The function and effectiveness of legal rules as instruments of social organisation have become an important focus of attention for those interested in financial architecture. This paper offers a critical overview of the policy of rule use of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK and considers the background of this policy, its nature and some problems pertaining to its implementation. The aim is twofold: first, to describe how current policy trends interact with and shape the FSA's policy of rule use and, secondly, to assess the impact of these trends on the effectiveness of this policy. Special attention will be given to developments such as the policy of making more intensive use of rules termed in a high level of abstractness and generality, the fostering of a discursive and participatory character of regulation, the shift towards meta-regulation and the adoption of a risk-based approach to regulation.

There has been considerable debate about how it would be possible to move from cosmopolitan normative theory to cosmopolitan legal practice. These debates range from an uncertainty about what specific moral and normative principles should underwrite cosmopolitan law, to how those requirements should be institutionalised at the global level. In addition, many cosmopolitan theorists rest their more elaborate institutional models on the assumption of an already existing and thoroughgoing practice of cosmopolitan law, without detailed considerations regarding applied theory. The purpose of this paper is to examine the concept of cosmopolitan law and to argue how legal cosmopolitanism provides a necessary linchpin and transitional conduit between cosmopolitan theory and more institutionally based forms of cosmopolitanism. The paper examines the historical development of legal cosmopolitanism, the uniqueness of contemporary cosmopolitan legal theory within international legal debates, and maps the various approaches for moving cosmopolitan legal theory to legal practice. Through mapping the discipline, it is argued that Kantian legal cosmopolitanism represents the most coherent attempt to move from cosmopolitan legal theory to global institutional practice. This is due to the fact that it represents a minimal and moderate form of legal cosmopolitanism that accepts that any move to a cosmopolitan order would need to evolve from our current legal order. In this regard, it is argued that Kantian legal cosmopolitanism can occupy a transitional position, that not only satisfies the cosmopolitan concern for human worth, but that is also not guilty of being grossly utopian in its quest toward global justice.

The relationship between law and justice has long been a concern of legal theory, but the gap of uncertainty, or aporia, between them has been a particular focus of recent jurisprudence. Some theorists, such as Costas Douzinas and Ronnie Warrington, have focused on the cleavage between judgment and the aspiration to ethical justice to the Other, while others, such as Robert Cover, Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns, have worked on the gulf between law and justice in the face of violence and pain, within, caused by and before the law. This paper suggests that such theories are primarily concerned with problematised dislocation, as a critical technique and an observed state, which is also to be found in modernist fiction, especially in Joseph Conrad's Weltanschauung and literary style. It is argued that examining the disconnections that characterise Conrad's fiction, through engagement with his stories and secondary commentaries thereon, and combining that analysis with the study of dislocation in legal theory, permit the development of a richer picture of these shared concerns. On this basis, the paper constructs a distinct concept of ‘dislocation’ and suggests how it can supplement jurisprudential discussion.

The landscape of legal duties imposed on financial investment intermediaries is characterised by the imposition of regulatory duties as well as duties arising under general law, in the realms of fiduciary duties and duties of care and skill. This article examines the relationship between public regulation and general private law in providing legal principles governing the conduct of financial investment intermediaries. This article also inquires into whether, in light of the Financial Services Authority's (FSA) desire to move into higher level ‘principles-based’ regulation of financial investment intermediaries, there may be a set of unifying principles that could govern financial investment intermediaries' relationships with their clients.

This paper addresses, from a comparative perspective, the legal position of the lay employees of religious institutions such as schools and hospitals. The legal regimes governing ‘ethos’ in the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and Britain are compared. The tension which exists between the right of religious schools and hospitals to uphold their ethos in a secular society on the one hand, and the rights of their employees to privacy and personal autonomy on the other, is highlighted. It will be argued that legislative reform is required to remove uncertainty from the lives of lay employees of religious institutions who work conscientiously but fear dismissal or discrimination because an aspect of their lifestyle – usually their sexuality – is considered unorthodox by their employer. The need for a change in judicial attitudes and a lessening of deference towards the actions of religious denominations is also a theme throughout.

Richard Rorty died in June 2007. According to some he was the most interesting, perhaps even the most important, philosopher of his generation. His influence on legal theory, especially legal theory of the more critical and literary kind, was considerable. And yet, in comparison with his reputation in the philosophical and literary academy, for many legal academics Rorty remains a relatively hazy figure. The purpose of this paper is to provide an introduction to Rorty; to his broader philosophy of pragmatism, a philosophy as he termed it of ‘bricolage’ and ‘law cunning’, as well as to his writings which focused rather more closely on jurisprudential questions, most importantly those that addressed the nature of rights. It closes with some thoughts on Rorty's final, provocative, and timely, observations on the decline of American civil society. If lawyers and legal theorists have, in large part, neglected Rorty, it is unfortunate; for, in our present age of vaulting political pretence, rarely has the need for a strong measure of intellectual scepticism seemed to be more urgent.

Singapore's Westminster parliamentary system of government was adopted as a historical result of it being a British colony. In its post-independence constitutional development, the dominant People's Action Party political leadership had made a series of constitutional amendments to its original electoral system, introducing innovative schemes such as Group Representation Constituencies, Non-Constituency Members of Parliament, Nominated Members of Parliament and the Elected Presidency. These changes have resulted in an electoral system that is so different and divergent from the Westminster model that it should be regarded a unique regime of its own. This paper advances the view that the constitutional evolution of its electoral system is reflective of a political vision structured along elitist lines – underscored by a desire to restructure the voting behaviour of its citizens, and ensure predictability and the preservation of the status quo. It has been driven by paternalistic assumptions about what is beneficial for its citizens. This paper examines the subsequent implementation of the schemes, before reflecting on how it is a system that has the potential to affect adversely the development of political participation and political pluralism, and dilute democratic politics in Singapore.