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The Experience Machine Objection to Desire Satisfactionism

  • DAN LOWE (a1) and JOSEPH STENBERG (a2)
Abstract:

It is widely held that the experience machine is the basis of a serious objection to hedonistic theories of welfare. It is also widely held that desire satisfactionist theories of welfare can readily avoid problems stemming from the experience machine. But in this paper, we argue that if the experience machine poses a serious problem for hedonism, it also poses a serious problem for desire satisfactionism. We raise two objections to desire satisfactionism, each of which relies on the experience machine. The first is very much like the well-known experience machine objection to hedonism. The second asks whether someone who accepts desire satisfactionism should want to form a desire to plug into the experience machine.

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Journal of the American Philosophical Association
  • ISSN: 2053-4477
  • EISSN: 2053-4485
  • URL: /core/journals/journal-of-the-american-philosophical-association
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