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Third Wave Shiʻism: Sayyid ‘Arif Husain al-Husaini and the Islamic Revolution in Pakistan1


This paper seeks to illuminate the intellectual impact of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 among Pakistani Shiʻas by focusing on Sayyid ʻArif Husain al-Husaini, the dominating Shiʻi leader of the 1980s. In particular, I am interested in exploring how al-Husaini adapted hallmark themes of the Iranian revolutionary message, such as Muslim unity or political leadership of the religious scholars (ʻulama), to the specific circumstances of Pakistan. Crucial for such processes of translation was not only pressure from the Pakistani state but rather internal challenges and divisions among the Shiʻi community. While al-Husaini could draw on a strong, indigenous tradition of political mobilisation, his revolutionary ʻthird waveʼ of Shiʻi thought sat uncomfortably between Lucknow-educated traditionalists and Najaf-trained reformers who shied away from getting entangled in these novel forms of politics. By drawing on biographical accounts and al-Husaini's speeches in Urdu, I trace how his revolutionary rhetoric had to accommodate thorny local issues such as sectarianism, South Asian mourning traditions or the lack of an established Shiʻi clerical hierarchy in Pakistan.

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The author would like to thank Ali Usman Qasmi, Justin Jones, Mirjam Künkler, Christophe Jaffrelot, Andreas Rieck, Mariam Abou Zahab, Laurence Louër, Muhammad Qasim Zaman and the anonymous reviewers of the JRAS for their extremely valuable feedback on earlier versions of this article.

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2 This article is only concerned with Twelver Shi‘as (ithna ‘ashariyya). For the Isma‘ili minority, see Holzwarth, W., Die Ismailiten in Nordpakistan: Zur Entwicklung einer religiösen Minderheit im Kontext neuer Außenbeziehungen (Berlin, 1994), and Marsden, M., Living Islam: Muslim Religious Experience in Pakistan's North-West Frontier (Cambridge, 2005), pp. 193238.

3 Nasr, V., “The Iranian Revolution and changes in Islamism in Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan”, in Iran and the Surrounding World. Interactions in Culture and Cultural Politics, (eds.) Keddie, N. R. and Matthee, R. P. (Seattle, 2002), p. 334.

4 For a detailed listing of deaths related to sectarian violence in this time period, see Kamran, T., “Contextualizing sectarian militancy in Pakistan: A case study of Jhang”, Journal of Islamic Studies, XX, 1 (2009), pp. 8182. For a recent, excellent discussion on late colonial manifestations of sectarianism that also points to the importance of internal debates within the Shi‘i community, see Jones, J., Shiʻa Islam in Colonial India. Religion, Community and Sectarianism (Cambridge, 2011), pp. 186238.

5 It is not my intention in this paper to evaluate the sincerity of these measures. For a critique of them as an “Islamically legitimised politics of state penetration”, see Malik, J., Colonialization of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan (New Delhi, 1996), pp. 340341.

6 F. Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan (New York, 2009), pp. 105–108.

7 Nasr, V., “The rise of Sunni militancy in Pakistan: The changing role of Islamism and the Ulama in society and politics”, Modern Asian Studies, XXXIV, 1 (2000), pp. 144145.

8 Ẓahīr, I. I., Al-Shīʿa wa-l-Sunna (Lahore, 2008), p. 184. Zahir himself was assassinated in 1987. See Abou Zahab, M., “The SSP: Herald of militant Sunni Islam in Pakistan”, in Armed Militias of South Asia. Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists, (eds,) Gayer, L. and Jaffrelot, C. (New York, 2009), pp. 167168.

9 Zaman, M. Q., “Sectarianism in Pakistan: The radicalization of Shi‘i and Sunni identities”, Modern Asian Studies, XXXII, 3 (1998), pp. 709713. Kamran argues that sectarianism was used by influential rural families as an extension of intra-biradari [kinship group] politics (Kamran, “Contextualizing sectarian militancy”, pp. 62–65). See also Abou Zahab, M., “The Sunni–Shia conflict in Jhang (Pakistan)”, in Lived Islam in South Asia: Adaptation, Accommodation and Conflict, (eds.) Ahmad, I. and Reifeld, H. (New Delhi, 2004), pp. 135148. See for a discussion that questions the decisiveness of Saudi influence on sectarian thought in Pakistan but instead emphasizes how local Deobandi scholars creatively drew on South Asian intellectual traditions in order to counter the political threat which in their view Shi‘i Islam constituted after the Iranian revolution, my paper, “Abū Muʿāwiya's Longings for the State. The dialectics of the local and the transnational in Shīʿī-Sunnī sectarianism”, presented at the workshop ‘Center and Periphery in the Muslim World: De-Centering Traditional Religious Authority’, The Center for the Study of Contemporary Muslims Societies, Qatar Faculty of Islamic Studies, Doha, Qatar, 31 March - 01 April 2014.

10 Ahmed, M., “Shi‘i political activism in Pakistan”, Studies in Contemporary Islam, 5, 1–2 (2003), p. 64. For a similar statement, see Roy, O., “The impact of the Iranian Revolution on the Middle East”, in The Shiʿa Worlds and Iran, (ed.) Mervin, S. (London, 2010), pp. 35–36, and also Syed, A. H., “The Sunni–Shia conflict in Pakistan”, in Pakistan. Founder's Aspirations and Today's Realities, (ed.) Malik, H. (Karachi, 2001), p. 255.

11 Mervin, S., “Introduction”, in The Shiʿa Worlds and Iran, (ed.) Mervin, S., p. 17.

12 Abou Zahab, M., “The politicization of the Shia community in Pakistan in the 1970s and 1980s”, in The other Shiites. From the Mediterranean to Central Asia, (eds.) Monsutti, A., Naef, S. and Sabahi, F. (Bern, 2007), pp. 100101.

13 See below for a discussion of the different camps to which Shi‘i scholars belonged.

14 The term ja‘fari relates to the sixth Shi‘i Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq (d. 765) who outlined the broad strokes of Shi‘i theories on the Imamate. Ja‘fari became increasingly used during the twentieth century in the context of energetic efforts to recast Shi‘ism as a fifth school of law (madhhab) along with the four established Sunni schools, culminating in an interview (and later fatwa) given by the Shaikh al-Azhar Mahmud Shaltut in 1959. Shaltut went as far as declaring that Muslims are free to attach themselves to any of the five schools. See Brunner, R., Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Century: the Azhar and Shiism between Rapprochement and Restraint (Brill, 1996), pp. 289293.

15 See A. Rieck, The Shias of Pakistan. An Assertive and Beleaguered Minority (forthcoming), p. 249. I am grateful to Dr Andreas Rieck for sharing several chapters of his yet unpublished book with me. Please note that the page numbers of the final printed version will most likely differ from this manuscript. Ahmed goes even further than Rieck when claiming that “probably single-handedly, ‘Arif al-Hussaini internationalised Pakistan's Shi‘i clergy” (Ahmed, “Political activism”, p. 66).

16 This is of course a rather problematic term and reflects first of all Iranian views on the “extreme (ifrati)” forms of traditional Shi‘i ritual in Pakistan. See D. Nu‘aimiyan, Bāztāb-i inqilāb dar Pākistān. Markaz-i Isnād-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī: (accessed 1 June 2012).

17 Unfortunately, Abou Zahab only provides some examples of how Iranian slogans in the vein of Kull yaum ‘Ashura, kull ard Karbala [Every day is ‘Ashura, every piece of land is Karbala] were gaining prominence at Shi‘i gatherings. See Abou Zahab, “The politicization”, pp. 108–109.

18 M. Nuṣūḥiyān, Shīʿiyān-i Pākistān va Inqilāb-i Islāmī-yi Īrān. See Markaz-i Isnād-i Inqilāb-i Islāmī, (accessed 1 June 2012).

19 None of his biographers discuss whether his sayyid pedigree facilitated his career. His family traces their lineage back to a grandchild of al-Husain (d. 680), Husain al-Asghar, son of Zain al-‘Abidin (d. 713).

20 T. R. Khān, Zindaḡināmah-i ʻallāmah shahīd ʻĀrif Ḥusain al-Ḥusainī az vilādat tā shahādat (Qom, 1990), p. 155. Al-Husaini refers to him as his main teacher. See al-Ḥusainī, Guftār-i ṣidq, pp. 107–108. For full biographical references of all literature on al-Husaini, see footnote 32.

21 On his life and influence in the Iraqi context and beyond, see Mallat, C., The Renewal of Islamic Law: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf and the Shi‘i International (Cambridge, 1995).

22 Khan singles him out as the only Pakistani student to do so. See Khān, Safīr-i nūr, p. 41. See also Ṣādiqī, S. G. H., “ʿAllāmah Sayyid ʿArif Ḥusain Ḥusainī”, in Satārgān-i Ḥaram, (eds.) Gurūhī āz nivīsandigān-i farhang-i kausar (Qom, 2004), p. 84.

23 For the former view, see Zaman, “Sectarianism”, p. 695; for the latter, Abou Zahab, “The politicization”, p. 105.

24 Khān, Safīr-i Nūr, p. 43.

25 Naqvī, Taẕkira, p. 156.

26 Abou Zahab, “The politicization”, p. 106.

27 Khān, Zindagīnāmah, p. 27.

28 Ibid., p. 28.

29 Rieck, The Shias of Pakistan, pp. 250–251.

30 Naqvi, S. H. A., “The controversy about the Shaykhiyya tendency among Shia ʿUlamāʾ in Pakistan”, in The Twelver Shia in Modern Times. Religious Culture & Political History, (eds.) Brunner, R. and Ende, W. (Leiden, 2001), pp. 135149. Andreas Rieck in his excellent study mainly discusses the rise of al-Husaini to the leadership and his confrontational relationship with the government. See Rieck, The Shias of Pakistan, pp. 247–259.

31 Al-Husaini himself referred to a treatise he planned to write in order to counter allegations that Shi‘as believe in the corruption of the Qurʼanic text (tahrif) but had to delegate these plans because of his busy schedule. See Sayyid ʿĀrif Ḥusain al-Ḥusainī, Misāq-i khūn. Avāʾil-i qiyādat aur ḥawzah-i ʿilmiyya ke mutaʿaliq shahīd qāʾid ke khibāt (Lahore, 1997), p. 165. There are no written works by al-Husaini referenced in Naqvī, Sayyid Ḥusain ʿĀrif's biographical dictionary Taẕkirah-i ʿulamāʾ-i imāmiyah-i Pākistān (Mashhad, 1991). The bibliographical collection of Shi‘i Urdu texts by the same author, Barr-i ṣaghīr ke imāmiyah mụsannifīn kī matūʿah tạsānīf aur tarājim (Islamabad, 1997), likewise only lists a couple of short pamphlets written on the life of Sayyid ‘Arif Husain al-Husaini (see vol. 1, p. 484, and vol. 2, pp. 453, 512).

32 Besides Misāq-i khūn, I am drawing on Guftār-i ṣidq. Maʿārif-i Qurʾān ō taʿlīmāt-i ahl-i bait shahīd-i maẓlūm ke khibāt (Lahore, 1996), Sukhan-i ʿishq. Majālis-i ʿazā sayyid al-shuhadāʾ (Lahore, 1996), Uslūb-i siyāsat. Islām-i Muḥammad ke ijrāʾ aur ʿālamī umūr par qāʾid shahīd ke khibāt (Lahore, 2007), as well as Sayyid Niār ʿAlī al-Ḥusainī al-Tirmiẕī, Naqīb-i vaḥdat. ʿAllāmah ʿĀrif Ḥusain al-Ḥusainī (Islamabad, 2011).

33 See, for example, Misāq-i khūn, pp. 65–72, 110–118 and 142–148.

34 Khān, T. R., Safīr-i nūr (Lahore, 1998) and Zindagīnāmah-i ʿallāmah shahīd ʿĀrif Ḥusain al-Ḥusainī az vilādat tā shahādat (Qom, 1990). This academy does not seem to be active beyond compiling al-Husaini's speeches.

35 See, for example, in the context of Norton, Lebanon A. R., Amal and the Shiʻa (Austin, 1987), pp. 1336.

36 ʿĀrifī, M. A., “Shīʿiyān-i Pākistān”, Faṣlnāmah-i takhaṣṣuṣī-yi Shīʿahshināsī, I, 3–4 (2003), p. 209.

37 Abou Zahab, “The politicization”, p. 97. For a similar view, see also Ahmed, M. D., “The Shi‘is of Pakistan”, in Shi‘ism, Resistance, and Revolution, (ed.) Kramer, M. (Boulder, 1987), pp. 280281.

38 Zahab, M. Abou, “The regional dimension of sectarian conflicts in Pakistan”, in Pakistan, Nationalism without a Nation, (ed.) Jaffrelot, C. (London, 2002), p. 116.

39 On his biography, see Naqvī, Taẕkirah, pp. 254–256. Being a prolific writer and gifted orator, Dihlavi was referred to as the “greatest preacher” (khatib-i a‘zam) in the Shi‘i community.

40 Rieck, A., “The struggle for equal rights as a minority: Shia communal organizations in Pakistan, 1948–1968”, in The Twelver Shia, (eds.) Brunner, R. and Ende, W., pp. 278280.

41 These rights were conceded gradually by the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, only to be revoked again under Zia ul-Haq in 1978. See ibid., pp. 282–283.

42 Ibid., p. 283.

43 See, for example, ʿĀrifī, M. A., Junbish-i islāmī-yi Pākistān: Barrasī-yi avāmil-i nākāmī dar ījād-i niẓām-i islāmī (Qom, 2003), p. 120.

44 Such a claim might be especially problematic when intended to cover the whole of Pakistan. Andreas Rieck has shown elsewhere that “the lack of a meaningful political representation of the Northern Areas people, both under British and Dogra rule and ever since their accession to Pakistan, (. . .) has helped the Shiʿa ulamāʾ a lot to win positions of influence within the local society, apparently unmatched in any other part of Pakistan”. See Rieck, A., “A stronghold of Shi‘a orthodoxy in Northern Pakistan”, in Islamstudien ohne Ende. Festschrift für Werner Ende zum 65. Geburtstag, (eds.) Brunner, al (Würzburg, 2002), p. 402.

45 Ja‘far Husain was born in Gujranwala in 1916 and studied in both Lucknow and Najaf before embarking on a teaching career in Pakistan. In 1949, he was chosen as a member of the Board of Islamic Education and served two terms under Ayub Khan on the Council of Islamic Ideology (see Naqvī, Taẕkirah, pp. 70–72).

46 Zaman, “Sectarianism”, p. 396.

47 Nasr, “Iranian Revolution”, p. 88. Not all authors regard Iran's involvement as decisive. See Haydar, A., “The politicization of the Shias and the development of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria in Pakistan”, in Pakistan, 1992, (ed.) Kennedy, C. H. (Westview, 1992), p. 81, and Tirmazi, S. A., Profiles of Intelligence (Lahore, 1995), p. 272.

48 Shi‘i leaders repeatedly referred to this success: see Rikār (1985).

49 Naqvi, “The controversy”, p. 140. For a recent endorsement of Naqvi's portrayal of Lucknow, see ʿĀrifī, Muḥammad Akram, Shīʿiiyān-i Pākistān (Qom, 2007). It is important to note that shaikhi can easily be (mis)used as a derogatory phrase to slander opponents who are more inclined to the inherent esoteric potentials of Shi‘ism and should thus be viewed with caution. The Indian mujtahid Sayyid ‘Ali Naqi Naqvi (d. 1988), writing about the Shaikhi school in 1934, remarks that they had only a very marginal influence in northern India. See ‘Naqvī, Alī Naqī, Bāb ō maẕhab-i Bahāʾī (Lucknow, 1934), pp. 128129.

50 Rieck, “A Stronghold”, p. 390.

51 Naqvi, “The controversy”, p. 135.

52 On this feature of Shi‘ism see also S. Mervin, “Transnational intellectual debates”, in The Shiʿa Worlds, (ed.) Mervin, pp. 321–346.

53 Rieck, “A stronghold”, pp. 292–294. It was only after the Iranian revolution that Qom and Mashhad fully replaced the Iraqi centres of learning.

54 For a list of his teachers, see Naqvī, Taẕkirah, p. 295.

55 See Kāẓmī, Sayyid Muḥammad Saqlain, Imāmiyah dīnī madāris-i Pākistān (Lahore, 2007), pp. 185187.

56 Naqvi, “The controversy”, p. 141.

57 For a discussion of this work, see Fyzee, A. A. A.The creed of Ibn Bābawayhi”, Journal of Bombay University, XII (1943), pp. 7086.

58 Denoting “exaggerated”, extremist Shi‘i beliefs.

59 Rieck, The Shias of Pakistan, p. 148.

60 Ansari was born in 1901 in the North Indian city of Shikarpur and combined a religious education with a secular college degree in Comparative Science of Religion. He became a Shi‘i missionary (muballigh) in Pakistan and is credited with large-scale conversions during public debates (munazarat) with Sunni opponents. Naqvi regards him as one of the most important propagandists of the shaikhiyya in Pakistan (Naqvī, Taẕkirah, pp. 276–279).

61 He became known as muballigh-i a‘ẓam [the greatest Shi‘i missionary] and allegedly revealed his shaikhi leanings only rather late in life (Naqvī, Taẕkirah, pp. 260–264).

62 Rieck, The Shias of Pakistan, p. 150.

63 Naqvi, “The controversy”, p. 142.

64 Rieck, The Shias of Pakistan, p. 152.

65 Naqvi, “The controversy” p. 143.

66 Rieck, The Shias of Pakistan, p. 198.

67 Naqvi, “The controversy”, p. 146.

68 Rieck, The Shias of Pakistan, p. 204.

69 See Rikār IL, 25 (1 July 1985) for an extensive discussion of this agreement.

70 Naqvi, “The controversy”, p. 147. Al-Ḥusainī, Misāq-i khūn, pp. 206–207.

71 See, for example, ibid., p. 199.

72 For a sample of his extensive travelling schedule in 1986, see Naqvī, Taẕkirah, pp. 159–160.

73 The prisoners were finally released in late April 1986. See Rikār, L, 17 (1 May 1986).

74 Zaman, “Sectarianism”, p. 696.

75 Rieck, The Shias of Pakistan, p. 259. Whereas Rieck holds that the murder was carried out by circles tied to Zia ul-Haq, others have blamed Iraq and Saudi Arabia (Khān, Zindagīnāmah, pp. 91–93).

76 Buchta, W., Die iranische Schia und die islamische Einheit: 1979–1996 (Hamburg, 1997), pp. 64—77.

77 Al-Husaini at one point approached his fellow Pashtu speaker Maulana Fazl ur-Rahman of the Jami‘at-i ‘Ulama-i Islam with the suggestion of forming a united party to advocate the Islamic revolution. At a discussion forum, organised by the newspaper Jang, the TNFJ representative yielded his time to no one less than Ihsan Ilahi Zahir to continue his critique of the government's proposed Shari‘at Bill (Al-Tirmiẕī, Naqīb-i vaḥdat, pp. 39–41).

78 Khān, Zindagīnāmah, p. 102.

79 See, for example, al-Ḥusainī, Uslūb-i siyāsat, p. 27.

80 See Brunner, Islamic Ecumenism, p. 237. This saying is missing in all major Sunni hadith collections but is widely cited in authoritative Shi‘i sources.

81 Al-Ḥusainī, Uslūb-i siyāsat, p. 25 and Guftār-i ṣidq, pp. 30–31, 81. See also Lodhi, M., “Pakistan's Shia movement: An interview with Arif Hussaini”, Third World Quarterly, X, 2 (1988), p. 813.

82 Al-Ḥusainī, Guftār-i ṣidq, p. 52 and idem., Uslūb-i siyāsat, p. 33.

83 Khān, Zindagīnamāh, p 110.

84 Al-Tirmiẕī, Naqīb-i vaḥdat, p. 80.

85 Al-Ḥusainī, Uslūb-i siyāsat, p. 80.

86 Ibid., p. 60.

87 Buchta, Die iranische Schia, p. 101.

88 Al-Tirmiẕī, Naqīb-i vaḥdat, p. 19.

89 Amirpur, K., “A doctrine in the making? Velayat-e Faqih in post-revolutionary Iran”, in Speaking for Islam. Religious authorities in Muslim societies, (eds.) Krämer, G. and Schmidtke, S. (Leiden, 2006), pp. 229230, and W. Buchta, “Tehran's ecumenical society (Majmaʿ al-Taqrīb): A veritable ecumenical revival or a Trojan horse of Iran?”, in The Twelver Shia, eds. Brunner and Ende, pp. 334–335. See also Calder, N., “Accommodation and revolution in Imami Shi’i Jurisprudence: Khumayni and the classical tradition”, in Shi’ism, State and Government, (eds.) Luft, P. and Turner, C. (London, 2008), pp. 5354.

90 Al-Ḥusainī, Guftār-i ṣidq, pp. 73, 120–122.

91 Khān, Zindagīnamāh, p. 169.

92 Ibid., pp. 156, 171.

93 Ibid., p. 158.

94 Al-Ḥusainī, Sukhn-i ʿishq, p. 71.

95 Khomeini was inter alia addressed as the Destroyer of Unbelief (kufr shikan), the Pounder of East and West (kubandah-i sharq o gharb) and the Heir of ʿAli (varis-i ‘Ali). See al-Ḥusainī, Misāq-i khūn, p. 39

96 Khān, Zindagīnamāh, pp. 123, 129.

97 Lodhi, “Pakistan's Shi‘a movement”, pp. 810–811.

98 Al-Ḥusainī, Uslūb-i siyāsat, pp. 127–128.

99 See Roy, “The Impact”, p. 35.

100 Abou Zahab, “Regional Dimensions”, p. 116.

101 Al-Ḥusainī, Guftār-i ṣidq, pp. 34, 43, 49, 191, 237, 247.

102 Ibid., pp. 39–40, 110.

103 ‘Awakening’ in this context is contrasted with the ‘traditional’ view which regarded political activism as running counter to the prescribed reliance on God's provision (taqwa). See Khān, Zindagīnāmah, pp. 32–33.

104 Naqvī, Taẕkirah, pp. 158–159.

105 Khān, Zindagīnamāh, p 103.

106 Ibid., p. 172.

107 Ibid., p. 146.

108 Ibid., p. 107, and al-Ḥusainī, Guftār-i ṣidq, p. 138.

109 Al-Ḥusainī, Uslūb-i siyāsat, pp. 64–65.

110 Ibid.; al-Ḥusainī, Guftār-i ṣidq, p. 137.

111 Idem, Uslūb-i siyāsat, pp. 63–64. See also Lodhi, “Pakistan's Shi‘a movement”, p. 808.

112 Al-Ḥusainī, Guftār-i ṣidq, pp. 81–82, and al-Tirmiẕī, Naqīb-i vaḥdat, pp. 86–87.

113 Al-Ḥusainī, Guftār-i ṣidq, p. 61, and Khān, Zindagīnamāh, 1990, p. 147.

114 Al-Ḥusainī, Misāq-i khūn, p. 191.

115 Idem, Uslūb-i siyāsat, p. 69.

116 Al-Tirmiẕī, Naqīb-i vaḥdat, p. 89.

117 Zamir, Syed Rizwan, ʿAlī Naqvī and his Thought (Unpublished PhD Thesis, Institute of Religious Studies, University of Virginia, 2011), p. 181. For the controversies surrounding this book, see also Hyder, Syed Akbar, Reliving Karbala. Martyrdom in South Asian Memory (New York, 2006), p. 102. See for a new reading of how ‘Ali Naqi Naqvi's reconceptualization of al-Husain pre-empted its later politicisation, Justin Jones, “Shi‘ism, Humanity and Revolution in Twentieth-Century India: Selfhood and Politics in the Husainology of ‘Ali Naqi Naqvi”, in this volume.

118 Al-Ḥusainī, Guftār-i ṣidq, p. 127.

119 Khān, Zindagīnamāh, p. 132.

120 Ibid., p. 128.

121 Menashri, D., Post-revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society, and Power (London, 2001), pp. 187188.

122 Ramazani, R., “Iran's export of the revolution: Politics, ends, and means”, in The Iranian Revolution. Its Global Impact, (ed.) Esposito, J. L. (Miami, 1990), pp. 7375.

123 With the exception of a Burgfrieden policy between 1983 and 1987. See Buchta, Die iranische Schia, pp. 84–85.

124 See Rieck, The Shias of Pakistan, p. 253.

125 Khān, Zindagīnamāh, pp. 120, 171.

126 Al-Ḥusainī, Guftār-i ṣidq, p. 200.

127 Ibid., p. 73, and Khān, Zindagīnamāh, pp. 169, 191.

128 Al-Ḥusainī, Guftār-i ṣidq, pp. 196–197. For a discussion of tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia in this regard, see Harrop, W. S., “Pakistan and revolutionary Iran: Adjusting to necessity”, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, XIII, 1–2 (1989), p. 120.

129 Al-Ḥusainī, Uslūb-i siyāsat, pp. 327–329.

130 Khān, Zindagīnamāh, p. 122.

131 Al-Ḥusainī, Guftār-i ṣidq, p. 50, and idem, Uslūb-i siyāsat, pp. 136, 318.

132 Ibid.; Al-Ḥusainī, Guftār-i ṣidq, p. 149.

133 Buchta, Die Iranische Schia, pp. 84–85.

134 Harrop, “Pakistan and revolutionary Iran”, p. 125.

135 Rieck, The Shias of Pakistan, p. 255. See also the coverage in Rikār, L, 2–3 (16 January 1986).

136 Scholars have made similar observations in the context of other countries such as Lebanon or the Gulf states. See, for example, Shaery-Eisenlohr, R., Shiʻite Lebanon. Transnational Religion and the Making of National Identities (New York, 2008), pp. 195210 and Laurence Louër, “The rise and fall of revolutionary utopias in the Gulf monarchies”, in The Shiʿa Worlds and Iran, (ed.) Mervin, pp. 84–87.

137 In the context of Afghanistan and its Hazara Shi‘a minority, Bindemann noticed a transformation during the 1980s. Authority shifted from the Sufi orders (tariqat), headed by a pir, to the ‘ulama and to a discourse more dominated by references to shari‘a than personal charisma. See R. Bindemann, Religion und Politik bei den schiitischen Haza in Afghanistan, Iran und Pakistan (Berlin, 1987), pp. 34–37.

138 Rieck, The Shias of Pakistan, p. 194. Vali Nasr writes that in the late 1980s South Asian Shi‘as referred to al-Khuʼi with the same lofty titles Iran used to address Khomeini. They regarded Khomeini only as a leader in political matters, whereas in religious questions they were followers of al-Khuʼi, who also received most of their khums. See Nasr, “The Iranian revolution”, p. 339.

139 Keddie, N. R., “Shīʿism and Change: Secularism and Myth”, in Shīʿite heritage. Essays on classical and modern traditions, (ed.) Clarke, L. (Binghamton, 2001), p. 400.

140 Pinault, D., Notes from the Fortune-Telling Parrot: Islam and the Struggle for Religious Pluralism in Pakistan (London, 2008), p. 79.

141 For an extensive discussion, see my paper, “Tapping sources: the marājiʿ and their followers in Pakistan”, presented at the workshop ‘Traditional Authority and Transnational Religious Networks in Contemporary Shi‘i Islamʼ, Keble College, Oxford, 7–9 January 2013. On Shariʻatmadari, see Abrahamian, E., Tortured Confessions: Prisons and Public Recantations in Modern Iran (Berkeley, 1999), pp. 157159.

1 The author would like to thank Ali Usman Qasmi, Justin Jones, Mirjam Künkler, Christophe Jaffrelot, Andreas Rieck, Mariam Abou Zahab, Laurence Louër, Muhammad Qasim Zaman and the anonymous reviewers of the JRAS for their extremely valuable feedback on earlier versions of this article.

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Total number of HTML views: 7
Total number of PDF views: 52 *
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Abstract views

Total abstract views: 604 *
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* Views captured on Cambridge Core between September 2016 - 26th May 2018. This data will be updated every 24 hours.