Property, Technology, and Environmental Policy: The Politics of Acid Rain in Ontario, 1978–1985
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 24 August 2015
- Copyright © Donald Critchlow and Cambridge University Press 2015
For helpful comments on earlier drafts of this manuscript, we thank Graeme Auld, Doug Macdonald, James Meadowcroft, Graham Smart, and Glen Toner. Ryan O’Connor’s research was supported by a Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council Postdoctoral Fellowship.
1. Among the scholars identifying the mid-1980s as representing a generational shift in Canadian environmental policymaking are Skogstad, Grace, “Intergovernmental Relations and the Politics of Environmental Protection in Canada,” in Federalism and the Environment: Environmental Policymaking in Australia, Canada, and the United States, ed. Holland, Kenneth M., Morton, F. L., and Galligan, Brian (Westport, Conn., 1996), 103–34Google Scholar; Paehlke, Robert, “Eco-history: Two Waves in the Evolution of Environmentalism,” Alternatives Journal 19, no. 1 (1992): 18–23Google Scholar; Macdonald, Douglas, Business and Environmental Politics in Canada (Peterborough, Ont., 2007)Google Scholar; O’Connor, Ryan, The First Green Wave: Pollution Probe and the Origins of Environmental Activism in Ontario (Vancouver, 2015).Google Scholar
2. For a description of what is commonly understood as the American environmental movement, see Dunlap, Riley E. and Mertig, Angela G., “The Evolution of the U.S. Environmental Movement from 1970 to 1990: An Overview,” Society and Natural Resources 4:3 (1991): 209–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Gottlieb, Robert, Forcing the Spring: The Transformation of the American Environmental Movement (Washington D.C., 2005).Google Scholar
3. Paehlke, “Eco-history”; Macdonald, Business and Environmental Politics in Canada. The two main scholarly accounts of the politics of Ontario’s acid rain program are Macdonald, Douglas, “Policy Communities and Allocation of Internalized Cost: Negotiation of the Ontario Acid Rain Program, 1982–1985” (Ph.D. diss., York University, 1997)Google Scholar; and Munton, Don “Using Science, Ignoring Science: Lake Acidification in Ontario,” in Science and Politics in the International Environment, ed. Harrison, Neil E. and Bryner, Gary C. (Lanham, Md., 2004), 143–72.Google Scholar
4. Notable examples include Scott Hamilton Dewey, Don’t Breathe the Air: Air Pollution and U.S. Environmental Politics, 1945–1970 (College Station, Tex., 2000); Krier, James E. and Ursin, Edmund, Pollution and Policy: A Case Study on California and Federal Experience with Motor Vehicle Air Pollution (Berkeley, 1977)Google Scholar; Wirth, John D., Smelter Smoke in North America: The Politics of Transborder Pollution (Lawrence, Kans., 2000).Google Scholar
5. The most notable examples examining the political behavior of elite propertied interests in lobbying for and formulating clean air policy are Gonzalez’s, George A. The Politics of Air Pollution: Urban Growth, Ecological Modernization, and Symbolic Inclusion (Albany, N.Y., 2005)Google Scholar; and Temby’s, Owen “Trouble in Smogville: The Politics of Toronto’s Air Pollution During the 1950s,” Journal of Urban History 39, no. 4 (2013): 669–89.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
6. See also Hajer, Maarten J., The Politics of Environmental Discourse: Ecological Modernization and the Policy Process (Oxford, 1995).Google Scholar
7. For an overview of the stratospheric ozone depletion case study and the role of science and technology in the policy process, see Dimitrov, Radoslav S., Science & International Environmental Policy: Regimes and Nonregimes in Global Governance (Lanham, Md., 2006)Google Scholar; and Litfin, Karen T., Ozone Discourses: Science and Politics in Global Environmental Cooperation (New York, 1994).Google Scholar
8. Moore, Ted, “Democratizing the Air: The Salt Lake Women’s Chamber of Commerce and Air Pollution, 1936–1945,” Environmental History 12, no. 1 (2007): 80–106Google Scholar; Wirth, Smelter Smoke in North America; Temby, “Trouble in Smogville.”
9. The urban regime perspective on urban political economy is well represented by the following texts: Friedland, Roger, Power and Crisis in the City: Corporations, Unions, and Urban Policy (New York, 1983)Google Scholar; Shefter, Martin, Political Crisis/Fiscal Crisis: The Collapse and Revival of New York City (New York, 1985)Google Scholar; Elkin, Stephen L., City and Regime in the American Republic (Chicago, 1987)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Stone, Clarence N., “Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern: A Political Economy Approach,” Journal of Public Affairs 15, no. 1 (1993): 1–28.Google Scholar
10. Molotch, Harvey, “The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place,” American Journal of Sociology 82, no. 2 (1976): 309–32.Google Scholar
11. Ibid., 310.
13. Barrow, Clyde W., “State Theory and the Dependency Principle: An Institutionalist Critique of the Business Climate Concept,” Journal of Economic Issues 32, no. 1 (1998): 117.Google Scholar
14. Molotch, “The City as a Growth Machine,” and Stone, “Urban Regimes and the Capacity to Govern.”
15. Molotch, “The City as a Growth Machine,” 315.
16. Ibid., 316.
17. Gonzalez, The Politics of Air Pollution, and Temby, “Trouble in Smogville.” See also Patterson, Thomas E., “The News Media: An Effective Political Actor?” Political Communication 14, no. 4 (1997): 445–55.Google Scholar
18. Gonzalez, The Politics of Air Pollution, 2.
19. Anastakis, Dimitry, “A ‘War on Pollution’? Canadian Responses to the Automotive Emissions Problem, 1970–1980,” Canadian Historical Review 90, no. 1 (2009): 99–136Google Scholar. Anastakis shows that the specific characteristics of the technology (i.e., that catalytic converters were add-on devices and that producing automobiles without them would not have required the manufactures to produce very different automobiles) were important in influencing the Canadian federal government’s decision to have laxer tailpipe standards than the United States throughout the 1970s. He shows that the Canadian government did so because of the perceived burden the added cost of the devices would place on consumers, and due to lobbying by the Canadian automobile and oil industries against stringent regulations.
20. Harrison, Kathyrn, Passing the Buck: Federalism and Canadian Environmental Policy (Vancouver, 1996)Google Scholar. For a critique of Harrison’s acid rain case study, see Munton, Don, “Blowing in the Wind: Ignoring and Controlling Air Pollution,” in Environmental Challenges and Opportunities: Local-Global Perspectives on Canadian Issues, ed. Gore, Christopher D. and Stoett, Peter J. (Toronto, 2008), 225–51.Google Scholar
21. Macdonald, “Policy Communities and Allocation of Internalized Cost,” 26.
22. For an account of environmental policy in Ontario emphasizing the importance of electoral outcomes and partisan ideology, see Winfield, Mark, Blue-Green Province: The Environment and the Political Economy of Ontario (Vancouver, 2012)Google Scholar; for a similar orientation toward air pollution politics in the United States, see Bryner, Gary C., Blue Skies, Green Politics: The Clean Air Act of 1990 and Its Implementation, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C., 1995).Google Scholar
23. In particular, see Burbank, Matthew J., Andranovich, Greg, and Heying, Charles H., “Mega-Events, Urban Development, and Public Policy,” Review of Policy Research 19, no. 3 (2002): 179–202.Google Scholar
24. Editorial, “Acid Rain: U.S. Must Act,” Toronto Star, 14 March 1981.
25. “Strategy Plan and 3-Year Budget for the Canadian Coalition on Acid Rain,” appendix 1, Canadian Coalition on Acid Rain (CCAR) fonds, file 1580, University of Waterloo Library Special Collections (hereafter UWLSC); “Canadian Coalition on Acid Rain Profile,” ND, CCAR fonds, file 1601, UWLSC; Michael Keating, “Do Not Wait for Pact on Acid Rain: Senator,” Globe and Mail, 10 February 1983; Christie McLaren, “Vermont Senator to Press Reagan; Ontario Pollution Laws Win Praise,” Globe and Mail, 19 December 1985.
26. Keating, Michael, “Acid Rain and the News Media: A Study of 20 Years of Coverage of Canada’s Major Environment Story by The Globe and Mail” (manuscript), December 1993, 4Google Scholar.
27. For more on the history of Toronto’s ENGOs, see O’Connor, The First Green Wave; O’Connor, Ryan, “An Ecological Call to Arms: The Air of Death and the Origins of Environmental Activism in Ontario,” Ontario History 105, no. 1 (Spring 2013): 19–46.Google Scholar
29. Muskoka Lakes Association Membership List, 24 August 1981, CCAR fonds, file 1390, UWLSC.
30. Michael Perley, “Presentation to the Muskoka Lakes Association,” 13 May 1981, CCAR fonds, file 1411, UWLSC.
31. Jeffrey W. Shearer to Michael Vaughan, 11 July 1985, CCAR fonds, file 1389, UWLSC.
32. Tony Barrett to William Prior, 18 July 1985, CCAR fonds, file 1877, UWLSC; Adèle Hurley to Jim Bradley, 5 February 1986, CCAR fonds, file 653, UWLSC; List of attendees, inaugural meeting of American Friends of Muskoka, ND, CCAR fonds, file 1905, UWLSC; Jean Booth to Peggy Weisman, 4 June 1984, CCAR fonds, file 1905, UWLSC; Adèle Hurley to John Fraser, 12 August 1985, CCAR fonds, file 1541, UWLSC; Elsie H. Hillman to John Heinz, 12 June 1987, CCAR fonds, file 650, UWLSC.
33. “Broker Helping Acid Rain Fight,” Globe and Mail, 2 March 1983.
34. Michael Perley, “Report to Board of Governors and Board of Directors,” 16 June 1983, CCAR fonds, file 1461, UWLSC; “The Movement Has Been Busy,” Raincheck: The Newsletter of the Movement Against Acid Rain 1, no. 1 (Fall 1983): 3, CCAR fonds, file 1911, UWLSC; “Summer Projects Raise Consciousness and $12,000,” Raincheck: The Newsletter of the Movement Against Acid Rain 1, no. 1 (Fall 1983): 3, CCAR fonds, file 1911, UWLSCGoogle Scholar.
35. Munton, “Using Science, Ignoring Science,” 158.
36. Keating, “Acid Rain and the News Media,” 3.
37. Howard, Ross and Perley, Michael, “Polluters Drag Feet in Rescue of Lakes,” Toronto Star, 8 October 1980Google Scholar; Howard and Perley, “Unnatural Peace Descends with Acid Rain: Sulphuric, Nitric Acids Bring Quiet Death to Wildlife Far from Pollution’s Sources,” Toronto Star, 7 October 1980.
38. Keating, Michael, “Rain of Death: Lake Once a Haven, ‘Now Everything Is Going,’” Globe and Mail, 27 July 1981Google Scholar.
39. Keating, “Acid Rain and the New Media.”
40. Ibid., 6, italics added by the authors. See, for example, Perley, Michael and Hurley, Adele, “Plan to Cut Acid Rain Will Increase It First,” Globe and Mail, 4 June 1981Google Scholar.
41. McLaren, Christie, “Acids in the Air Linked to Lung Problems Among Children,” Globe and Mail, 20 September 1985Google Scholar.
42. Keating, “Acid Rain and the News Media,” 6. Nevertheless, the content of the editorial pages of the two papers varied somewhat. At this point in its history, the Globe positioned itself more as Canada’s national newspaper of record than as a Toronto metropolitan newspaper (despite the fact that its main office was located in Toronto). This change in its positioning is reflected by the fact that its editorials focused more on pressuring the federal government and the United States to arrive at a bilateral arrangement than on the specific measures taken in Ontario. The Star, in contrast, used its editorial page to apply pressure to the Ontario government over its provincial program.
43. Ibid., 7.
45. Ibid., 9.
46. Ibid., 12, italics added by the authors.
47. Howard, Ross, “Ottawa Now Gets Blame for Acid Rain,” Toronto Star, 21 November 1981Google Scholar; Howard, “Ontario Amends Controls on Hydro Pollutants Blamed for Acid Rain,” Toronto Star, 3 February 1982.
48. Howard, “Ontario Amends Controls on Hydro Pollutants Blamed for Acid Rain,” A18. Other articles gave the CCAR a voice in debates over acid rain during election campaigns. See, for example, Haliechuk, Rick, “Acid Rain Group Attacks Tory Candidates’ Stands,” Toronto Star, 16 January 1985Google Scholar.
49. Canadian efforts to influence American policy took the form of lobbying American policymakers in Washington, D.C., for domestic acid rain policy and negotiating with the U.S. State Department over bilateral commitments. For discussions of the U.S. acid rain program and the bilateral Canada-U.S. negotiations, see Munton, Don, “Dispelling Myths of the Acid Rain Story,” Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development,” 40, no. 1 (1998): 4–7CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Munton, , “Acid Rain Politics in North America: Conflict to Cooperation to Collusion,” in Acid in the Environment: Lessons Learned and Future Prospects, ed. Visgilio, Gerald R. and Whitelaw, Diana M. (New York, 2007), 175–201.Google Scholar
50. Macdonald, “Policy Communities and Allocation of Internalized Cost,” 136.
51. Ontario’s point of impingement regulations specify the allowed concentration of a regulated substance at the point at which it comes in contact with humans. Thus, power plants and smelters sought ways to dilute pollution so that the ambient concentrations at the point of impingement did not require abatement techniques beyond building higher stacks. For a description of this regulatory technique, see Estrin, David and Swaigen, John, Environment on Trial: A Citizen’s Guide to Ontario’s Environmental Law (Don Mills, Ont., 1974).Google Scholar
52. As Macdonald notes in “Policy Communities and Allocation of Internalized Cost,” the fact that, during the negotiations over acid rain–causing emissions during the early 1980s, Ontario Hydro managed to avoid being told which plants to reduce emissions from, or how to meet its overall targeted cap, is indicative of the power of this organization.
53. Macdonald, “Policy Communities and Allocation of Internalized Cost,” 124–25; Macdonald, Business and Environmental Politics in Canada, 99.
54. Macdonald, “Policy Communities and Allocation of Internalized Cost,” 133–34.
55. Inco informed provincial officials in 1976 that they could not expect sulfur dioxide reductions, a fact that the government publicly acknowledged in December 1977 (see Munton, “Using Science, Ignoring Science.”)
56. See Munton, “Using Science, Ignoring Science,” 153.
57. Editorial, “Meanwhile, We Still Have Pollution,” Toronto Star, 1 August 1978, A8.
58. Don Munton, Michael Keating, and Adam Fenech, “Media Coverage of Acid Rain in Canada,” in The Press and Global Environmental Change: An International Comparison of Elite Newspaper Reporting on the Acid Rain Issue from 1972 to 1992. Discussion Paper E-95-12, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, December 1995, B-10 (available at http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/publication/2716/press_and_global_environmental_change.html).
59. T. G. (Tom) Brydges, Acid Rain in Story and Song (Brampton, Ont., 2004), 38. In 1978, Brydges was manager of the Liminology and Toxicity Branch of the MOE. At that time he was in charge of a program to conduct fieldwork in the Muskoka/Haliburton area to “evaluate the effects of cottage development on lake water quality” (2).
60. Malarek, Victor, “Ontario Revokes Pollution Control Order, Gives Inco Four-year Reprieve,” Globe and Mail, 31 July 1978Google Scholar.
61. Munton, “Using Science, Ignoring Science,” 157–58.
62. Howard, Ross, “48,000 Lakes Dying as Ontario Stalls,” Toronto Star, 10 March 1979, C4Google Scholar. Two years later, in 1981, the FOCA’s president, Jerry Strickland, made similar public comments: “If the fishing is not there, the tourist will stay away, and that’s the end of the economy of Haliburton and Muskoka. Acid rain could spell the end of cottage country if it’s not curbed” (Daniel Stoffman, “Housing Ripple Hits Cottage Country,” Toronto Star, 10 May 1981, A16). In addition, the Muskoka region’s largest chamber of commerce, the Huntsville Chamber of Commerce, lobbied Canadian officials to address the issue (Howard, “Ottawa Now Gets Blame for Acid Rain”).
63. Howard, Ross, “Ruling on Inco’s Pollution Provokes Opposition Uproar,” Toronto Star, 1 August 1978Google Scholar; “Conservationists Urge McCague’s Dismissal,” Toronto Star, 3 August 1978; Elaine Carey, “Heat’s on McCague for Inco Decision,” Toronto Star, 5 August 1978; “Smith Charges Environment ‘Breakdown’ over Inco Pollution,” Toronto Star, 10 August 1978; Rich Halie, “Davis’ Environment Stand May Topple Him, Critics Say,” Toronto Star, 12 August 1978; “Davis Off for Policy Talks Amid Storm over Shuffle,” Toronto Star, 19 August 1978; Jonathan Manthorpe, “Smile! It’s an Election Cabinet,” Toronto Star, 19 August 1978. One group, calling itself the “Inco Stinko Action Faction,” deposited a mini smokestack in the MOE’s office, where it emitted noxious fumes and frightened employees (“Eco-activists Raise a Stink at Ministry,” Toronto Star, 3 August 1978).
64. Howard, “48,000 Lakes Dying as Ontario Stalls.”
65. Howard, Ross, “Who Will Stop Acid Rain in Time to Save Our Lakes?” Toronto Star, 16 October 1979Google Scholar; Munton, “Acid Rain Politics in North America."
66. Canada–United States Research Consultation Group on the Long-Range Transport of Air Pollutants, The LRTAP Problem in North America: A Preliminary Overview (Ottawa and Washington, D.C., 1979); see also Don Munton, Marvin Soroos, Elena Nikitina, and Marc A. Levy, “Acid Rain in Europe and North America,” in The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes, ed. Oran R. Young (Cambridge, 1999), 171.
67. Editorial, “That Acid Rain Is Our Home Brew,” Globe and Mail, 17 October 1979, 6.
68. Editorial, “We Can’t Ignore Acid Rain,” Toronto Star, 16 December 1979, A8.
69. Speirs, Rosemary, “Parrott Promises Plan for Reducing Acid Rain,” Globe and Mail, 10 April 1980Google Scholar; Michael Keating, “Parrott to Set Acid Rain Limits by Next Week,” Globe and Mail, 22 April 1980; Editorial, “Good Start on Acid Rain,” Toronto Star, 2 May 1980. The May 1980 control order capped Inco’s sulfur dioxide emission at 645,000 metric tons per year (equal to roughly 2,000 standard tons per day) by the end of 1982 (see Macdonald, “Policy Communities and Allocation of Internalized Cost,” 124–25). In Business and Environmental Politics in Canada, 100, Macdonald notes that Inco was already planning to undertake these reductions through efficiency improvements.
70. Howard, Ross, “Minister Calls Hydro’s Progress Against Acid Rain Unsatisfactory,” Toronto Star, 18 November 1980Google Scholar.
71. The regulation capped Ontario Hydro’s emissions at 260,000 metric tons per year, down from 1980 emissions of 452,000 metric tons. However, these reductions were planned to decrease only after 30 percent annual increases during 1982 and 1983, before the technological changes were to be made. Editorial, “Acid Rain: U.S. Must Act”; Perley and Hurley, “Plan to Cut Acid Rain Will Increase It First”; Douglas Macdonald, “Policy Communities and Allocation of Internalized Cost,” 124–25.
72. Keating, “Do Not Wait for Pact on Acid Rain: Senator”; However, in June 1983, Ontario Hydro announced that the construction of several new nuclear power plants would enable it to meet its sulfur reduction commitments by retiring several coal-fired plants rather than install scrubbers on any existing ones (see “Ontario Hydro Just Doesn’t Care About Acid Rain, Liberal MP Says,” Toronto Star, 24 June 1983; Macdonald, “Policy Communities and Allocation of Internalized Cost,” 157).
73. Ontario/Canada Task Force, Report of the Ontario/Canada Task Force for the Development and Evaluation of Air Pollution Abatement Options for INCO Limited and Falconbridge Nickel Mines Limited in the Regional Municipality of Sudbury, Ontario (Ottawa and Toronto, 1982); see also Macdonald, Business and Environmental Politics in Canada, 100.
74. See Macdonald, “Policy Communities and Allocation of Internalized Cost,” 221.
75. The October 1983 agreement was popularly referred to as the “Fredericton accord,” an understanding that additional reductions would be made, contingent on specific circumstances related to federal assistance and American reciprocity. It was clear at the time that smelters in Manitoba, Québec, and Ontario would need to be regulated (with the bulk of the reductions occurring in Ontario). It also appeared likely that the federal government would assist financially with loans or grants, and there was hope that Canada would be able to improve its bargaining position with the United States, as bilateral talks were scheduled to reopen during October 1983 (see Keating, Michael, “Acid Rain: An Incomplete Strategy,” Globe and Mail, 3 October 1983Google Scholar; and also Macdonald, “Policy Communities and Allocation of Internalized Cost” and Brydges, Acid Rain in Story and Song).
76. Keating, “Acid Rain: An Incomplete Strategy”; Kimberley Noble, “Noranda Mines Links Pollution Control Costs to Fate of Its Smelter,” Globe and Mail, 31 May 1984.
77. The original source of the idea to fund smelter modernization is unclear, largely due to the secretive nature of the meetings, and also because it was rapidly adopted as a solution. Macdonald (“Policy Communities and Allocation of Internalized Cost”) traces it to meetings among provincial ministers in May and June 1983, but does not claim that it originated with them. Brydges (Acid Rain in Story and Song) mentions that it was brought up with the federal government during the September 1983 negotiations of the Fredericton accord but also acknowledges that it had been discussed at earlier meetings. Following the Fredericton accord, Ontario environmental minister Andrew Brandt publicly recognized the need for federal assistance. The CCAR’s report was the first report to recommend it as a policy instrument.
78. Keating, Michael, “Group Urges Taxpayers, Inco to Clean Up Acid Rain,” Globe and Mail, 21 December 1983Google Scholar. See also Macdonald, “Policy Communities and Allocation of Internalized Cost,” 239. The report was prepared by Bill Glenn, a public-interest representative on the federal-provincial task force that produced the 1982 report.
79. Keating, “Group Urges Taxpayers”; Macdonald, “Policy Communities and the Allocation of Internalized Cost,” 239. Mark Winfield argues that the provincial government at this time relegated pollution control to industrial growth, and suggests that at this specific juncture the province was stalling in order to ensure the optimal conditions for Inco’s return to profitability. He notes: “The minister of the environment specifically refused to make a commitment to take actions against Inco, pending studies of the economic condition of the metals and smelting industry of Canada” (Winfield, Blue-Green Province, 35).
80. Editorial, “Inco, Turn Off the Rain,” Toronto Star, 15 January 1984, F2.
81. Macdonald, “Policy Communities and Allocation of Internalized Cost,” 239. Macdonald mistakenly places the date of this meeting as 20 December 1983 in Business and Environmental Politics in Canada, 101.
82. See Macdonald, “Policy Communities and Allocation of Internalized Cost,” 239–40.
83. Editorial, “Make Acid Rain Cleanup Work,” Toronto Star, 10 March 1984, B2.
84. Macdonald, “Policy Communities and Allocation of Internalized Cost,” 239–40.
85. On the CCAR’s strategic use of and symbiotic relationship with Toronto’s print media, see Keating, “Acid Rain and the News Media.”
86. “Who’ll Stop the Rain?” Toronto Star, 25 February 1982; Hamlin Grange, “Acid Rain Fighters Launch Major Radio Campaign,” Toronto Star, 12 February 1982.
87. Harrington, Denise, “Surcharge on Electricity Bills Suggested to Help Fight Acid Rain,” Toronto Star, 4 February 1982Google Scholar.
88. “Poll Shows Public Wants Funds to Fight Acid Rain,” Toronto Star, 28 April 1984.
89. Pat McNenly, “You’d Pay to Stop Acid Rain, Poll Finds,” Toronto Star, 10 May 1984.
90. Keating, Michael, “Poll says Inco Cleanup Cost Largely Taxpayers’ Problem, Globe and Mail, 28 April 1984Google Scholar; Michael Keating, “Canadians Would Pay to Clean Up Acid Rain, Globe and Mail, 10 May 1984.
91. Editorial, “To Fight Acid Rain,” Globe and Mail, 11 May 1984, 6.
92. Keating, “Canadians Would Pay to Clean Up Acid Rain.”
93. Keating, Michael, “Eastern Provinces to Find Joint Approach: Acid Rain Agreement Hailed as Victory,” Globe and Mail, 6 February 1985Google Scholar.
94. See Macdonald, Business and Environmental Politics in Canada, 101.
95. Keating, Michael, “Provinces to Assist in Cutting Acid Rain,” Globe and Mail, 2 February 1985Google Scholar; Editorial, “Clean Hands for the Summit,” Globe and Mail, 5 February 1985; “Material World,” Globe and Mail, 8 March 1985; Macdonald, Business and Environmental Politics in Canada, chap. 4; G. Bruce Doern and Thomas Conway, The Greening of Canada: Federal Institutions and Decisions (Toronto, 1994), chap. 7. In March 1985, the federal government would make $150 million available for smelter modernizations.
96. Keating, “Eastern Provinces to Find Joint Approach.”
97. Partridge, John, “Inco to Slash Emissions 50% by Modifying Sudbury Plant,” Globe and Mail, 25 April 1985Google Scholar.
98. Michael Keating, “Eastern Provinces to Find Joint Approach”; see also Christie McLaren, “Ontario Plan to Reduce Acid Rain is Praised by Pollution Watchdog,” Globe and Mail, 13 December 1985.
99. See Macdonald, Business and Environmental Politics in Canada, 101–2.
100. Editorial, “Acid Rain: How High on Our Agenda?” Toronto Star, 7 September 1985, B2.
101. Ontario Ministry of the Environment, Countdown Acid Rain (Toronto, 1985); see also Winfield, Green-Blue Province, 45.
102. Algoma Steel’s annual sulfur dioxide emissions allowances were reduced from 280,000 metric tons per year to 125,000 and Falconbridge’s from 154,000 metric tons a year to 100,000. Inco’s new cap was set at 265,000 metric tons per year. This is the equivalent of 726 metric tons (800 standard tons) per day, which is comparable to the 1970 control order of 750 standard tons per day. See Christie McLaren, “Ontario’s New Laws on Acid Rain ‘Tough Message’ for Washington,” Globe and Mail, 18 December 1985; Macdonald, “Policy Communities and Allocation of Internalized Cost,” 125–26.
103. McLaren, “Ontario’s New Laws on Acid Rain,” 1.
104. McLaren, “Ontario Plan to Reduce Acid Rain Is Praised by Pollution Watchdog,” 1.
105. Macdonald, “Policy Communities and Allocation of Internalized Cost.”
106. See Gonzalez, The Politics of Air Pollution; Moore, “Democratizing the Air”; Don Munton and Owen Temby, “From Sudbury to Trail to Sudbury: Smelter ‘Fume’ Damage and Canadian Environmentalism” (manuscript), March 2013; Temby, “Trouble in Smogville.”
107. Gonzalez, The Politics of Air Pollution.
108. Quoted in Welner, Chris, “Acid Rain Cleanup Must Start in Canada Water Inquiry Told,” Toronto Star, 2 November 1984, A19Google Scholar.
109. Gonzalez, The Politics of Air Pollution; Munton and Temby, “From Sudbury to Trail to Sudbury”; Wirth, Smelter Smoke in North America.
110. See Paehlke, Robert, “The Environmental Movement in Canada,” in Canadian Environmental Policy and Politics: Prospects for Leadership and Innovation, ed. VanNijnatten, Debora L. and Boardman, Robert (Don Mills, Ont., 2009), 2–13Google Scholar; and Miller, Russell A., “Surprising Parallels Between Trail Smelter and the Global Climate Change Regime,” in Transboundary Harm and International Law: Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration, ed. Bratspies, Rebecca M. and Miller, Russell A. (New York, 2006), 167–80Google Scholar. Miller goes so far as to call the coalition of local farmers and businessmen fighting Trail smelter fumes during the 1920s and 1930s an “environmental NGO” (169).
111. See Cahn, Matthew A., Environmental Deceptions: The Tension Between Liberalism and Environmental Policymaking in the United States (Albany, N.Y., 1995)Google Scholar; and Temby, Owen, “Policy Symbolism and Air Pollution in Toronto and Ontario, 1963–1967,” Planning Perspectives 30, no. 2 (2015): 271–84.Google Scholar
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