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On the Limits of the Method of Phenomenal Contrast

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 December 2017

MARTINA FÜRST
MARTINA FÜRST*
Affiliation:
UNIVERSITY OF GRAZmartina.fuerst@uni-graz.at
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Abstract:

The method of phenomenal contrast aims to shed light on the phenomenal character of perceptual and cognitive experiences. Within the debate about cognitive phenomenology, phenomenal contrast arguments can be divided into two kinds. First, arguments based on actual cases that aim to provide the reader with a first-person experience of phenomenal contrast. Second, arguments that involve hypothetical cases and focus on the conceivability of contrast scenarios. Notably, in the light of these contrast cases, proponents and skeptics of cognitive phenomenology remain steadfast in their views. I provide an explanation of the method's dialectical ineffectiveness by focusing on first-person performances of phenomenal contrast tasks. In particular, I argue that introspective judgments about phenomenology are regimented by the view initially held. Understanding the underlying mechanisms responsible for the dialectical standoff in the face of phenomenal contrast cases casts light on introspection-based arguments for phenomenology in general.

Keywords

cognitive phenomenologysensory phenomenologyphenomenal contrastintrospection
Type
Articles
Information
Journal of the American Philosophical Association , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , Summer 2017 , pp. 168 - 188
Copyright
Copyright © American Philosophical Association 2017 

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