This paper examines Japanese attitudes toward the independence movement in Vietnam, the Japanese idea of “independence”, and Japanese relationships with the Vietnamese nationalists during the period between 1940 and 1945.
The Japanese used French Indochina, one constituent of which was “Vietnam”, as a supply base and a stepping stone for their troops on their way to other battle grounds such as Burma, Singapore, Indonesia, or the Philippines. The defeated units were returned to Vietnam, rested, and reorganized into new military units. Coal and rice and other foodstuffs used by the Japanese in these battlefields often came from Vietnam. For these objectives, the Japanese kept the political and administrative structure of French Indochina intact under the French. But on 9 March 1945, the 30, 000-man Japanese military attacked the 50, 000-man French Indochinese Army in a surprise attack under the command of Lieutenant General Tsuchihashi, commanding general of the 38th Army. (This operation is identified in Japanese military terms as “Meigo Sakusen” [Bright Moon Action].)
1 Khanh, Huynh Kim, “The Vietnamese August Revolution”, Journal of Asian Studies 30, 4 (04 1971): 761–81.
2 McAlister, John T., Vietnam: The Origins of Revolution (1885-1945) (Washington, D.C.: Center for Research for Social Systems, 1968), p. 83.
3 Marr, David G., “World War II and the Vietnamese Revolution”, in Southeast Asia under Japanese Occupation, ed. McCoy, Alfred W. (Yale University, Southeast Asia Studies, Monograph no. 22, 1981), pp. 150–52.
4 Lam, Truong Buu, “Japan and the Disruption of the Vietnamese Nationalist Movement”, in Aspects of Vietnamese History, ed. Vella, Walter F (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, Asian Studies Program, Monograph no. 81, 1973), p. 244.
5 Smith, Ralph, “The Japanese Period in Indochina and the Coup of 9 March 1945”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 9, 2 (09 1978): 399–401.
6 Nitz, Kiyoko K., “Japanese Military Policy towards French Indochina During the Second World War: The Road to the Meigo Sakusen (9 March 1945)”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 14, 2 (09 1983): 328–53.
7 Ooiwa, Makoto, Annam Minzoku Undoshi Gaisetsu [An Outline of the Annamese Nationalist Movement] (Tokyo: Guroria Societe, 1941), p. 1.
8 , Ooiwa, Minzoku Undoshi, p. 1.
9 , Ooiwa, Minzoku Undoshi, p. 41; The Japanese text of this is in the “Appendix”.
10 For Japanese views on these economic negotiations, refer to Mantetsu Toa Keizai Chosakyoku, ed., Nanyo Sosho, vol. 2, “Furansuryo Indoshina Hen” [French Indochina] (Tokyo: Mantetsu Toa Keizai Chosa Kyoku, 1942), pp. 758–90.
11 Chosakyoku, Mantetsu Toa Keizai, Nanyo Sosho, p. 768.
12 International Military Tribunal Far East (hereafter IMTFE), Exhibit (hereafter E) 652.
13 IMTFE, E 218. Negotiation on economic cooperation began immediately in October between the Japanese delegation under Matsunomiya and Decoux.
14 , Smith, “The Japanese Period”, p. 272.
15 Duiker, William J., The Rise of Nationalism in Vietnam, 1900-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), pp. 264–67.
16 Shiraishi, Masaya, “Betonamu Fukkoku Domeikai to 1940-nen Fukkokugun Hoki ni Tsuite” [The Vietnam Phuc Quoc League and their 1940 Rebellion], Ajia Keizai 23, 4 (1981): 36–37. His source is , Boeicho [Defense Agency], Senshishitsu, , ed., Shina Jiken Rikugun Sakusen (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1974), vol. 3, pp. 260, 264-65, 288.
17 , Shiraishi, “Fukkoku Domei”, pp. 24–25. His soufce is De, Cuong, Cuoc Doi Cach Mang Cuong De (Saigon, 1957), but he also states that the information is confirmed by materials contained in the “Annan Ozoku Honpo Bomei Kankei” compiled by the Japanese Foreign Ministry.
18 Yoshio, Himeda, “Appendix”, in D'Aureles, Jean, Asia des Moussons, trans. Yoshio Himeda (Tokyo: Ikueisha, 1942), p. 268.
19 Oomiya, interview, II Nov. 1962; Maeda, interview, 18 Sept. 1962.
20 Kenkyujo, Kajima, Nihon Gaikoshi (Tokyo: Kajima Kenkyujo Shuppankai, 1973), 22: 249.
21 Oomiya, interview, 24 Oct. 1962.
22 , Shiraishi, “Fukkoku Domei”, p. 39 (source: Shiraishi's interview with Ujihara, date unknown).
23 , Himeda, “Appendix”, p. 268.
24 , Shiraishi, “Fukkoku Domei”, p. 38 (source: Shiraishi's interviews with Ujihara and Uchikawa, who worked for a Japanese firm in Indochina during that time). Shiraishi maintains that McAlister's figures on arms provided to the Vietnamese by the Japanese is incorrect.
25 Diplomat Tashiro came back to Vietnam later, but was again called back to Tokyo before the Meigo Action took place. It is speculated that his overt involvement in the nationalist movement was too annoying t o Tokyo (Oomiya, interview, 24 Oct. 1962). When, after the Action, Vietnamese nationalists returned home from abroad, Tahara, free to assist the nationalists openly, handed out money to them. This question of providing assistance to the Vietnamese nationalists became an important issue again when the Japanese began planning the Meigo Action (Tsukamoto, interview, 11 July 1962).
26 Chosakyoku, Mantetsu Toa Keizai, Nanyo Sosho, p. 785.
27 Chosakyoku, Mantetsu Toa Keizai, Nanyo Sosho, pp. 758, 784.
28 Hattori, Takushiro, Daitoa Senso Zenshi [Complete History of the Greater East Asia War] (Tokyo: Hara-Shobo, 1965), pp. 46–47, and, Kajima, Nihon Gaikoshi, 22: 298–300. According to Hammer, Ellen, “Under Decoux, some eight to ten thousand Indochinese political prisoners were said to be in French jails in Indochina. It appeared as if the Japanese authorities were suppressing the Vietnamese in accordance with the French” (Strugglefor Indochina [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1954], p. 30); a similar view is found in Marr, “The Vietnamese Revolution”.
29 Interviews, Maeda, 6 Sept. 1962, and Oomiya, 24 Oct. and 11 Nov. 1962.
30 Minister Yokoyama went to Tokyo in May 1942, but went back to Vietnam as an economic attache under Ambassador Yoshizawa in September. He was later appointed Director of the Japanese Cultural Center (Yokoyama, interview, 1 Aug. 1962).
31 “Tairikushi” [Directive], no. 991, and “Tairikumei” [Order], no. 564; also in , Hattori, Dailoa Senso Zenshi, pp. 190–92.
32 “Teikoku Rikugun Zenpan Sakusen Keikaku” [Plan of Operations of the Imperial Army], in , Hattori, Daitoa Senso Zenshi, p. 178.
33 Defense Agency, Senshishitsu, , ed., Senshi Sosho [Military History], vol. 22, “Shittan-Meigo Sakusen” (Tokyo: Asagumo Shimbunsha, 1969), pp. 549–50.
34 Staff Officer of the Southern Region Army Colonel Kushida's memo to Tokyo, quoted in , Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho, pp. 579–80; a joint memo prepared by Southern Region Army staff officer Major General Ayabe and Chief of Staff of the Indoshina-Chutongun Major General Kamamura, , Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho, pp. 580–81.
35 Prime Minister Tojo's explanation about the “Daitoa Seiryaku Shido Yoko” [Outline for Guiding Political Programs in Greater East Asia] at the Conference with the presence of the Emperor, 31 May 1943 ( , Hattori, Daitoa Senso Zenshi, p. 451).
36 Yoshizawa, interview, 11 June 1962.
37 Mikuni, Naotomi, “Futsuin no Komatsusan” [Mr. Komatsu in French Indochina], Maruka News 35 (5 09 1965), p. 10.
38 Oshima, Chikamitsu, “Betonamu no Aikokusha: Komatsu Kiyoshi o Shinobu”[A Patriot in Vietnam: Memory of Mr. Kiyoshi Komatsu], Tochigi Shimbun, 27 06 1962.
39 Oshima, interview, 2 Sept. 1962.
40 Tsuchihashi, interview, 24 July 1962.
41 Yoshizawa, interview, 11 June 1962; Oomiya, interview, 24 Nov. 1962. This line of thought led to a compromise with the military's view of keeping “peace and order”, although inconsistent with Shigemitsu's support of “liberating the natives”. But the military received an impression from Yoshizawa's attitude that the Foreign Ministry had its own plans for liberating the locals and acted according to that plan (Memoir of Colonel Tanemura, “Sanbo Honbu Sensoshido-hancho”, quoted in , Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho, p. 582).
42 Oomiya, interview, 24 Nov. 1962.
43 “Dai Ajia Kyolcai o Kataru”[On the Greater Asia Society], Hogaku 14 (09 1962); pp. 11-19. Also see Smith's reference to Cuong De and General Matsui ( , Smith, “The Japanese Period”, p. 272).
44 , Smith, “The Japanese Period”, p. 274.
45 Ibid.; Ishida, interview, 30 Aug. 1962. Ishida considers that Diem's frequent meeting with him was because Diem thought that through Ishida he could communicate with and influence the Japanese military. Later, after World War II, Diem appointed Ishida advisor to the Vietnamese Embassy in Tokyo, but he requested that Ishida not publicize his close ties with the Japanese during World War II.
46 Nishiwaki, Kansei, “Koga Hijo: Harada Toshiaki no Kunshi” [Honorable Death of Toshiaki Harada], Nampo Kai 6 (11 09 1957), p. 4. Yamane is also known for arranging, in cooperation with a Domei Tsushin journalist, the escape of Wang Ching-wei via Hanoi (Maeda, interview, 6 Sept. 1962). Yamane is not widely known in western language sources, but Patti mentions his existence (Doichi Yamane); Patti, Archimedes L.A., Why Viet Nam?: Prelude to America's Albatross (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 302.
47 Yokoyama, interview, I Aug. 1962. Yokoyama described the mission of the Center as “to carry out all sorts of work (by all possible means), by threatening, coaxing, appeasing, or encouraging ….”(Testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee, House of Representatives 33rd Diet (vol. 1, no. 4), Gaimu linkai Giroku[Proceedings] 13(21 Nov. 1959), p. 2. The French, in return, established new schools and organized a youth movement for sports and physical education as well as paramilitary training ( , Hammer, Struggle, p. 31). Yokoyama also described the Japanese Cultural Centers as being established for assisting Vietnamese nationalists and for providing a contact place under a pretense of propagating Japanese culture. He personally recruited in Japan the Japanese artists and literary figures fluent in French. In Hanoi, Yokoyama says, the Center employees were meeting Viet Minh members, even Ho Chi Minh (Yokoyama, interview, 1 Aug. 1962).
48 Oomiya, interviews, 24 Oct. and 11 Nov. 1962; “Komaki Oomi: Ryakureki to Sakuhin Chosho” [Personal History and Publication of Komaki Oomi] (pamphlet; Tokyo: Tanemaku Hito Kenshokai, 1962). For his philosophy, read some of his works, including those written in Vietnam during the last days of the Japanese period: a collection of poems and letters entitled “Une Date (Anno Hi Yori)”(Hanoi: Imperimerie Nitinam, 2 July 1945). Patti identifies Oomiya as “Yokoyama's deputy” and Komatsu as “a propaganda agent” ( , Patti, Why Viet Nam?, p. 304). These labels, however, oversimplify the roles these two figures played in wartime Vietnam.
49 Oomiya, interviews, 24 Oct. and 11 Nov. 1962.
50 Komatsu, Kiyoshi, “A Japanese Franco-Tireur Talks with Gide and Malraux”, trans. Fishel, Wesley R. and Scott, Midori H., The Centennial Review A, 1 (1960), p. 141. His earlier career is discussed by , Smith, “The Japanese Period”, pp. 275–76.
51 Oshima, “Betonamu no Aikokusha”; Oomi, Komaki, “Am Minzoku Shugisha no Shi: Minami-Betonamu no Antei o Megutte” [Death of a Certain Nationalist: On Stability in South Vietnam], Asahi Shimbun, 6 11 1963, p. 11. For a comparison of personality and philosophy between Oomiya and Komatsu, see Nasu, Kunio, “Daitoa Kyoeikenka no Betonamu: Komatsu Kiyoshi o Megutte”, Shiso no Kagaku 57, 21 (1963): 41–49.
52 , Nasu, “Komatsu Koyoshi o Megutte”, p. 48.
53 , Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho, pp. 549–52.
54 Tsukamoto, interview, 11 July 1962; Matsumoto, interview, 5 Aug. and 26 Aug. 1962; , Senshishitsu, SenshiSosho, p. 647. For a more detailed discussion, see Nitz, “Meigo Sakusen”, and Smith, “The Japanese Period”. In May, Matsumoto was called back to Tokyo to serve as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs under Foreign Minster Togo. Other appointments included diplomat Nishimura, administrator of Tonkin, and diplomat Minoda, Governor of Cochinchina. Japanese advisors were placed in former French protectorates: Minister Yokoyama for Vietnam, consul Kubota for Cambodia, and Colonel Ishihashi for the State of Luang Prabang. Headquarters of the 38th Army was moved to Hanoi from Saigon to ease Tsuchihashi's concurrent handling of the Governor General's responsibility. In order to fill these new posts, Japanese citizens were drafted from both the Southern Region and Japan. As the number of civilian employees who were not familiar with the customs and traditions of French Indochina increased, the conflict between those long-time residents and the “newcomers” is said to have intensified. Ooya, Soichi, Kiiroi Kakumei[yellow Revolution] (Tokyo: Bungei Shinjusha, 1961), p. 225.
55 Tsuchihashi, interview, 24 July and 9 Aug. 1962.
56 IMTFE, E 664, “Proclamation” no. 11.
57 Fujita, interview, 30 Aug. 1962.
58 Maeda, interview, 18 Sept. 1962.
59 , Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho. p. 646.
60 Yokoyama, interview, 1 Aug. 1962. Prior to 9 March 1945, Yokoyama spent most of his time in Saigon, though the head office of the Japanese Cultural Center was located in Hanoi; Maruyama, Shizuo, Ushinawaretaru Kiroku: Taika Nampo Seiryakushi [The Lost Records: Secret History of the Political Maneuvering towards China and the Southern Region] (Tokyo: Koraku Shobo, 1950). Tsuchihashi recalls that the majority of those in the new government posts were very inexperienced, “ubu”; Yuki Tsuchihashi, “Dai Sanju Hachigun Kiroku”[Records of the 38th Army] (A Memoir-type monograph, 1962), p. 111. McAlister considers that they had internal experiences in “elite” politics but lacked in grass-root political experience, which gave further impetus for the Viet Minh to expand; , McAlister, Vietnam, p. 77.
61 , Smith, “The Japanese Period”, pp. 290–91.
62 Yokoyama, interview, 1 Aug. 1962. Maeda similarly recalls that agricultural production and factories ceased to operate and schools were closed (interview, 18 Sept. 1962). Note that the Japanese continued to use various names to designate Indochina, such as Annan (Annam), Etsunan (Vietnam), Futsuin (French Indochina), Indoshina (Indochina), and Betonamu (Vietnam).
63 Tsukamoto, interview, 11 July 1962; Yokoyama, interview, I Aug. 1962.
64 , Maruyama, Ushinawaretaru Kiroku, p. 313.
65 Yokoyama, interview, 1 Aug. 1962.
66 , Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho, p. 683.
67 Tsuchihashi's Memoir quoted in , Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho, p. 683; for the details of the period after 9 March 1945, see Nitz, “Meigo Sakusen”, or Smith, “The Japanese Period”.
68 , Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho, p. 682. The three cities reverted to Vietnam on 20 July. Tran Van Lai, the new mayor of Hanoi, immediately threw out French officials, changed street names to Vietnamese and knocked down French statues in the city.
69 “Futusin Shinchu Nippongun Shireikan Fukoku” [Declaration of the Commander of the Japanese Expeditionary Force in French Indochina], 12 Mar. 1945; IMTFE, E 554, Proclamation no. 11.
70 “A Draft of Communique of the Imperial Government to be Issued in the Event French Indochina Refuses Our Demands”, TheSupreme War Leadership Conference Report no. 12, 1 Mar. 1945. Tsuchihashi prepared rough outlines based on this and ordered his staff to prepare translated texts. At one point he suggested Diem as a possible translator, but Diem refused. Tsuchihashi did not know who eventually prepared the translated proclamations issued in his name.
71 IMTFE, E664, Proclamation no. 10.
72 Supreme War'Leadership Conference Decision, 26 Feb. 1945.
73 , Tsuchihashi, “Memoir”, pp. 30–33.
74 Tsuchihashi, interview, 3 Aug. 1962; Tsukamoto, interview, 11 July 1962; Tsukamoto's statement in Kokumin Gaikokai, ed., “Indoshina Sangoku Dokuritsu no Hiwa” [Secret Stories behind the Independence of the Three Indochinese States], mimeo., unpublished proceedings of a meeting to commemorate 9 March 1945, attended by 21 participants, held on 9 March 1955, pp. 59-60.
75 Seigo Kaneko, “Annam Himitsu Butai: Annam Dokuritsu ni Karamaru Yasutai no Anryaku”[Annam Secret Unit: The Secret Maneuvers of the Yasutai in the Process of Independence of Annam], Shukan Yomiuri, a special edition: “Nippon Himitsu Sen” [Japan's Secret Wars], 8 Dec. 1957, p. 161.
76 Mikuni, “Komatsusan”; Mikuni, interview, 14 Sept. 1962; Chikamitsu Oshima, “Etsumei to Etsunan Minshu” [The Viet Minh and the Vietnamese People], The Sugamo (Prison) Weekly News 112 (5 Aug. 1950), p. 1.
77 Mikuni, “Komatsusan”; Komatsu, Kiyoshi, Betonamu no Chi [The Blood of Vietnam] (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1954), pp. 11–12. According to Komatsu, the group was guarded by several volunteer soldiers who were then called “kaizoku” [pirates].
78 , Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho, pp. 684–85.
79 Manaki, interview, 19 June 1962.
80 Nishikawa, “Koga Hijo”. He is said to have contacted Vo Nguyen Giap at least twice prior to his death.
81 Oshima, interview, 9 Sept. 1962.
82 Oshima, “Betonamu no Aikokusha”; Oshima, interview, 9 Sept. 1962. According to Oshima, the Japanese Kempei (military police) were essentially “sakusen” (operational) kempei and different from European military police such as the French one. Thus, political affairs were important only so far as they affected the smooth working of military operations, and not an end in themself. But the kempeitai engaged in extensive information gathering activities in northern mountain regions, including the Thai Nguyen area, using Japanese firms and Chinese gambling houses.
83 Chikamitsu, Ooshima, “Vietnam and Vietnamese People, part 3”, Sugamo Weekly News 114 (19 08 1950), p. 3.
84 Oshima, interview, 9 Sept. 1962; Minoda, interview, 16 Sept. 1962. However, a report prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Gaiko Binran”, suggests that the Japanese assisted the Cao Daists. A different view is presented by McAlister. According to him, the Japanese maintained close contact with the Cao Dai and the Hoa Hao through Mitsuhiro Matsushita, President of the Dainan Koshi, a Japanese trading firm in Vietnam ( , McAlister, Vietnam, p. 80). Minoda did not believe that Matsushita could have particularly favored these sects. But a number of persons I interviewed agreed that Matsushita could possibly have made use of these sects, acting according to his own plans. Post-World War II Japanese Foreign Ministry publications imply close Japanese ties with both the Cao Dai and'the Phuc Quoc group. Tsukamoto, interview, 11 July 1962; Oomiya, interview, 11 Nov. 1962.
85 , Maruyama, Ushinawaretaru Kiroku, p. 302; Tsuchihashi, interview, 3 Aug. 1962. The existence of different Japanese special agencies in French Indochina is not clearly documented except in the case of the Yasutai. Tsuchihashi denied any knowledge of its existence. He stated that ifsuch an agency existed, it must have been organized by his staff but without his authorization. For the organization and activities of the Yasutai, read Kaneko, “Yasutai”.
86 , Kaneko, “Yasutai”, p. 263; also quoted in , Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho, p. 636.
87 Matsumoto, interview, 26 Aug. 1962.
88 Some consider that the Foreign Ministry had its own very strong policy in support of the independence movement (Memoir of Colonel Tanemura, former staff officer, Imperial Headquarters, quoted in , Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho, p. 582).
89 , Oomiya's statement in Gaikokai, Kokumin, ed., “Dokuritsu no Hiwa”, p. 52.
90 Nishikawa, “Koga Hijo”.
91 Asahi Shimbun, 6 Nov. 1963.
92 Oomiya, interview, 24 Oct. and 11 Nov. 1962.
93 Nasu, “Komatsu Kiyoshi”.
94 Mikuni, “Futsuin no Komatsusan”. Komatsu recollected his activities in his Betonamu no Chi.
95 Maeda, interview, 18 Sept. 1945. Jt seems that Bao Dai himself had expected to be replaced by Cuong De (Le Monde, 20 Feb. 1948, quoted in , Hammer, Struggle, p. 47).
96 General Matsui was the President of the Dai Ajia Kyokai [The Greater Asia Society], which advocated the unity of Asian nations for expelling foreign powers out of Asia, in addition to studying politics, culture, economics and other subjects on Asia. The Society received financial assistance from the Mitsubishi and Mitsui Cartels (“Dai Ajia Kyokai o Kataru”, p. 13). Cuong De's earlier supporters included Inukai. Tran Trong Kim's memoir recalls 1943 as the date of General Matsu's visit to Saigon, while this article states that the visit took place in 1944.
97 , Matsushita's statement in Gaikokai, Kokumin, ed., “Dokuritsu no Hiwa”, pp. 44–45.
98 Kaneko, , “Yasutai”, p. 162.
99 Oomiya, interview, 24 Oct. and 11 Nov. 1962.
100 , Tsuchihashi, Memoir, pp. 51–53. Ambassador Matsumoto met Diem once, but he did not think very highly of Diem (Matsumoto, interview, 26 Aug. 1962).
101 , Tsuchihashi, Memoir, p. 43. Some argue that this selection of Bao Dai over Cuong De alienated many Vietnamese nationalists loyal to the Japanese. Ngo Dinh Diem did not accept any government posts because Cuong De did not come back to the throne. (Tsukamoto, interview, 11 July 1962.) Some others maintain that the Japanese Army intercepted Bao Dai's letter inviting Diem to be Prime Minister. Smith reports that Hayashi, a kempei, who then was responsible for the protection of Diem, told him that Diem received such a letter ( , Smith, “The Japanese Period”, p. 288).
102 , Tsuchihashi, “Memoir”, pp. 43–48; Tsuchihashi, interview, 3 Aug. 1962. This intention of later receiving Cuong De in Vietnam is also mentioned in , Ooya, Kiiroi Kakumei, p. 226.
103 , Tsuchihashi, “Memoir”, p. 43; Manaki, interview, 19 June 1962. Tominaga also refers to a planned return of Cuong De to Vietnam at the end of July; Tominaya, Toyofumi, “Ocho Ruten” [The Wandering Dynasty], in Hiroku Daitoa Senshi, ed. Ikeda, Yu (Tokyo: Fuji-Shoen, 1949), 3: 159.
104 They were aware that the U.S. landing was unlikely after their landing in Okinawa and that these fortresses would be useless in case of massive attacks by the Indian, British, and U.S. troops, but Tsuchihashi considered that these measures might buy time ( , Senshishitsu, Senshi Sosho, pp. 670–71).
105 , Hattori, Daitoa Senso Zenshi, p. 1007. The Dai Sanju Hachigun Kiroku, however, suggests a figure of 82, 130 (p. 73).
106 Ishida, interview, 30 Aug. 1962.
107 Marr, David G., Vietnamese Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), pp. 368–69. According to Komatsu, this was due to Ho's personal efforts to persuade the Vietnamese not to regard the Japanese as enemy and also his own effort in persuading Japanese military commanders not to use arms; , Komatsu, Betonamu no Chi, p. 16.
108 Patti gives the date as 2 Sept. ( , Patti, Why Viet Nam?, p. 260).
109 Oshima, interview, 9 Sept. 1962; Oshima, Chikamitsu, “Sei to Shi no Aida”(unpublished diary), vol. 1.
110 Manaki, interview, 19 June 1962; Hayashi, , et. al., ed., Nihon Shusenshi [History of Termination of the War] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1962), vol. 1, pp. 125–26;, Hammer, Struggle, pp. 113–14;Rosie, George, The British in Vietnam (London: Panther Books, 1970).
111 , Ooya, Kiiroi Kakumei, P. 233; Hayashi, , et. al., Shusenshi, pp. 121–23.
112 Nonami, interview, II July and 28 July 1962.
113 Fujita, interview, 30 Aug. 1962.
114 , Komatsu, Betonamu no Chi, pp. 8–9;, Nasu, “Komatsu Kiyoshi”, p. 48.
115 , Nasu, “Komatsu Kiyoshi”, p. 49; Oomiya, interview, 24 Oct. 1962. This relationship is not mentioned in most publications. However, a recent work by Patti suggests such a close contact between these groups: “During my weeks in Hanoi I was interested to observe Solosieff in the company, variously, of Japanese officials, influential French, Viet Minh leaders, and prominent Chinese. His was the only visible Soviet presence at the time, and he kept his role very low key.” ( , Patti, Why Viet Nam?, p. 181.)
116 , Nasu, “Komatsu Kiyoshi”, p. 49; Oomiya, interview 24 Oct. 1961.
Email your librarian or administrator to recommend adding this journal to your organisation's collection.
* Views captured on Cambridge Core between <date>. This data will be updated every 24 hours.
Usage data cannot currently be displayed