1 For examples of Luttwak's more modern writings, see his Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (1987), and ‘Toward post-heroic warfare’, Foreign Affairs 74/ 3 (1995), 109–22.
2 The debate is well summarized in Wheeler, E. L., ‘Methodological limits and the mirage of Roman strategy’, Journal of Military History 57 (1993), 7–41, 215–40.
3 See Hanson, V. D., The Western Way of War: Infantry Battle in Classical Greece (1989), ix–xiii, xx; Hanson, V. D. (ed.), Hoplites: The Classical Greek Battle Experience (1991), xvi; Lloyd, A. B. (ed.), Battle in Antiquity (1996), vii–viii.
4 See Anderson, J. K., Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon (1970); Pritchett, W. K., The Greek State at War, 5 vols (1971–1991); Hanson, op. cit. (n. 3); Lazenby, J. F., The Spartan Army (1985).
5 For excellent summaries of the contending arguments, see Luginbill, R. D., ‘Othismos: the importance of the mass-shove in hoplite warfare’, Phoenix 48/1 (1994), 51–61; Goldsworthy, A. K., ‘The othismos, myths and heresies: the nature of hoplite battle’, War in History 4/1 (1997), 1–26.
6 See Delbruck, H., History of the Art of War, 1, Warfare in Antiquity (trans. 1975); Kromayer, J. and Veith, G., Heerwesen und Kriegfuhrung der Griechen und Romer (1928).
7 See, for example, Peddie, J., The Roman War Machine (1994); Gilliver, C. M., The Roman Army at War (1999).
8 See, in particular, A. K. Goldsworthy, The Roman Army at War, 100 BC–AD 200 (1996), chs 4–6; Sabin, P. A. G., ‘The mechanics of battle in the Second Punic War’, in Cornell, T. J., Rankov, N. B. and Sabin, P. A. G. (eds), The Second Punic War: A Reappraisal, BICS Supplement 67 (1996), 59–79; A. D. Lee, ‘Morale and the Roman experience of battle’, in Lloyd, op. cit. (n. 3), 199–217; Zhmodikov, A., ‘Roman Republican heavy infantrymen in battle (IV–II centuries BC)’, Historia 49/1 (2000), 67–78.
9 See Samuels, M., ‘The reality of Cannae’, Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen 47 (1990), 7–29; Hammond, N. G. L., ‘The campaign and battle of Cynoscephalae (197 BC)’, JHS 108 (1988), 60–82.
10 See Dixon, K. R. and Southern, P., The Roman Cavalry (1992); Hyland, A., Equus: The Horse in the Roman World (1990); eadem, Training the Roman Cavalry: from Arrian's Ars Tactica (1993); Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 8), 228–44.
11 See H. van Wees, ‘Heroes, knights and nutters: warrior mentality in Homer’, in Lloyd, op. cit. (n. 3), 1–86; Sabin, P. A. G., ‘Maldon AD 991’, Slingshot 181 (1995), 26–31.
12 See Walsh, P. G., Livy: His Historical Aims and Methods (1961); Cornell, T. J., The Beginnings of Rome (1995), 1–30.
13 For an excellent survey of the impact of different styles of analysis among ancient writers, see Lendon, J. E., ‘The rhetoric of combat: Greek military theory and Roman culture in Julius Caesar's battle descriptions’, Classical Antiquity 18/1 (1999), 273–329.
14 See Wheeler, E. L., ‘The legion as phalanx’, Chiron 9 (1979), 303–18.
15 A useful discussion of the treatises as a genre is Campbell, B., ‘Teach yourself how to be a general’, JRS 77 (1987), 13–29. See also Gilliver, op. cit. (n. 7).
16 See Bishop, M. C. and Coulston, J. C. N., Roman Military Equipment (1993).
17 See J. K. Anderson, ‘Hoplite weapons and offensive arms’; V. D. Hanson, ‘Hoplite technology in hoplite battle’, in Hanson, op. cit. (n. 3, 1991), 15–37, 63–84.
18 See Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 8), 217–19; Connolly, P., ‘The Roman fighting technique deduced from armour and weaponry’, in Maxfield, V. A. and Dobson, M. J. (eds), Roman Frontier Studies 1989 (1991), 358–63.
19 See, in particular, the various essays in Lloyd, op. cit. (n. 3).
20 See Keegan, J., The Face of Battle (1976), 171–4.
21 See Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 8), 201–6; idem, ‘Legionaries and warbands: an historical overview’, Slingshot 199 (1998), 9–14.
22 See Pritchett, op. cit. (n. 4, vol. 4, 1985), 47–51.
23 Krentz, P., ‘Casualties in hoplite battles’, GRBS 26/1 (1985), 13–20.
24 See Gabriel, R. A. and Metz, K. S., From Sumer to Rome: The Military Capabilities of Ancient Armies (1991), 83–91.
25 The 5,700 dead which Hannibal suffered at Cannae represented 11 per cent of his force, but this is easily explicable in terms of the effort needed to annihilate a much larger Roman army.
26 See Lendon, op. cit. (n. 13).
27 As with other aspects of Roman battle, not much has been written on the topic recently. A good summary of the historical debate is in Holmes, T. Rice, Caesar's Conquest of Gaul (1911), 587-99, and more recently in Wheeler, op. cit. (n. 14). I hope to publish my own thoughts on the subject soon.
28 On the problems of Livy's account, see Rawson, E., ‘Literary sources for the pre-Marian army’, PBSR ns 26 (1971), 26–31.
30 See Hacket, J. (ed.), Warfare in the Ancient World (1989), 66–7.
31 See Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 8), 206–12, 217–19.
32 On Greek references to such crowding, see Hanson, op. cit. (n. 3, 1989), 174–6.
33 See Bar-Kochva, B., The Seleucid Army (1976), 134–5, 167–9.
34 See , K. and Guest, D., British Battles (1996), 100–1.
35 See Peachey, S., The Mechanics of Infantry Combat in the First English Civil War (1992); Reid, S., Gunpowder Triumphant (1987).
36 See Head, D., Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars, 359 BC to 146 BC (1982), 106, 111.
37 See Connolly, P., The Roman Army (1975), 8–9; idem, ‘Legion versus phalanx’, Military Illustrated 124 (1998), 36–41.
38 See Head, op. cit. (n. 36), 143–70.
39 The argument that hoplite battles took the form of such individual duels is advanced in Krentz, P., ‘The nature of hoplite battle’, Classical Antiquity 4/1 (1985), 50–61.
40 Connolly, op. cit. (n. 29), 142.
41 This process is nicely illustrated in Warry, J., Warfare in the Classical World (1980), 126–7.
42 See Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 8), 179–80.
43 See Fuller, J. F. C., Julius Caesar: Man, Soldier and Tyrant (1965), 90–1.
44 See Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 8), 208, 257–8.
45 For example, even if we assume that just 5 percent of the troops were in the front rank, and that they struck their adversaries only every five seconds, and that less than 1 per cent of these attacks caused death or mortal injury, each army would suffer 5 per cent fatalities every ten minutes.
46 Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 8), ch. 5. Cf. Kromayer and Veith, op. cit. (n. 6), 361–2.
48 Marshall, S. L. A., Men against Fire (1947).
49 Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 8), 222.
51 Zhmodikov, op. cit. (n. 8).
52 Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 8), 199.
53 The Mainz relief is illustrated in Goldsworthy, A. J., Roman Warfare (2000), 76.
54 Sabin, op. cit. (n. 8).
55 See Griffith, P., Forward into Battle (2nd edn, 1990), ch. 2; idem, Rally Once Again: Battle Tactics in the American Civil War (1987) 140–5.
56 du Picq, A., Battle Studies, translated in Roots of Strategy, Book 2 (1987), 69.
58 See Hanson, op. cit. (n. 3, 1989), 160–1; Xenophon, An. 1.8, 1.10.
59 Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 21), 10–11.
60 Griffith, op. cit. (n. 55, 1990), ch. 2.
61 See van Wees, H., ‘Kings in combat: battles and heroes in the Iliad’, Classical Quarterly 38/1 (1988), 1–24; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, I., The Biology of Peace and War (1979), 129–87.
62 See Sabin, op. cit. (n. 8), 73–7.
63 Penguin translation by A. de Selincourt.
64 Polybius (15.13) in this instance does not support the physical pressure interpretation, since he says that the key Roman advantages lay in the steadiness of their ranks and the superiority of their equipment, and that the principes gave support by cheering on, rather than shoving, their comrades.
65 The theoretical lethality of ancient missile weapons, and the importance of shields in reducing this, are discussed in Gabriel and Metz, op. cit. (n. 24), 70–5.
66 On the role of junior leaders such as centurions, see Isaac, B., ‘Hierarchy and command structure in the Roman army’, in le Bohec, Y. (ed.), La Hierarchie (Rangordnung) de l'armée romaine sous le haut-empire (1995), 23–31.
67 See Sabin, op. cit. (n. 8), 76–7.
68 See Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 8), 219–27.
69 Du Picq, op. cit. (n. 56), 79.
70 Keegan, op. cit. (n. 20), 99.
72 See Goldsworthy, op. cit. (n. 8), 283–4.