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Designing incentives in organizations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 January 2010

JOHN ROBERTS*
Affiliation:
Graduate School of Business, Stanford University, California, United States

Abstract:

The design of incentive systems is a central issue in the economics of organization. This paper argues that very often the ideal incentive systems to use within firms will involve low-powered incentives. Five particular circumstances leading to weak incentives being optimal are examined.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The JOIE Foundation 2010

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