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Cultural Universals and Cultural Differences in Meta-Norms about Peer Punishment

  • Kimmo Eriksson (a1) (a2), Pontus Strimling (a1) (a3), Per A. Andersson (a4), Mark Aveyard (a5), Markus Brauer (a6), Vladimir Gritskov (a7), Toko Kiyonari (a8), David M. Kuhlman (a9), Angela T. Maitner (a5), Zoi Manesi (a10), Catherine Molho (a10), Leonard S. Peperkoorn (a10), Muhammad Rizwan (a11), Adam W. Stivers (a12), Qirui Tian (a13), Paul A. M. Van Lange (a10), Irina Vartanova (a3) (a14), Junhui Wu (a15) and Toshio Yamagishi (a16)...
Abstract

Violators of cooperation norms may be informally punished by their peers. How such norm enforcement is judged by others can be regarded as a meta-norm (i.e., a second-order norm). We examined whether meta-norms about peer punishment vary across cultures by having students in eight countries judge animations in which an agent who over-harvested a common resource was punished either by a single peer or by the entire peer group. Whether the punishment was retributive or restorative varied between two studies, and findings were largely consistent across these two types of punishment. Across all countries, punishment was judged as more appropriate when implemented by the entire peer group than by an individual. Differences between countries were revealed in judgments of punishers vs. non-punishers. Specifically, appraisals of punishers were relatively negative in three Western countries and Japan, and more neutral in Pakistan, UAE, Russia, and China, consistent with the influence of individualism, power distance, and/or indulgence. Our studies constitute a first step in mapping how meta-norms vary around the globe, demonstrating both cultural universals and cultural differences.

摘要:

违背合作规范的人会受到同伴的非正式惩罚。他人如何看待这种规范的执行被看做元规范 (也被称作二级规范) 。我们让八个国家的学生看一个动画, 其中一个人因过度收获某种共同资源而被一个同伴或整个同伴群体所惩罚, 通过比较不同国家的人对于动画当中的人的判断来探讨同伴惩罚的元规范是否具有文化差异性。我们在两个研究中对于惩罚是报复性的还是校正性的进行了变化, 两种惩罚的发现大致是一致的。在所有八个国家中, 整个同伴群体实施的惩罚比一个同伴实施的惩罚被判断为更合适。不同国家的学生对于惩罚者和非惩罚者的判断出现了差异。具体而言, 在西方的三个国家和日本, 对于惩罚者的评价相对负面, 在巴基斯坦、阿拉伯联合酋长国、俄罗斯和中国, 对于惩罚者的评价更加中性, 这是与个体主义、权力距离和/或放纵的影响是一致的。我们的研究就衡量元规范在不同国家出现怎样的变化迈出了第一步, 表明了元规范既具有文化普遍性, 也具有文化差异性。

सहयोग सम्बन्धी कायदों का उल्लंघन करने वालों का उनके समकक्ष समूह सदस्यों द्वारा अनौपचारिक ताड़न हो सकता है. ऐसे कायदे के अमल की प्रक्रिया दूसरों की धरना को वृहद् कायदा (या द्वितीय अनुक्रम कायदा) कहा जा सकता है. हमने आठ देशों के छात्रों में समकक्ष समूह ताड़ना के वृहद् कायदों के संभावित अंतर पर एक एनीमेशन फिल्म पर दिए गए निर्णय के माध्यम से जाँच की, जिसमें सार्वजनिक संसाधन का प्रचुर दोहन करने वाले प्रतिनिधि को समकक्ष सदस्य या समूह प्रताड़ित करता है. ताड़ना के दंडात्मक व पुष्टिकारक स्वरूप में दोनों अध्ययनों में अंतर था और दोनों प्रकार की ताड़नाओं पर निष्कर्ष मूलतः अनुरूप थे. सारे देशों में व्यक्ति की अपेक्षा समूह द्वारा दी गयी ताड़ना को अधिक उपयुक्त करार दिया गया. देशों के बीच अंतर ताड़कों व गैर-ताड़कों के निर्णय में पाए गए. विशेषतः ताड़कों के प्रति निर्णय तीन पश्चिमी देशों व जापान में अपेक्षाकृत नकारात्मक थे और पाकिस्तान, संयुक्त अरब अमीरात, रूस व चीन में तटस्थ थे जो की व्यक्तिवाद, शक्तिपरक दूरी तथा तुष्टिकरण के आयामों से सुसंगत है. हमारे अध्ययन वृहद् कायदों के भूमंडलीय विभेद के प्रतिचित्रण की ओर प्रथम प्रयास है जिसमें सांस्कृतिक सार्वभौम और विभेद, दोनों ही दिखाए गए हैं.

SUMÁRIO:

Violadores de normas de cooperação podem ser punidos informalmente por seus pares. Como essa aplicação da norma é julgada por outros pode ser considerada como uma meta-norma (ou seja, uma norma de segunda ordem). Examinamos se as meta-normas sobre a punição de pares variam em todas as culturas fazendo com que estudantes em oito países julguem animações em que um agente que sobreutilizou um recurso comum foi punido por um único par ou por todo o grupo de pares. Se o castigo foi retributivo ou restaurador variou entre dois estudos, e os achados foram bastante consistentes em ambos os tipos de punição. Em todos os países, o castigo foi considerado mais apropriado quando implementado por todo o grupo de pares do que por um indivíduo. As diferenças entre os países foram expostas em julgamentos de punidores versus não punidores. Especificamente, as avaliações de punidores foram relativamente negativas em três países ocidentais e no Japão, e mais neutras no Paquistão, nos Emirados Árabes Unidos, na Rússia e na China, consistentes com a influência do individualismo, distância de poder e / ou indulgência. Nossos estudos constituem um primeiro passo no mapeamento de como as meta-normas variam ao redor do mundo, demonstrando tanto os universais culturais quanto as diferenças culturais.

АННОТАЦИЯ:

Те, кто нарушают правила сотрудничества, могут быть неофициально наказаны своими коллегами. То, как соблюдение таких норм оценивается остальными, можно рассматривать как мета-норму (т.е. норму второго порядка). Мы изучали, каким образом мета-нормы о наказании среди равных отличаются в разных культурах; для этого, мы попросили студентов из восьми стран оценить изображения, на которых показано, как человек, который злоупотреблял общими ресурсами, понес наказание от одного коллеги или целой группы коллег. Выводы были приблизительно одинаковыми для двух видов наказания, т.е. не зависели от карательного или реституционного характера наказания, которые варьировались в двух исследованиях. Во всех странах наказание считалось более приемлемым в том случае, если оно осуществлялось всей группой, а не отдельными лицами. Различия между странами были выявлены в оценках “карателей” относительно “не-карателей”. В частности, суждения о карателях были достаточно негативными в трех западных странах и Японии и более нейтральными в Пакистане, ОАЭ, России и Китае, в соответствии с влиянием категорий индивидуализма, дистанции от власти, и/или снисходительности. Наши исследования представляют собой первый шаг в определении того, как мета-нормы различаются по всему миру, демонстрируя как культурные универсалии, так и культурные различия.

RESUMEN:

Los infractores de las normas de cooperación pueden ser castigados informalmente por sus pares. La forma en que la norma se aplica es juzgada por otros puede ser considerada como una meta-norma (es decir, una norma de segundo orden). Examinamos si las meta-normas sobre el castigo de pares varían entre las culturas al hacer que estudiantes de ocho países juzgaron animaciones en las cuales un agente que sobreexplotaba un recurso común fue castigado ya sea por un solo par o por el grupo entero de pares. Si el castigo fue retributivo o restaurativo varió entre los dos estudios, y los hallazgos fueron ampliamente consistentes entre estos dos tipos de castigos. Entre todos los países, el castigo fue juzgado como más apropiado cuando fue implementado por el grupo entero en lugar que por un individuo. Las diferencias entre países fueron reveladas en juicios de los castigadores versus los castigados. Específicamente, las valoraciones de los castigadores fueron relativamente negativas en tres países Occidentales y en el Japón, y más neutral en Pakistán, los Emiratos Árabes Unidos, Rusia, y China, consistente con la influencia del individualismo, la distancia al poder, y/o la indulgencia. Nuestros estudios constituyen un primer paso en mapear como las meta-normas varían en todo el mundo, lo que demuestra universales culturales y diferencias culturales.

Copyright
Corresponding author
Corresponding author: Kimmo Eriksson (kimmo.eriksson@mdh.se)
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