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Intrinsic work motivation and pension reform preferences

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 October 2012

FRIEDRICH HEINEMANN*
Affiliation:
ZEW Mannheim and University of Heidelberg (e-mail: Heinemann@zew.de)
TANJA HENNIGHAUSEN
Affiliation:
ZEW Mannheim and University of Mannheim
MARC-DANIEL MOESSINGER
Affiliation:
ZEW Mannheim
*
*Corresponding author: Friedrich Heinemann Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)L7,1 68161 Mannheim, Germany. Tel: +49-621-1235 149.

Abstract

Although demographic change leaves pay-as-you-go pension systems unsustainable, reforms, such as a higher pension age, are highly unpopular. This contribution looks into the role of intrinsic motivation as a driver for pension reform preferences. Theoretical reasoning suggests that this driver should be relevant as it decreases the subjective costs of a higher pension age. We test this key hypothesis on the basis of the German General Social Survey (ALLBUS). The results are unambiguous: in addition to factors such as age or education, the inclusion of intrinsic work motivation helps improving our prediction of an individual's reform orientation.

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Articles
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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