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In the CEO We Trust: Negative Effects of Trust Between the Board and the CEO

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2023

Kee-Hong Bae*
Affiliation:
York University Schulich School of Business and ECGI
Sadok El Ghoul
Affiliation:
University of Alberta Campus Saint-Jean elghoul@ualberta.ca
Zhaoran (Jason) Gong
Affiliation:
Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool University International Business School Suzhou Department of Finance Zhaoran.Gong@xjtlu.edu.cn
Omrane Guedhami
Affiliation:
University of South Carolina Darla Moore School of Business omrane.guedhami@moore.sc.edu
*
kbae@schulich.yorku.ca (corresponding author)
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Abstract

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In this study, we investigate whether and how trust between board members and the CEO (board–CEO trust) affects the performance of mergers and acquisitions. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that firms with higher levels of board–CEO trust exhibit poor M&A performance. High trust is associated with low acquisition announcement returns, long-term stock return performance, and post-deal operating performance. This negative effect of board–CEO trust is more pronounced among acquiring companies prone to agency problems. Our results suggest that, in the institutional setting of corporate boards, high trust can be too much of a good thing.

Information

Type
Research Article
Creative Commons
Creative Common License - CCCreative Common License - BY
This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduction, provided the original article is properly cited.
Copyright
© The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Michael G. Foster School of Business, University of Washington
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