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The End of an Era: the Rise and Fall of G.D.R. Aid

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 November 2008

Extract

The reunification of Germany on 3 October 1990 marked the end not only of a socialist experiment but also of an alternative source of aid to developing countries as far apart as Vietnam, Cuba, and Mozambique. Whilst the Soviet Union was the major socialist provider of assistance, the former German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.) played a not insignificant rôle. Yet how great was the loss to the developing world when the G.D.R. rapidly disintegrated? What was distinctive about its aid compared with that of capitalist donors? What happened to the projects, experts, overseas students, and foreign workers once Germany reunified?

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Articles
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1994

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References

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3 For example, the G.D.R. cut aid to Ghana when Nkrumah was overthrown in 1966 and to Chile after the Allende coup in 1973. See Göschel, Hans ‘Was kann die DDR in die entwicklungspolitische Diskussion in Deutschland einbringen?’, in Engels, Benno (ed.), ‘Das vereinte Deutschland in der Weltwirtschaft: Beiträge zu einer deutsch-deutsch Aussenwirtschaft-stagung des Deutschen Übersee-Institut’, in Schriften des Deutschen-Übersee-Instituts, II (Hamburg), 10, 1991, pp. 167–86.Google Scholar

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22 See Rothensee, loc. cit. p. 280, and Spanger and Brock, op. cit. pp. 194–9, for a discussion of military aid.

23 September 1991 interview with a senior official in the F.R.G.'s Ministry of Economic Co-operation (B.M.Z.), previously employed in the G.D.R.'s interim Ministry of Economic Co-operation (M.W.Z.) that had been established in March 1990. Hereinafter referred to as September 1991 B.M.Z. interview.Google Scholar

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51 As an adaptation of the term ‘ma-Joni’, used to describe Mozambicans who worked in the South African mines, ‘ma-German’ has negative overtones. Other terms used to describe the returnees were ‘os molwenes da zona’ (the marginals of the neighbourhood) and ‘ninjas’. Mulder, op. cit. p. 18.

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55 Ibid. p. 107.

56 September 1991 B.M.Z. interview.

57 ‘Die Altprojekte der DDR sollen keine Ruinen werden’, in Handelsblatt (Düsseldorf), 25 10 1990, p. 13.Google Scholar

58 September 1991 B.M.Z. interview.

59 Interview in Berlin, September 1991.

60 Another example of ‘bad aid’ concerned a proposed phosphate and bauxite site in Guinea-Bissau, where the G.D.R. sent experts despite the fact that this project had already been rejected by other international agencies. September 1991 B.M.Z. interview.

61 Interview, Humboldt University, September 1991.

62 September 1991 B.M.Z. interview.

63 Claus and Taake, op. cit. p. 12.

64 So, for example, all the equipment and furnishings in the hospital in Managua, even the electricity system, had been imported from the G.D.R.

65 For a critical discussion of the rôle of international agencies in Mozambique and the latter's dependence on aid, see Hanlon, op. cit.; Bowen, Merle L., ‘Beyond Reform: adjustment and political power in contemporary Mozambique’, in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 30, 2, 06 1992, pp. 255–79;CrossRefGoogle Scholar and David N. Plank, ‘Aid, Debt, and the End of Sovereignty: Mozambique and its donors’, in ibid. 31, 3, September 1993, pp. 407–30.