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Institutions, rules and equilibria: a commentary

  • KEN BINMORE (a1)

This brief note is a commentary on Hendriks and Guala's (2014) unification of the institutional theories of Lewis, North, and Searle. It argues that the equilibrium theory of Lewis is fundamental and that the kind of equilibrium best suited in this role remains the orthodox notion of Nash.

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Journal of Institutional Economics
  • ISSN: 1744-1374
  • EISSN: 1744-1382
  • URL: /core/journals/journal-of-institutional-economics
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