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Policy Gatekeepers in Latin American Legislatures

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Eduardo Alemán
Eduardo Alemán*
Affiliation:
University of Houston
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Abstract

Legislators who control the congressional agenda have a significant advantage over the membership at large. Policy gatekeepers can restrict change to outcomes they prefer over the status quo and can use this prerogative to keep a legislative party or coalition unified. This article examines agenda-setting rules in 26 Latin American chambers, shows why the institutional structure is theoretically relevant, and reveals some implications for policymaking with evidence from Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Majority leaders in the Argentine and Chilean lower chambers have successfully blocked passage of legislation opposed by most of their fellow partisans despite the lack of codified gatekeeping rights. Since 1997, none of the major Mexican parties has benefited from the gatekeeping rights established in the rules. Instead, the benefits have come from the parties' advantageous position with respect to the other parties on the steering committee setting the plenary agenda.

Type
Research Article
Information
Latin American Politics and Society , Volume 48 , Issue 3 , Autumn 2006 , pp. 125 - 155
Copyright
Copyright © University of Miami 2006

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