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Mill ownership and farmer's cooperative behavior: the case of Costa Rica coffee farmers


We analyze how Costa Rican coffee farmer's behavior in an experimental public good game depends on the institutional structure of the farmers buying point (cooperative vs. privately owned mills), and on the background of their game partners (partners selling to the same type of mill or not). We find that cooperative farmers do not display more public good orientation than private market farmers when playing with partners from the same type of mill. However, though farmers selling to private mills make no difference with respect to the background of partners, farmers selling to cooperatives significantly decrease contributions when paired with non-cooperative members. Finally, we study how self-selection into a mechanism that punishes the lowest contributors effects contributions both inside the group and with partners of the opposite background, and we show that it increases contributions by cooperative farmers interacting with non-cooperative farmers by more than 100%.

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Journal of Institutional Economics
  • ISSN: 1744-1374
  • EISSN: 1744-1382
  • URL: /core/journals/journal-of-institutional-economics
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Hopfensitz and Miquel-Florensa supplementary material
Hopfensitz and Miquel-Florensa supplementary material

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