Contemporary conflicts over efforts to expand the role of Islamic law in the national legal system of Indonesia are so intense that they undermine reasoned public debate about this question. They are part of a long-standing polemic, not only about the role of Shariah in Indonesia generally but about the specific question of whether the Jakarta Charter, which references obligations to obey Islamic law, should be restored as part of the Constitution. This article is an attempt to revive the neglected academic discourse on the role of Islamic jurisprudence in Indonesian law, and to move beyond the confused polemics to a thoughtful consideration of where Islamic law fits in a non-Islamic state such as Indonesia. Because Indonesia is a secular state, the Shariah as a whole is not enforced by the state, but the Shariah has a significant meaning for Muslims in Indonesia because it provides the norms distinguishing the obligatory and recommended from those actions which are neutral, disapproved and prohibited in Muslims' lives. Moreover, some elements of Islamic jurisprudence in personal law have been absorbed into positive law in Indonesia through the decisions of religious courts, which have existed since the Dutch colonialism,3 as currently regulated by Law No. 7/1989. The Compilation of Islamic Law No. 1/1991 essentially functions as the legal code for all Muslims who must resort to the religious courts for the adjudication of disputes involving marriage, divorce, inheritance and waqf. Thus, consideration of the propriety of attempts to extend Islamic law to matters of property and of contract is appropriate at this time.

Ukraine's “Orange Revolution” in 2004-05 captivated an international audience. Western reporting on this “democratic moment” focused on Victor Yuschenko's eventual hard-fought victory, labeling it an indication of Ukraine's commitment to breaking ties with its Soviet socialist past and to establishing itself fully as a capitalist market economy. In the shrinking global economy, Ukraine, suddenly, was a hot commodity. Yet, in the flurry of rhetoric about a former Soviet state achieving independence and sovereignty, moving from a socialist past to a capitalist future, few seemed directly to address the issue of private property. There seemed to be very little mention, though, at least in the popular media, of the shape of a right to private property in Ukrainian law. This was surprising in view of the fact that this is a basic prerequisite to a market economy. In fact, Ukrainian law does offer some minimal guidance concerning this important concept.

In the article The Use of Natural Law in Early Calvinist Resistance Theory, David VanDrunen, Robert B. Strimple Associate Professor of Systematic Theology and Christian Ethics at Westminster Seminary (California), analyzes natural law as it appeared in the writings of several sixteenth—century resistance theorists—John Knox, Christopher Goodman, John Ponet, Theodore Beza, Francois Hotman, and the unknown writer of Vindiciae contra Tyrannos. Van Drunen's article is much needed, since Richard Tuck, in his otherwise astute 1979 study on natural law, does not adequately address Reformation-era developments, focusing instead on Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf, and other seventeenth-century theorists. Nevertheless, I take issue with Van Drunen's assertion that these writers were all “committed to the theology of Calvin” and were “early Calvinist resistance theorists.” One could make the case that most of these writers were, but there is one notable exception: English reformer, humanist, bishop, and polemicist John Ponet.