Skip to main content Accessibility help
×
Home
Hostname: page-component-55597f9d44-mm7gn Total loading time: 0.567 Render date: 2022-08-08T05:27:42.045Z Has data issue: true Feature Flags: { "shouldUseShareProductTool": true, "shouldUseHypothesis": true, "isUnsiloEnabled": true, "useRatesEcommerce": false, "useNewApi": true } hasContentIssue true

On the optimality of PAYG pension systems in an endogenous fertility setting

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 May 2004

G. ABÍO
Affiliation:
Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresarials, Universitat de Barcelona, Avda. Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona, Spain (e-mail: abio@ub.edu)
G. MAHIEU
Affiliation:
National Bank of Belgium, 1000 Bruxelles, Belgium (e-mail: geraldine.mahieu@nbb.be)
C. PATXOT
Affiliation:
Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresarials, Universitat de Barcelona, Avda. Diagonal 690, 08034 Barcelona, Spain (e-mail: cio.patxot@ub.edu)

Abstract

In order to help in designing an accurate pension reform, we determine the resource allocation in an endogenous fertility model that generates an endogenous demographic transition by means of distinguishing between female and male labor. We analyze the problem of the optimal solution and characterize the decentralization of the first best. We show that a pension policy linking pension benefits to the number of children acts as a corrective tax system able to restore both the optimal capital stock and the optimal rate of population growth as a single instrument. We also show that neither a Beveridgean pension scheme nor a Bismarckian one can decentralize the first best.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
2004 Cambridge University Press

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

Footnotes

The authors gratefully acknowledge financial help from the Project SEC2002-00019 and Fundación BBV. We also thank the participants of the 17th annual congress of the European Economic Association (EEA) held in Venice in August 2002 and two anonymous referees for helpful comments.
37
Cited by

Save article to Kindle

To save this article to your Kindle, first ensure coreplatform@cambridge.org is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle.

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

On the optimality of PAYG pension systems in an endogenous fertility setting
Available formats
×

Save article to Dropbox

To save this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Dropbox account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox.

On the optimality of PAYG pension systems in an endogenous fertility setting
Available formats
×

Save article to Google Drive

To save this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Google Drive account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive.

On the optimality of PAYG pension systems in an endogenous fertility setting
Available formats
×
×

Reply to: Submit a response

Please enter your response.

Your details

Please enter a valid email address.

Conflicting interests

Do you have any conflicting interests? *