Starting without any a priori assumption that government is necessarily a force for good or ill, this article examines what negative consequences are likely to arise from big government – or government growing bigger still. Three generic effects are postulated: a loss of effectiveness, because of the use of weaker means-ends programme technologies for new programmes; an increase in contradictions between existing, growing and new programmes; and a possible reduction of consent, insofar as growth increases the ‘impropriety’ of government actions. The growth of government is shown to be ‘unbalanced’, that is, to occur in incommensurable ways and at varying rates for major resources (government revenue, personnel, and laws); government organizations; and programme outputs. The different character of growth in each element is examined, and particular consequences hypothesized for resource elements singly, for internal characteristics of organizations, and for their combination in programmes. The analysis suggests that while much growth involves no intrinsic problems of size (as long as economic resources are available to meet the costs), there is likely to be disproportionate loss of effectiveness, and increasing contradictions between programmes if big government grows bigger still.

This paper presents the results of tests of a number of models of public expenditure growth which have achieved wide currency. The main types of models examined are a permanent income model, electoral cycle models, and stabilization policy models. The models are tested with data from Britain and the United States of America and the results are compared with evidence from other countries. The paper concludes that government expenditure grows in proportion to national income because politicians find it convenient to plan that way; electoral-cyclical factors are relatively unimportant in determining public expenditure; there appears to be a limited role for public expenditure in economic stabilization policy; in a comparative context institutions of expenditure control are important in determining relative rates of growth of public sector consumption expenditure.

This essay is an introduction to a little studied aspect of a world-wide phenomenon, the political environment of the professions. In the absence of any model of political interactions between the environment and professions, a deductive developmental model is set out below, detailing the stages of conflict between the professionals and the non-profesionals, or ‘laity’, whom they serve. Its evidence is adduced from primarily the United States, but also from elsewhere in the English-speaking world; its application should be even wider. A concluding section briefly suggests explanatory propositions for this conflict. Throughout, the focus is not upon professionals as such, but upon (a) the potential for conflict which lies in the grant of autonomy given them by the society, and (b) the current crisis when the autonomy of even the most powerful profession is under challenge.

This paper examines three distinct images of the policy process. Iron triangles emphasiże stable relations among a limited number of participants in a relatively closed policy area. Issue networks are fragmented, open and extraordinarily complex and are ill-structured for resolving conflicts and reaching authoritative decisions. The neo-corporatist literature posits a mechanistic interpretation of society: hierarchy, discipline, command and stability, though organized through sectors. These three images can be contrasted with an image of cabinet government which stresses the integrative capacities of central government. The United States can be seen to have moved to some degree from a pattern more closely captured by the iron triangle image to a looser, more complex one resembling features of the issue network image. In Britain, it is possible to detect some movement towards the complexity of the issue network approach. Despite some superficial plausibility, the corporatist image does not apply to Britain, which is best described by drawing on elements of the iron triangle and cabinet government images and some of the complexity of the issue network image. Finally, limits to the fragmentation implied by the issue network image are noted.

A long time ago I received a letter from Rex Stout inviting me to join the Authors' Guild, a letter no doubt sent to all who had books published. I didn't join because I didn't think of myself primarily as a writer, but as an aspiring scholar who merely set out the results of investigations that, so to speak, wrote themselves. Writing was incidental, not essential. Some years later a similar letter arrived. By then, having spent several hours a day writing most days, I joined. I had become a writer, if not by accomplishment, at least by occupation. Only recently, however, have I thought of myself as a writer by vocation, as a person who cares about the quality and craft of writing as inseparable from the content of whatever I am trying to communicate. Indeed, for me, writing has become an integral part of thinking.