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Inequality and culture in a cross-section of countries



A growing literature in the fields of economics and political science has identified the importance of culture for both economic development and good governance. In this article, we argue that a fundamental factor driving cultural traits conducive towards development and governance is inter-personal income inequality. Our empirical evidence from a cross-section of countries and based on measures of culture extracted from the World Values Survey, provides strong support for our argument even after controlling for the effect of an extensive range of potentially confounding variables and the possibility that our estimates may suffer from both measurement error and reverse causality.


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