The ICJ considered the Wall in terms of the structure of the Israeli occupation and the settlements, which is one of de facto annexation. By contrast, the Israeli HCJ uses proportionality to regulate within the occupation. This approach may be inherent in humanitarian law, but involves a misplaced transplantation of the proportionality doctrine and an imbalanced rights/security equation. Contrary to the HCJ's determination, which attributes the different conclusions of the two courts to the different factual backgrounds available to them, this article argues that they reflect the courts' variant attitudes towards the barrier and its place within the broader context of the occupation and its structure. The looming shadow of the ICJ affected the HCJ's decision. On critical questions of international law, however, a wall separates international law as articulated in The Hague and the decisions issued in Jerusalem, pointing to the need for a new articulation of existing theories on transnational legal processes.
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