The small railway coal wagon was an early example held up to demonstrate Edwardian Britain’s technological stagnation. The small wagons have been blamed for inflated rail freight rates and depressed railway profits. What has been overlooked is that the small wagon was integral to the local coal market. The coal wagon was a substitute for costly distribution and delivery by road transport; although some railway specific costs may have been inflated, beyond the railhead other costs were economized. Seen in the appropriate context the small coal wagon was neither a bad choice nor an oddity.

This article reviews Mancur Olson’s ideas concerning the impact of institutions on growth rates and national competitive performance. We suggest that Olson’s “ideal typical” methodology limits the usefulness of his approach and that institutional structures and strategies can be dependent variables. In comparing the performance of three European countries in the postwar period, we argue (contrary to strict Olsonian principles) that changing market and political environments helped to determine the kind of institutional forms that emerged. We question the weight that Olson places on the role of institutional structures and strategies on long-run economic performance.

The return of growth theory to center stage in mainstream economics provides opportunities for historians to reconsider the forces shaping longer-term economic development. A key motivation for developing new growth modeling strategies lay in the desire to reestablish contact between theory and the empirics of economic growth. By postulating diminishing returns to capital, the traditional neoclassical paradigm precludes the sustaining of per capita growth in the absence of exogenous technological progress. Since historical records of economic development offer scant evidence for declining per capita growth, disenchantment grew with a theoretical perspective that leaves the crucial part of the empirical record unexplained, prompting a search for alternative modeling strategies.

The overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy in 1893 offers an illuminating case study of the political economy of preferential trading relationships between large and small countries. The limited-term reciprocity treaty of 1876 between Hawaii and the United States generated problematic strategic dynamics, as the normal operation of the treaty gradually worsened Hawaii’s bargaining position. This allowed the United States to extract better terms when the treaty expired in 1883 and to act opportunistically in 1890 with the passage of the McKinley Tariff. The political economy of the treaty contributed significantly to the overthrow of the Hawaiian monarchy.

After World War I rent control became a cornerstone of housing policy in many European countries, resulting in quantity constraints on the demand for housing. The theory on complete demand systems provides a framework for analyzing the effects of these policies on consumption. As a test case, a demand model is estimated to calculate virtual rent prices for interwar Belgium. The results are well in line with historical evidence, providing insight into the extent of rationing Simulations with the demand model show that the severe rent restrictions especially favored expenditures on food.

David Greasley and Les Oxley provide an interesting but ultimately unconvincing chalenge to the perspective on the British Industrial Revolution that we have set out in recent articles1. We believe that the issues that they raise are important and deserve a full response. Thus, we take the opportunity to clarify ideas on growth theory and its implications for growth accounting, to review the econometrics of estimating trend growth in an economy undergoing structural change, and to reconsider the persuasiveness of different views of the nature of technological change in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

Using annual data on nationally chartered U.S. and Canadian banks from 1929 to 1989, this article empirically evaluates the impact of various regulations on bank profitability. An intercountry comparison reveals that the less restrictive regulatory environment in Canada has historically resulted in higher bank profits. Specifically, higher leverage, greater securities investment and lending opportunities, and the freedom to establish branch units all significantly contribute to higher bank profitability in Canada. Evidence presented also shows that U.S. banks would have been more profitable over the sample period in a regulatory environment similar to Canada's.

The origins of this exchange stem from an important paper by N. F. R. Crafts, Steven Leybourne, and Terence Mills, which argues that underlying trends in British industrial output for the period 1700 to 1913 are stochastic rather than linearly deterministic. Using parsimonious methods, we propose an alternative view that the output series have alternating stochastic properties. Specifically we distinguish the period 1780 to 1851 as an Industrial Revolution epoch during which shocks had long-term effects. Out model simplifies to help understand the complexities of the Industrial Revolution, and we agree with Clive Granger and Zhuanxin Ding, that “While it is correct to search over a specific set of parsimonious models … the model so achieved is, at best, an approximation to the truth”.

This article proposes a unified framework for studying the greenback-gold price during the U.S. suspension of convertibility from 1862 to 1879.The gold price is viewed as a floating exchange rate, with a fixed destination given by gold standard parity because of the prospect of resumption. This perspective is tested using daily data for the entire period, and the effect of news during and after the Civil War is measured. New evidence of a decline in the volatility of gold returns after the Resumption Act of 1875 provides statistical support for the importance of expectations of resumption.