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Is Kant's Transcendental Deduction of the Categories Fit for Purpose?

  • Anil Gomes (a1)
Abstract

James Van Cleve has argued that Kant's transcendental deduction of the categories shows, at most, that we must apply the categories to experience. This falls short of Kant's aim, which is to show that they must so apply. In this discussion I argue that, once we have noted the differences between the first and second editions of the deduction, this objection is less telling. But Van Cleve's objection can help illuminate the structure of the B deduction, and it suggests an interesting reason why the rewriting might have been thought necessary.

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H. E. Allison (2000) ‘Where have all the categories gone? Reflections on Longuenesse's reading of Kant's Transcendental Deduction’, Inquiry, 43: 6780.

K. Ameriks (2003) ‘Recent work on Kant's theoretical philosophy’, reprinted in Interpreting Kant's Critiques (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Q. Cassam (1987) ‘Transcendental arguments, transcendental synthesis and transcendental idealism’, Philosophical Quarterly, 37: 355–78.

B. Longuenesse (2000) ‘Kant's categories and the capacity to judge: responses to Henry Allison and Sally Sedgwick’, Inquiry, 43: 91110.

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Kantian Review
  • ISSN: 1369-4154
  • EISSN: 2044-2394
  • URL: /core/journals/kantian-review
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