of the state, or are you primarily interested in creating a monopoly situation to eliminate competition and raise prices?”The spokesman for the occupational group smiled and said, “Governor, we're interested in a little of each.”Council of State GovernmentsCouncil of State Governments, Occupational Licensin g, p. 1.

We test for the presence of market discipline in the banking sector in early-twentieth-century Mexico. Using financial data from note-issuing banks between 1900 and 1910, we examine whether bank fundamentals influenced the patterns of withdrawals and of note issue. We show that fundamentals were a strong determinant of bank withdrawals and note issue, indicating that market discipline was an important feature of the banking system in this period. This result crucially depends on correcting for selection bias generated by the exit of several banks in the 1907 crisis.

Historical scholarship on the politics of nineteenth-century Chinese immigration emphasizes the interests of labor and management in the genesis of congressional legislation in 1882 that limited Chinese immigration into the United States. This article examines early state attempts at the exclusion of Chinese workers after the first major wave of Chinese immigration during the California Gold Rush. Opposition to exclusion occurred in California in the early 1850s because Chinese immigrants were important taxpayers when both the state and localities were experiencing major fiscal difficulties. State attempts to legislate exclusion were successful only after financial conditions improved in the late 1850s.

Risk and transaction costs often provide competing explanations of institutional outcomes. In this article we argue that they offer opposing predictions regarding the assignment of fixed and variable taxes in a multi-tiered governmental structure. Although the central government can pool regional risks from variable taxes, local governments can measure variable tax bases more accurately. Evidence on tax assignment from the mid-sixteenth-century Ottoman Empire supports the transaction cost explanation, suggesting that risk matters less because insurance can be obtained in a variety of ways.

The failure of French Canadians to settle the Canadian west before 1900, when substantial numbers of anglophones and Europeans were migrating, is a long-standing puzzle. Historians have relied mainly on cultural explanations. Using new data, we demonstrate that anglophones and francophones had very different personal characteristics, so that movement to the west was rarely economically attractive for francophones. However, large-scale migration into New England fitted French Canadians' demographic and human capital profile. Even if the United States had imposed immigration restrictions by the 1880s, this would not likely have diverted many French Canadians westward.